This study creates four scenarios for the employment of carbon emission reduction policy tools, depending on whether the two emission reduction policies of carbon trading and carbon tax are engaged. During this process, evolutionary game theory is applied. The stability analysis of the game system has provided a thorough explanation of the influence mechanism and action mechanism of the combination of carbon emission reduction policies on enterprise carbon emission reduction. On this premise, we conduct sensitivity analysis to discover the primary sensitivity elements that influence the game system's path. In the empirical analysis section, we take the case of national carbon trading market construction as the empirical object, simulate the evolution trajectory of the main body of carbon trading and mixed carbon policy use scenario game, deeply analyze the influence degree of key factors on the system, and put forward the dynamic increasing tax rate and dynamic reward and punishment strategy, optimize the carbon emission reduction efficiency improvement strategy of mixed carb. The study found that: when compared to no carbon trading without carbon tax, carbon trading without carbon tax, and no carbon trading with carbon tax, the mixed carbon policy use scenario has the highest carbon emission reduction efficiency. Second, the current construction of China's carbon trading market need further strengthening. The government and businesses have not achieved the optimal state（supervision, carbon emission reduction）. The cost and penalty elements have a clear impact on the game system, however the direction of subsidy factors is unknown. Third, dynamic incentive and punishment schemes are combined with dynamic incremental tax rates in the mixed carbon policy scenario. The system spirals upward and reaches a stable equilibrium position（carbon emission reduction, supervision）, where the optimal reward and punishment scheme is dynamic subsidy-dynamic punishment.