In the context of port shore power deployment, studying the impact of different policies on port and shipping enterprises is crucial for improving shore power utilization and achieving established emission reduction goals. To explore the policy effects on these enterprises, a Stackelberg game model was constructed with the port as the leader and shipping companies as the follower, incorporating innovation subsidies into the framework. This model aims to address innovation challenges in shore power equipment and examines the combined impact of subsidies and carbon trading policies on port and shipping enterprises. The model is solved using backward induction and numerically simulated via Matlab. The results indicate that in the early stages of emission reduction, subsidy policies help enhance innovation levels, while after the maturation of shore power technology, the implementation of dual policies involving both subsidies and carbon trading is more effective in motivating the industry to develop emission reduction technologies. Therefore, it is recommended that the government take measures to expand market scale, strengthen societal low-carbon awareness, and increase innovation subsidies in the early phase to promote shore power utilization. After the technology matures, the subsidy ratio and carbon price can be adjusted to sustain the utilization of shore power.

shore power  /  carbon trading policy  /  subsidy policy  /  Stackelberg game model