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Evolutionary game analysis of dangerous goods transportation in civil aviation under dynamic penalty mechanism: case of airline and ground service agents
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Haibin SHEN, Ling HU, Na LI, Wenyi ZHANG, Runqi XIE
China Safety Science Journal | 2025, 35(5) : 23 - 31
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China Safety Science Journal | 2025, 35(5): 23-31
Safety social science and safety management
Evolutionary game analysis of dangerous goods transportation in civil aviation under dynamic penalty mechanism: case of airline and ground service agents
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Haibin SHEN, Ling HU, Na LI, Wenyi ZHANG, Runqi XIE
Affiliations
  • School of Safety Science and Engineering, Civil Aviation University of China, Tianjin 300300, China
Published: 2025-05-28 doi: 10.16265/j.cnki.issn1003-3033.2025.05.0301
Outline
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In addressing the issues of non-compliance by ground service agents and lax supervision by airlines in the transportation of hazardous materials in civil aviation. Firstly, evolutionary game models between airlines and ground service agents were constructed under both static and dynamic punishment mechanisms. The evolutionary stable strategies under different mechanisms were then explored. Subsequently, a quantitative analysis model was developed by integrating system dynamics to further analyze the interactions between the two parties. Finally, simulations were conducted to analyze the impact of key parameters on the behavioral strategies of both sides. The results reveal that under the static punishment mechanism, no stable equilibrium point is observed in the game system. No evolutionary stable strategy is formed, with the behavioral strategies of both parties showing periodic fluctuations over time. In contrast, when a dynamic punishment mechanism is introduced, a stable equilibrium point emerged in the game system. The behavioral strategies of both parties converge to a stable focal point. Moreover, compared with a low level of punishment, a higher level of punishment is found to be more effective in increasing the probability that ground service agents strictly comply with the agency agreement.

dynamic penalty mechanism  /  dangerous goods transportation  /  evolutionary game  /  airlines  /  ground service agents  /  system dynamics
Haibin SHEN, Ling HU, Na LI, Wenyi ZHANG, Runqi XIE. Evolutionary game analysis of dangerous goods transportation in civil aviation under dynamic penalty mechanism: case of airline and ground service agents[J]. China Safety Science Journal, 2025 , 35 (5) : 23 -31 . DOI: 10.16265/j.cnki.issn1003-3033.2025.05.0301
Year 2025 volume 35 Issue 5
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Article Info
doi: 10.16265/j.cnki.issn1003-3033.2025.05.0301
  • Receive Date:2025-01-12
  • Online Date:2026-07-08
  • Published:2025-05-28
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  • Received:2025-01-12
  • Revised:2025-03-20
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    School of Safety Science and Engineering, Civil Aviation University of China, Tianjin 300300, China
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表12种不同金属材料的力学参数

Family
属数
Number of
genus
种数
Number of
species
占总种数比例
Percentage of
total species (%)

Genus
种数
Number of
species
占总种数比例
Percentage of total
species (%)
鹅膏菌科Amanitaceae 2 11 5.26 鹅膏菌属 Amanita 10 4.78
小菇科 Mycenaceae 2 12 5.74 丝盖伞属 Inocybe 5 2.39
多孔菌科 Polyporaceae 8 14 6.70 蜡蘑属 Laccaria 5 2.39
红菇科 Russulaceae 3 23 11.00 小皮伞属 Marasmius 6 2.87
小菇属 Mycena 11 5.26
光柄菇属 Pluteus 5 2.39
红菇属 Russula 17 8.13
栓菌属 Trametes 5 2.39
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