In addressing the issues of non-compliance by ground service agents and lax supervision by airlines in the transportation of hazardous materials in civil aviation. Firstly, evolutionary game models between airlines and ground service agents were constructed under both static and dynamic punishment mechanisms. The evolutionary stable strategies under different mechanisms were then explored. Subsequently, a quantitative analysis model was developed by integrating system dynamics to further analyze the interactions between the two parties. Finally, simulations were conducted to analyze the impact of key parameters on the behavioral strategies of both sides. The results reveal that under the static punishment mechanism, no stable equilibrium point is observed in the game system. No evolutionary stable strategy is formed, with the behavioral strategies of both parties showing periodic fluctuations over time. In contrast, when a dynamic punishment mechanism is introduced, a stable equilibrium point emerged in the game system. The behavioral strategies of both parties converge to a stable focal point. Moreover, compared with a low level of punishment, a higher level of punishment is found to be more effective in increasing the probability that ground service agents strictly comply with the agency agreement.
| 科 Family | 属数 Number of genus | 种数 Number of species | 占总种数比例 Percentage of total species (%) | 属 Genus | 种数 Number of species | 占总种数比例 Percentage of total species (%) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 鹅膏菌科Amanitaceae | 2 | 11 | 5.26 | 鹅膏菌属 Amanita | 10 | 4.78 |
| 小菇科 Mycenaceae | 2 | 12 | 5.74 | 丝盖伞属 Inocybe | 5 | 2.39 |
| 多孔菌科 Polyporaceae | 8 | 14 | 6.70 | 蜡蘑属 Laccaria | 5 | 2.39 |
| 红菇科 Russulaceae | 3 | 23 | 11.00 | 小皮伞属 Marasmius | 6 | 2.87 |
| 小菇属 Mycena | 11 | 5.26 | ||||
| 光柄菇属 Pluteus | 5 | 2.39 | ||||
| 红菇属 Russula | 17 | 8.13 | ||||
| 栓菌属 Trametes | 5 | 2.39 |