To improve the current situation of frequent disasters and accidents in coal mines, the game behaviors among various stakeholders in the dynamic governance of intelligent coal mine safety risks were investigated. A tripartite evolutionary game model was constructed involving the government, coal mine enterprises, and miners, to analyze the evolutionary stability among the three parties. Additionally, evolutionary game scenario simulations were employed to mimic the actual context of intelligent coal mine safety risk governance. Through this, the influence processes of factors such as governmental regulatory intensity and benefit-sharing ratio on the strategies of the gaming participants were revealed. The results indicate that governments should appropriately apply reward and punishment mechanisms during the regulation of enterprise safety governance. This approach can enhance corporate attention to safety risk management, reduce regulatory costs, and promote synergistic benefits between government and enterprises. High governance costs tend to reduce corporate enthusiasm for compliance and may encourage opportunistic behavior; therefore, incentive mechanisms and cost-sharing strategies are necessary to alleviate the burden on enterprises. Encouraging miner participation and reducing their involvement costs contribute to faster identification of potential safety risks and help prevent accidents.