The rapid development of emerging technologies is fundamentally redrawing the ethical boundaries of human society, making the achievement of ethical consensus more challenging than ever. While China has prioritized technology ethics through top-level institutional frameworks-such as the Opinions on Strengthening the Governance of Science and Technology Ethics (2022) and the Measures for Ethical Review of Science and Technology (Trial) (2023)-these norms are primarily applicable to the "post-consensus" governance phase. They provide standardized procedures for known risks but often lack efficacy during the "controversy phase," where uncertainty is high and fundamental values clash. Historically, the 1975 Asilomar Conference on recombinant DNA (rDNA) is lauded as the gold standard for resolving such disputes. However, existing scholarship predominantly views it through the lens of the "expert warning" model, overlooking the intricate socio-technical process of building the consensus itself. This study evaluates three traditional consensus modes: the ethical approach of principalism, which often fails in morally pluralistic societies; the technical approach of risk assessment, which is often hamstrung by the Collingridge Dilemma; and the social approach of public participation, which can lead to "over-commitment" or governance chaos. The research identifies that the fundamental difficulties in forming consensus lie in managing technical uncertainty and determining which actors should lead the process.To address these challenges, this research utilizes Actor-Network Theory (ANT) to deconstruct the Asilomar process as a "translation" of interests. Under ANT, humans (scientists, lawyers, and policy-makers) and non-humans (viruses, plasmids, and legal codes) are treated as interconnected "actors" within a heterogeneous network. The formation of consensus began with the transition from individual anxiety to a collective "risk community". Early pioneers like Paul Berg and Robert Pollack identified significant hazards in using the SV40 virus-a known oncogenic agent-within E. coli systems. These technical concerns were not resolved in isolation but were translated into a broader scientific dialogue through the 1973 Asilomar I and Gordon Conferences. A pivotal moment occurred with the publication of the 1974 "moratorium" letter in Science, which called for a temporary halt on specific experiments. This act served as a "problematization" strategy, establishing a "mandatory passage point" for the scientific community. By going public, scientists transformed a localized laboratory concern into a global socio-technical challenge, forcing stakeholders to recognize that the very survival of scientific autonomy depended on addressing public fears regarding biosafety and ethical responsibility.The heart of the consensus process occurred during the 1975 Asilomar II Conference, where technical negotiations initially reached a stalemate. Specialized sub-groups tasked with categorizing risks-focusing on animal viruses, plasmids, and eukaryotes-found that scientific knowledge was insufficient to provide definitive evidence of safety or danger. Scientists were caught in a binary trap: they feared that any admission of risk would lead to permanent government bans, yet they also realized that a failure to self-regulate would invite even harsher external control. The "translation" was ultimately completed when legal experts introduced the "non-human" actor of existing institutional frameworks into the network. Law professor Roger Dworkin clarified that scientists would be held personally and institutionally liable for any laboratory-born harm under existing tort and occupational safety laws. This realization fundamentally altered the interests of the core actors. Scientists understood that "pure autonomy" was no longer a viable option and that a pragmatic, tiered risk-classification system-ranging from minimal to high risk-was the only way to safeguard the future of their research. This flexible consensus allowed for a middle path: prohibiting the most dangerous experiments while providing clear, conditional guidelines for others.The study concludes that the Asilomar consensus was not a static event but a dynamic process that was subsequently institutionalized via the NIH Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules (1976). This institutionalization ensured that the consensus remained flexible, with the NIH acting as a "boundary organization" to mediate between science, government, and the public. A key takeaway for contemporary technology governance is the necessity of "expert-led multi-stakeholder participation". This model relies on what Harry Collins describes as "Owl Scientists"-those who possess both the technical proficiency to understand the science and the reflexive capacity to grasp its social and ethical implications. The Asilomar experience demonstrates that institutional constraints are not impediments but necessary conditions for consensus, as they provide the "bottom line" that forces actors toward compromise. Furthermore, the final consensus must remain flexible and dynamic, utilizing categorized management to address scientific uncertainty and allowing for periodic revisions as new knowledge emerges. For China's emerging technology landscape, the lesson is clear: ethical governance must move beyond the mere declaration of abstract principles to the creation of flexible, tiered, and dynamic consensus-building mechanisms that can navigate the profound uncertainties of the controversy phase.