The dual integration policy has promoted the transformation of the new energy vehicle market layout, and for automobile enterprises, collaborative innovation was conducive to enhance international core competitiveness of innovation ability. In this context, a tripartite game matrix of new energy vehicle enterprises, traditional vehicle enterprises and the government was built, and the influence of relevant parameters on that tripartite game was studied through MATLAB numerical simulation. There are three conclusions auto companies always choose collaborative innovation, but their willingness towards collaborative innovation is affected by the average income of new energy vehicles, the total number of orders in the new energy vehicle market, and the grabbing of market share. In the context of the dual points policy, the government has shifted from the direct leader to the indirect supervisor, and the strategy choice of auto enterprises is nearly not affected by the government incentives. The government's willingness to participate in collaborative innovation becomes stronger with the growth of the average income of new energy vehicles, the NEV points income of auto enterprises, the total number of market orders and the corporate income tax rate, while it becomes weaker with the growth of incentive costs and supervision costs. The research will contribute to the precise implementation of high-quality and sustainable development of China's new energy vehicle industry under the dual integration policy.