born in 1999. Master candidate. Student member of CCF. His main research interests include computer system security and information security
born in 1990. PhD, associate professor. Member of CCF. His main research interests include computer system security, blockchain application security, and network traffic identification
born in 1978. PhD, professor. Member of CCF. His main research interests include applied cryptography, network security, and system security.(linjq@ustc.edu.cn)
born in 1996. PhD candidate. Student member of CCF. His main research interests include system security and applied cryptography.(menglingjia@iie.ac.cn)
born in 1990. PhD, associate professor. Member of CCF. His main research interests include cryptographic application security and network security.(libingyu@buaa.edu.cn)
born in 1986. PhD, associate professor. Member of CCF. Her main research interests include cyberspace security and information security.(limiao_smile@nxu.edu.cn)
born in 1995. Master candidate. Student member of CCF. Her main research interests include system security and information security.(gaofei@stu.nxu.edu.cn)
Transient execution attacks (TEAs) exploit processor optimizations to bypass security checks and exfiltrate sensitive information through covert channels. Among them, Meltdown and Spectre attacks have become prominent, affecting mainstream commercial processors such as Intel, ARM, and AMD. Despite the defensive measures implemented by processor manufacturers, variants of these attacks continue to be discovered and disclosed by researchers. To improve the understanding of TEAs and deploy robust defenses, this paper comprehensively analyzes TEAs under various covert channels. Initially, the common characteristics of TEAs are extracted, and a novel model for TEAs is systematically constructed. Subsequently, we summarize the various types of covert channels involved in existing research, classify the TEAs into three types: Meltdown type attacks driven by out-of-order execution (OoOE), Spectre type attacks driven by branch misprediction, and microarchitecture data sampling (MDS) type attacks driven by data misprediction, and delineate the key aspects and relationships of each type of attack. Notably, this paper systematically compiles and categorizes MDS type attacks for the first time. Then, the capabilities of each attack variant are meticulously analyzed and evaluated from three dimensions: covert channel, attack applicable scenarios, and microarchitecture immunity status, which aids security researchers in developing new and more destructive attack types based on the deficiencies of the existing attack-related research. Finally, combined with the above-mentioned comprehensive and in-depth analysis, and the summary of processor microarchitecture and covert channels, this paper anticipates the future trajectory of TEAs research, hoping to provide strong support for subsequent research work.
| 科 Family | 属数 Number of genus | 种数 Number of species | 占总种数比例 Percentage of total species (%) | 属 Genus | 种数 Number of species | 占总种数比例 Percentage of total species (%) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 鹅膏菌科Amanitaceae | 2 | 11 | 5.26 | 鹅膏菌属 Amanita | 10 | 4.78 |
| 小菇科 Mycenaceae | 2 | 12 | 5.74 | 丝盖伞属 Inocybe | 5 | 2.39 |
| 多孔菌科 Polyporaceae | 8 | 14 | 6.70 | 蜡蘑属 Laccaria | 5 | 2.39 |
| 红菇科 Russulaceae | 3 | 23 | 11.00 | 小皮伞属 Marasmius | 6 | 2.87 |
| 小菇属 Mycena | 11 | 5.26 | ||||
| 光柄菇属 Pluteus | 5 | 2.39 | ||||
| 红菇属 Russula | 17 | 8.13 | ||||
| 栓菌属 Trametes | 5 | 2.39 |