Article(id=1329457896326279228, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, issueId=1329457773609332873, articleNumber=null, orderNo=null, doi=10.7544/issn1000-1239.202440453, pmid=null, cstr=null, oa=null, hot=null, price=null, onlineType=0, articleFormat=0, articleType=null, articleTypeStr=null, receivedDate=1717516800000, receivedDateStr=2024-06-05, revisedDate=1721145600000, revisedDateStr=2024-07-17, acceptedDate=null, acceptedDateStr=null, onlineDate=1794897062617, onlineDateStr=2026-11-17, pubDate=1727712000000, pubDateStr=2024-10-01, doiRegisterDate=null, doiRegisterDateStr=null, onlineIssueDate=1794897062617, onlineIssueDateStr=2026-11-17, onlineJustAcceptDate=null, onlineJustAcceptDateStr=null, onlineFirstDate=null, onlineFirstDateStr=null, sourceXml=null, magXml=null, createTime=1794897062617, creator=13701087609, updateTime=1794897062617, updator=13701087609, issue=Issue{id=1329457773609332873, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, year='2024', volume='61', issue='10', pageStart='2401', pageEnd='2661', issueExtLink='null', onlineDate='null', pubDate='1727712000000', pubDateStr='2024-10-01', beforeIssueId=null, nextIssueId=null, price=null, status=1, issueComplete=1, articleOrder=1, issueType=-1, specialIssue=null, createTime=1794897033359, creator='13701087609', updateTime=1794897033359, updator='13701087609', preIssue=null, nextIssue=null, articleTotal=null, ext=null, issueFiles=null, downloadFileDto=null}, startPage=2448, endPage=2466, ext={EN=ArticleExt(id=1329457896607297597, articleId=1329457896326279228, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, language=EN, title=Lightweight Multi-User Verifiable Privacy-Preserving Gene Sequence Analysis Scheme, columnId=1329457774406250635, journalTitle=Journal of Computer Research and Development, columnName=Secure Circulation of Data Elements, runingTitle=null, highlight=null, articleAbstract=

As the development of the emerging areas of network services such as big data and cloud computing, data element has played an increasingly critical role in the fields of intelligent e-health and scientific research. Gene sequencing technology is widely used in many fields to determine the cause and category of a patient’s disease, by processing the patient’s gene sequence. Due to constrained storage and computing resources, local users often need to rent resource-abundant cloud servers, unfortunately always working in untrusted environments, to fulfill the computationally-intensive task of large-scale gene sequencing function evaluation. To guarantee users’ data privacy and the correctness of computing results, most of the state-of-the-art methods exploit the techniques of public key fully homomorphic encryption and secure multiparty computation to achieve data privacy, and the technique of Yao’s garbled circuit or bilinear paring to achieve correctness verification. Owing to the fact that huge computational overhead and communication overhead are required in the cryptographic primitives mentioned above, they are inappropriate for efficiency needs of the resource-constrained local users in gene sequence analysis. To address this challenging issue, in this paper, a lightweight verifiable privacy-preserving gene sequence analysis scheme in the multi-user setting is proposed. Firstly, we design an efficient verifiable multi-key homomorphic data encapsulation mechanism VMK-HDEM. The proposed VMK-HDEM enables batch outsourced function evaluation on L different input instances over the encrypted domain. The usage time complexity of public key encryption on each user $ {S en}_{i} $’s end is O(L), independent of the dataset size $ {n}_{i} $, which significantly decreases the computational cost of local users. For verification, the size of the proof is $ O({deg}_{F}) $ where $ {deg}_{F} $ denotes the degree of the function, independent to the size of user’s dataset $ {n}_{i} $. Furthermore, based on our constructed cryptographic primitive VMK-HDEM, a lightweight and efficient verifiable privacy-preserving gene sequence analysis scheme LWPPGS is proposed. It not only can preserve the privacy of both users’ gene datasets and the results of gene sequence analysis, but also efficiently verify the correctness of the outcome. Finally, formal security proof and experimental simulation results show the security and practicability of our proposed VMK-HDEM and LWPPGS.

, authors=Yunshu Hu, Jun Zhou*, Zhenfu Cao, Xiaolei Dong, authorsList=Yunshu Hu, Jun Zhou, Zhenfu Cao, Xiaolei Dong, authorCompany=null, correspAuthors=Jun Zhou, authorNote=

born in 2004. Undergraduate. Her main research interests include fully homomorphic encryption, secure multiparty computation, and verifiable computation

born in 1982. PhD, professor, PhD supervisor. Member of CCF, IEEE, ACM and IACR. His main research interests include public key cryptography, cloud computing security, and privacy-preserving machine learning

born in 1962. PhD, professor, PhD supervisor. Senior member of CCF. His main research interests include public key encryption, digital signature, private computation, and post-quantum cryptography

born in 1971. PhD, professor, PhD supervisor. Her main research interests include number theory, cryptography, and network security

, correspAuthorsNote=null, copyrightStatement=Copyright © 2024 Journal of Computer Research and Development. All rights reserved., copyrightOwner=null, extLink=null, articleAbsUrl=null, sourceXml=null, magXml=null, pdfUrl=null, pdf=null, pdfFileSize=null, pdfExtLink=null, richHtmlUrl=null, mobilePdfUrl=null, reviewReport=null, pdfFirstPage=null, abstractGraph=null, abstractGraphContent=null, abstractVideo=null, citation=null, cebUrl=null, magXmlContent=null, mapNumber=null, fund=null), CN=ArticleExt(id=1329457902638706787, articleId=1329457896326279228, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, language=CN, title=轻量级多用户可验证隐私保护基因序列分析方案, columnId=1329457774548856973, journalTitle=计算机研究与发展, columnName=数据要素安全流通, runingTitle=null, highlight=null, articleAbstract=

随着云计算、大数据等新兴网络服务的蓬勃发展,数据要素在智慧医疗、科学研究等领域中占据重要地位. 基因组测序技术通过对病人基因组序列进行处理来判断病人的患病原因和类别,在多个领域有广泛应用. 由于存储、计算资源受限,本地用户通常需要租用资源丰富但工作在不可信环境下的云服务器来完成复杂的大规模基因组测序处理函数计算任务. 为了保护用户数据隐私及验证计算结果的正确性,国内外现有工作通常的做法是利用公钥全同态加密或安全多方计算技术实现数据隐私保护;利用Yao混淆电路或双线性配对技术实现计算结果的正确性验证. 由于密码原语的计算开销和通信开销巨大,均不适用于基因序列分析系统中存储、计算资源受限的本地用户的客观性能需求. 为了解决上述挑战性问题,提出了一个轻量级多用户可验证隐私保护基因序列分析方案. 首先,构造了一种高效的可验证多密钥同态数据封装机制VMK-HDEM,该方案支持在密文域上对L个不同输入实例的打包计算,用户端$ {S en}_{i} $公钥加密的使用次数复杂度为O(L),即与其数据集的大小$ {n}_{i} $无关,大大降低了资源受限的本地用户的计算开销;在可验证性方面,云服务器生成的密文计算结果正确性验证证据大小复杂度为$ O({deg}_{F}) $(其中$ {deg}_{F} $代表外包计算函数的阶),与用户数据集大小$ {n}_{i} $无关. 然后,基于所构造的新型密码原语VMK-HDEM,设计了一个轻量级高效的可验证隐私保护基因序列分析方案LWPPGS,有效保护了用户基因数据集的隐私和基因序列分析结果的隐私,并高效验证其分析结果的正确性. 最后,通过形式化的安全性证明和实验仿真结果表明了所构造方案VMK-HDEM和LWPPGS的安全性和实用性.

, authors=胡云舒, 周俊*, 曹珍富, 董晓蕾, authorsList=胡云舒, 周俊, 曹珍富, 董晓蕾, authorCompany=null, correspAuthors=周俊, authorNote=

2004年生. 本科生. 主要研究方向为全同态加密、安全多方计算、可验证计算

1982年生. 博士,教授,博士生导师. CCF、IEEE、ACM和IACR会员. 主要研究方向为公钥密码学、云计算安全、机器学习隐私保护

1962年生. 博士,教授,博士生导师. CCF高级会员. 主要研究方向为公钥加密、数字签名、隐私计算、后量子密码

1971年生. 博士,教授,博士生导师. 主要研究方向为数论、密码学、网络安全

, correspAuthorsNote=
周俊()
, copyrightStatement=版权所有 © 2024 计算机研究与发展编辑部, copyrightOwner=null, extLink=null, articleAbsUrl=null, sourceXml=eSf2gYZpGX39JdWJOGYylA==, magXml=36pvwIhhEdE0500bktl5eA==, pdfUrl=null, pdf=ACYBRf3eeGxrxA8h6wlknA==, pdfFileSize=2578465, pdfExtLink=null, richHtmlUrl=null, mobilePdfUrl=null, reviewReport=null, pdfFirstPage=null, abstractGraph=fh0x9QWVLCfJoJuZIBygVA==, abstractGraphContent=null, abstractVideo=null, citation=null, cebUrl=null, magXmlContent=W34FzNjwS6n1JBqkUpv0MQ==, mapNumber=null, fund=null)}, authors=[Author(id=1329457904756830315, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, orderNo=0, firstName=null, middleName=null, lastName=null, nameCn=null, orcid=null, stid=null, country=null, authorPic=null, dead=0, email=hysss1136@gmail.com, emailSecond=null, emailThird=null, correspondingAuthor=0, authorType=1, ext={EN=AuthorExt(id=1329457904924602477, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, authorId=1329457904756830315, language=EN, stringName=Yunshu Hu, firstName=Yunshu, middleName=null, lastName=Hu, prefix=null, suffix=null, authorComment=null, nameInitials=null, affiliation=null, department=null, xref=null, address=Department of Cryptography and Network Security, Soft Engineering Institute, East China Normal University, Shanghai 200062, bio={"content":"

born in 2004. Undergraduate. Her main research interests include fully homomorphic encryption, secure multiparty computation, and verifiable computation

"}, bioImg=null, bioContent=

born in 2004. Undergraduate. Her main research interests include fully homomorphic encryption, secure multiparty computation, and verifiable computation

, aboutCorrespAuthor=null), CN=AuthorExt(id=1329457905008488558, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, authorId=1329457904756830315, language=CN, stringName=胡云舒, firstName=null, middleName=null, lastName=null, prefix=null, suffix=null, authorComment=null, nameInitials=null, affiliation=null, department=null, xref=null, address=华东师范大学软件工程学院 密码与网络安全系 上海 200062, bio={"img":"PwFIjfZOiEZTL3f2PWRNmQ==","content":"

2004年生. 本科生. 主要研究方向为全同态加密、安全多方计算、可验证计算

"}, bioImg=PwFIjfZOiEZTL3f2PWRNmQ==, bioContent=

2004年生. 本科生. 主要研究方向为全同态加密、安全多方计算、可验证计算

, aboutCorrespAuthor=null)}, companyList=[AuthorCompany(id=1329457904559698023, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, xref=null, ext=[AuthorCompanyExt(id=1329457904572280936, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, companyId=1329457904559698023, language=EN, country=null, province=null, city=null, postcode=null, companyName=null, departmentName=null, remark=Department of Cryptography and Network Security, Soft Engineering Institute, East China Normal University, Shanghai 200062), AuthorCompanyExt(id=1329457904643584105, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, companyId=1329457904559698023, language=CN, country=null, province=null, city=null, postcode=null, companyName=null, departmentName=null, remark=华东师范大学软件工程学院 密码与网络安全系 上海 200062)])]), Author(id=1329457905071403121, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, orderNo=1, firstName=null, middleName=null, lastName=null, nameCn=null, orcid=null, stid=null, country=null, authorPic=null, dead=0, email=jzhou@sei.ecnu.edu.cn, emailSecond=null, emailThird=null, correspondingAuthor=1, authorType=1, ext={EN=AuthorExt(id=1329457905155289203, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, authorId=1329457905071403121, language=EN, stringName=Jun Zhou, firstName=Jun, middleName=null, lastName=Zhou, prefix=null, suffix=null, authorComment=null, nameInitials=null, affiliation=null, department=null, xref=*, address=Department of Cryptography and Network Security, Soft Engineering Institute, East China Normal University, Shanghai 200062, bio={"content":"

born in 1982. PhD, professor, PhD supervisor. Member of CCF, IEEE, ACM and IACR. His main research interests include public key cryptography, cloud computing security, and privacy-preserving machine learning

"}, bioImg=null, bioContent=

born in 1982. PhD, professor, PhD supervisor. Member of CCF, IEEE, ACM and IACR. His main research interests include public key cryptography, cloud computing security, and privacy-preserving machine learning

, aboutCorrespAuthor=null), CN=AuthorExt(id=1329457905251758196, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, authorId=1329457905071403121, language=CN, stringName=周俊, firstName=null, middleName=null, lastName=null, prefix=null, suffix=null, authorComment=null, nameInitials=null, affiliation=null, department=null, xref=*, address=华东师范大学软件工程学院 密码与网络安全系 上海 200062, bio={"img":"+Mx//lc3u7wh16hUmuDbYg==","content":"

1982年生. 博士,教授,博士生导师. CCF、IEEE、ACM和IACR会员. 主要研究方向为公钥密码学、云计算安全、机器学习隐私保护

"}, bioImg=+Mx//lc3u7wh16hUmuDbYg==, bioContent=

1982年生. 博士,教授,博士生导师. CCF、IEEE、ACM和IACR会员. 主要研究方向为公钥密码学、云计算安全、机器学习隐私保护

, aboutCorrespAuthor=null)}, companyList=[AuthorCompany(id=1329457904559698023, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, xref=null, ext=[AuthorCompanyExt(id=1329457904572280936, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, companyId=1329457904559698023, language=EN, country=null, province=null, city=null, postcode=null, companyName=null, departmentName=null, remark=Department of Cryptography and Network Security, Soft Engineering Institute, East China Normal University, Shanghai 200062), AuthorCompanyExt(id=1329457904643584105, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, companyId=1329457904559698023, language=CN, country=null, province=null, city=null, postcode=null, companyName=null, departmentName=null, remark=华东师范大学软件工程学院 密码与网络安全系 上海 200062)])]), Author(id=1329457905323061366, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, orderNo=2, firstName=null, middleName=null, lastName=null, nameCn=null, orcid=null, stid=null, country=null, authorPic=null, dead=0, email=null, emailSecond=null, emailThird=null, correspondingAuthor=0, authorType=1, ext={EN=AuthorExt(id=1329457905398558840, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, authorId=1329457905323061366, language=EN, stringName=Zhenfu Cao, firstName=Zhenfu, middleName=null, lastName=Cao, prefix=null, suffix=null, authorComment=null, nameInitials=null, affiliation=null, department=null, xref=null, address=Department of Cryptography and Network Security, Soft Engineering Institute, East China Normal University, Shanghai 200062, bio={"content":"

born in 1962. PhD, professor, PhD supervisor. Senior member of CCF. His main research interests include public key encryption, digital signature, private computation, and post-quantum cryptography

"}, bioImg=null, bioContent=

born in 1962. PhD, professor, PhD supervisor. Senior member of CCF. His main research interests include public key encryption, digital signature, private computation, and post-quantum cryptography

, aboutCorrespAuthor=null), CN=AuthorExt(id=1329457905465667705, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, authorId=1329457905323061366, language=CN, stringName=曹珍富, firstName=null, middleName=null, lastName=null, prefix=null, suffix=null, authorComment=null, nameInitials=null, affiliation=null, department=null, xref=null, address=华东师范大学软件工程学院 密码与网络安全系 上海 200062, bio={"img":"SQk5/Hy6uxvWhR7+VDx5bQ==","content":"

1962年生. 博士,教授,博士生导师. CCF高级会员. 主要研究方向为公钥加密、数字签名、隐私计算、后量子密码

"}, bioImg=SQk5/Hy6uxvWhR7+VDx5bQ==, bioContent=

1962年生. 博士,教授,博士生导师. CCF高级会员. 主要研究方向为公钥加密、数字签名、隐私计算、后量子密码

, aboutCorrespAuthor=null)}, companyList=[AuthorCompany(id=1329457904559698023, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, xref=null, ext=[AuthorCompanyExt(id=1329457904572280936, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, companyId=1329457904559698023, language=EN, country=null, province=null, city=null, postcode=null, companyName=null, departmentName=null, remark=Department of Cryptography and Network Security, Soft Engineering Institute, East China Normal University, Shanghai 200062), AuthorCompanyExt(id=1329457904643584105, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, companyId=1329457904559698023, language=CN, country=null, province=null, city=null, postcode=null, companyName=null, departmentName=null, remark=华东师范大学软件工程学院 密码与网络安全系 上海 200062)])]), Author(id=1329457905541165179, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, orderNo=3, firstName=null, middleName=null, lastName=null, nameCn=null, orcid=null, stid=null, country=null, authorPic=null, dead=0, email=null, emailSecond=null, emailThird=null, correspondingAuthor=0, authorType=1, ext={EN=AuthorExt(id=1329457905612468349, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, authorId=1329457905541165179, language=EN, stringName=Xiaolei Dong, firstName=Xiaolei, middleName=null, lastName=Dong, prefix=null, suffix=null, authorComment=null, nameInitials=null, affiliation=null, department=null, xref=null, address=Department of Cryptography and Network Security, Soft Engineering Institute, East China Normal University, Shanghai 200062, bio={"content":"

born in 1971. PhD, professor, PhD supervisor. Her main research interests include number theory, cryptography, and network security

"}, bioImg=null, bioContent=

born in 1971. PhD, professor, PhD supervisor. Her main research interests include number theory, cryptography, and network security

, aboutCorrespAuthor=null), CN=AuthorExt(id=1329457905671188607, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, authorId=1329457905541165179, language=CN, stringName=董晓蕾, firstName=null, middleName=null, lastName=null, prefix=null, suffix=null, authorComment=null, nameInitials=null, affiliation=null, department=null, xref=null, address=华东师范大学软件工程学院 密码与网络安全系 上海 200062, bio={"img":"uPuTm+NvfXg5YRg17FxU4A==","content":"

1971年生. 博士,教授,博士生导师. 主要研究方向为数论、密码学、网络安全

"}, bioImg=uPuTm+NvfXg5YRg17FxU4A==, bioContent=

1971年生. 博士,教授,博士生导师. 主要研究方向为数论、密码学、网络安全

, aboutCorrespAuthor=null)}, companyList=[AuthorCompany(id=1329457904559698023, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, xref=null, ext=[AuthorCompanyExt(id=1329457904572280936, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, companyId=1329457904559698023, language=EN, country=null, province=null, city=null, postcode=null, companyName=null, departmentName=null, remark=Department of Cryptography and Network Security, Soft Engineering Institute, East China Normal University, Shanghai 200062), AuthorCompanyExt(id=1329457904643584105, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, companyId=1329457904559698023, language=CN, country=null, province=null, city=null, postcode=null, companyName=null, departmentName=null, remark=华东师范大学软件工程学院 密码与网络安全系 上海 200062)])])], keywords=[Keyword(id=1329457905767657600, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, language=EN, orderNo=1, keyword=multi-key fully homomorphic data encapsulation mechanism), Keyword(id=1329457905830572161, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, language=EN, orderNo=2, keyword=verifiability), Keyword(id=1329457905897681026, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, language=EN, orderNo=3, keyword=gene sequence analysis), Keyword(id=1329457905973178500, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, language=EN, orderNo=4, keyword=privacy-preserving), Keyword(id=1329457906052870277, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, language=EN, orderNo=5, keyword=efficiency), Keyword(id=1329457906107396230, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, language=CN, orderNo=1, keyword=多密钥全同态数据封装机制), Keyword(id=1329457906174505096, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, language=CN, orderNo=2, keyword=可验证), Keyword(id=1329457906254196873, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, language=CN, orderNo=3, keyword=基因序列分析), Keyword(id=1329457906312917130, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, language=CN, orderNo=4, keyword=隐私保护), Keyword(id=1329457906392608907, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, language=CN, orderNo=5, keyword=高效性)], refs=[Reference(id=1329457913321599159, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, doi=null, pmid=null, pmcid=null, year=null, volume=null, issue=null, pageStart=null, pageEnd=null, url=null, language=null, rfNumber=1, rfOrder=0, authorNames=null, journalName=null, refType=null, unstructuredReference=Kantarcioglu M, Jiang W, Liu Y, et al. A cryptographic approach to securely share and uery genomic sequences[C]//Proc of the 2008 IEEE Transactions Information Technol. Piscataway, NJ: IEEE, 2008: 606–617, articleTitle=null, refAbstract=null), Reference(id=1329457913384513720, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, doi=null, pmid=null, pmcid=null, year=null, volume=null, issue=null, pageStart=null, pageEnd=null, url=null, language=null, rfNumber=2, rfOrder=1, authorNames=null, journalName=null, refType=null, unstructuredReference=López-Alt A, Tromer E, Vaikuntanathan V. On-the-fly multiparty computation on the cloud via multikey fully homomorphic encryption[C]//Proc of the 44th annual ACM Symp on Theory of Computing. New York: ACM, 2012: 1219–1234, articleTitle=null, refAbstract=null), Reference(id=1329457913531314361, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, doi=null, pmid=null, pmcid=null, year=null, volume=null, issue=null, pageStart=null, pageEnd=null, url=null, language=null, rfNumber=3, rfOrder=2, authorNames=null, journalName=null, refType=null, unstructuredReference=Brakerski Z, Vaikuntanathan V. Fully homomorphic encryption from ring-LWE and security for key dependent messages[C]//Advances in Cryptology—CRYPTO 2011(Lecture Notes in Computer Science). Berlin: Springer, 2011: 505–524, articleTitle=null, refAbstract=null), Reference(id=1329457913598423226, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, doi=null, pmid=null, pmcid=null, year=null, volume=null, issue=null, pageStart=null, pageEnd=null, url=null, language=null, rfNumber=4, rfOrder=3, authorNames=null, journalName=null, refType=null, unstructuredReference=Chen H, Dai W, Kim M, et al. Efficient multi-key homomorphic encryption with packed ciphertexts with application to oblivious neural network inference[C]//Proc of the 2019 ACM SIGSAC Conf on Computer and Communications Security. New York: ACM, 2019: 395–412, articleTitle=null, refAbstract=null), Reference(id=1329457913669726395, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, doi=null, pmid=null, pmcid=null, year=null, volume=null, issue=null, pageStart=null, pageEnd=null, url=null, language=null, rfNumber=5, rfOrder=4, authorNames=null, journalName=null, refType=null, unstructuredReference=Cheno J H, Kim A, Kim M, et al. Homomorphic encryption for arithmetic of approximate numbers[C]//Advances in Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2017. Cham: Springer, 2017: 409–437, articleTitle=null, refAbstract=null), Reference(id=1329457913749418172, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, doi=null, pmid=null, pmcid=null, year=null, volume=null, issue=null, pageStart=null, pageEnd=null, url=null, language=null, rfNumber=6, rfOrder=5, authorNames=null, journalName=null, refType=null, unstructuredReference=Coron J S, Lepoint J, Tibouchi M. ScaleInvariant fully homomorphic encryption over the integers[C]//Advances in Cryptology-EUROCRYPT 2010. Berlin: Springer, 2014: 311–328, articleTitle=null, refAbstract=null), Reference(id=1329457913820721341, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, doi=null, pmid=null, pmcid=null, year=null, volume=null, issue=null, pageStart=null, pageEnd=null, url=null, language=null, rfNumber=7, rfOrder=6, authorNames=null, journalName=null, refType=null, unstructuredReference=Cheon J H, Kim J, Lee M S, et al, CRT-based fully homomorphic encryption over the integers[J]. Information Sciences, 2015, 310: 149−162, articleTitle=null, refAbstract=null), Reference(id=1329457913992687807, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, doi=null, pmid=null, pmcid=null, year=null, volume=null, issue=null, pageStart=null, pageEnd=null, url=null, language=null, rfNumber=8, rfOrder=7, authorNames=null, journalName=null, refType=null, unstructuredReference=Micciancio D, Vaikuntanathan V. SoK: Learning with errors, circular security, and fully homomorphic encryption[C]//Proc of Public-Key Cryptography – PKC 2024. Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland, 2024: 291−321, articleTitle=null, refAbstract=null), Reference(id=1329457914147877056, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, doi=null, pmid=null, pmcid=null, year=null, volume=null, issue=null, pageStart=null, pageEnd=null, url=null, language=null, rfNumber=9, rfOrder=8, authorNames=null, journalName=null, refType=null, unstructuredReference=Zhou Jun, Kim-Kwang R C, Cao Zhenfu, et al. PVOPM: Verifiable privacy-preserving pattern matching with efficient outsourcing in the malicious setting[C]//Proc of the 2021 IEEE Transactions Dependable Secure Computing. Piscataway, NJ: IEEE, 2021: 2253−2270, articleTitle=null, refAbstract=null), Reference(id=1329457914244346049, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, doi=null, pmid=null, pmcid=null, year=null, volume=null, issue=null, pageStart=null, pageEnd=null, url=null, language=null, rfNumber=10, rfOrder=9, authorNames=null, journalName=null, refType=null, unstructuredReference=曹珍富,董晓蕾,周俊,等. 大数据安全与隐私保护研究进展[J]. 计算机研究与发展,2016,53(10):2137−2151, articleTitle=null, refAbstract=null), Reference(id=1329457914324037827, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, doi=null, pmid=null, pmcid=null, year=null, volume=null, issue=null, pageStart=null, pageEnd=null, url=null, language=null, rfNumber=10, rfOrder=10, authorNames=null, journalName=null, refType=null, unstructuredReference=Cao Zhenfu, Dong Xiaolei, Zhou Jun, et al. Research advances on big data security and privacy preserving[J]. Journal of Computer Research and Development, 2016, 53(10): 2137−2151 (in Chinese), articleTitle=null, refAbstract=null), Reference(id=1329457914403729605, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, doi=null, pmid=null, pmcid=null, year=null, volume=null, issue=null, pageStart=null, pageEnd=null, url=null, language=null, rfNumber=11, rfOrder=11, authorNames=null, journalName=null, refType=null, unstructuredReference=Chen Jing, Chen Zhiping, Kuang Linai, et al. Security count query and integrity verification based on encrypted genomic data[C]//Proc of the 9th Int Conf on Computer Engineering and Networks. Berlin: Springer, 2021: 647−654, articleTitle=null, refAbstract=null), Reference(id=1329457914479227078, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, doi=null, pmid=null, pmcid=null, year=null, volume=null, issue=null, pageStart=null, pageEnd=null, url=null, language=null, rfNumber=12, rfOrder=12, authorNames=null, journalName=null, refType=null, unstructuredReference=Hasan M Z, Mahdi M S R, Sadat M N, et al. Secure count query on encrypted genomic data[J]. Journal of Biomedical Informatics, 2018, 81: 41−52, articleTitle=null, refAbstract=null), Reference(id=1329457914546335943, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, doi=null, pmid=null, pmcid=null, year=null, volume=null, issue=null, pageStart=null, pageEnd=null, url=null, language=null, rfNumber=13, rfOrder=13, authorNames=null, journalName=null, refType=null, unstructuredReference=Choi S G, Katz J, Kumaresan R, et al. Multi-client non-interactive verifiable computation[C]//Proc of Theory of Cryptography. Berlin: Springer, 2013: 499−518, articleTitle=null, refAbstract=null), Reference(id=1329457914676359368, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, doi=null, pmid=null, pmcid=null, year=null, volume=null, issue=null, pageStart=null, pageEnd=null, url=null, language=null, rfNumber=14, rfOrder=14, authorNames=null, journalName=null, refType=null, unstructuredReference=冯帅,邓伦治. 基于身份的隐私保护数据审计方案[J]. 贵州师范大学学报:自然科学版,2023,41(2):105–112, articleTitle=null, refAbstract=null), Reference(id=1329457914785411274, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, doi=null, pmid=null, pmcid=null, year=null, volume=null, issue=null, pageStart=null, pageEnd=null, url=null, language=null, rfNumber=14, rfOrder=15, authorNames=null, journalName=null, refType=null, unstructuredReference=Feng Shuai, Deng Lunzhi. Identity-based data auditing scheme with privacy protection[J]. Journal of Guizhou Normal University (Natural Sciences), 2023, 41(2): 105–112, articleTitle=null, refAbstract=null), Reference(id=1329457914919629003, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, doi=null, pmid=null, pmcid=null, year=null, volume=null, issue=null, pageStart=null, pageEnd=null, url=null, language=null, rfNumber=15, rfOrder=16, authorNames=null, journalName=null, refType=null, unstructuredReference=Rivest R L, Adleman L, Dertouzos M L. On data banks and privacy homomorphisms[C]. Foundations of Secure Computation, New York: Academia Press, 1978: 169−179, articleTitle=null, refAbstract=null), Reference(id=1329457915028680908, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, doi=null, pmid=null, pmcid=null, year=null, volume=null, issue=null, pageStart=null, pageEnd=null, url=null, language=null, rfNumber=16, rfOrder=17, authorNames=null, journalName=null, refType=null, unstructuredReference=Kwak H, Min S, Song Y. Towards practical multi-key TFHE: Parallelizable, key-compatible, quasi-linear complexity[C]//Proc of Public-Key Cryptography – PKC 2024. Cham: Springer, 2024: 354−385, articleTitle=null, refAbstract=null), Reference(id=1329457915112566990, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, doi=null, pmid=null, pmcid=null, year=null, volume=null, issue=null, pageStart=null, pageEnd=null, url=null, language=null, rfNumber=17, rfOrder=18, authorNames=null, journalName=null, refType=null, unstructuredReference=彭长根,何兴,谭伟杰等. 人工智能算法安全研究现状与对策[J]. 贵州师范大学学报:自然科学版,2022,40(6):1−16, articleTitle=null, refAbstract=null), Reference(id=1329457915204841679, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, doi=null, pmid=null, pmcid=null, year=null, volume=null, issue=null, pageStart=null, pageEnd=null, url=null, language=null, rfNumber=17, rfOrder=19, authorNames=null, journalName=null, refType=null, unstructuredReference=Peng Changgen, He Xin, Tan Weijie, et al. Research status and countermeasures of artificial intelligence algorithm security[J]. Journal of Guizhou Normal University (Natural Sciences), 2022, 40(6): 1−16, articleTitle=null, refAbstract=null), Reference(id=1329457915267756240, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, doi=null, pmid=null, pmcid=null, year=null, volume=null, issue=null, pageStart=null, pageEnd=null, url=null, language=null, rfNumber=18, rfOrder=20, authorNames=null, journalName=null, refType=null, unstructuredReference=Gentry C. Fully homomorphic encryption using ideal lattices[C]//Proc of the 41st Annual ACM Symp on Theory of Computing. New York: ACM, 2009: 169−178, articleTitle=null, refAbstract=null), Reference(id=1329457915343253713, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, doi=null, pmid=null, pmcid=null, year=null, volume=null, issue=null, pageStart=null, pageEnd=null, url=null, language=null, rfNumber=19, rfOrder=21, authorNames=null, journalName=null, refType=null, unstructuredReference=Dijk M V, Gentry C, Halevi S, et al. Fully homomorphic encryption over the integers[J]. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2010, 2009(4): 24−43, articleTitle=null, refAbstract=null), Reference(id=1329457915406168274, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, doi=null, pmid=null, pmcid=null, year=null, volume=null, issue=null, pageStart=null, pageEnd=null, url=null, language=null, rfNumber=20, rfOrder=22, authorNames=null, journalName=null, refType=null, unstructuredReference=Brakerski Z, Vaikuntanathan V. Efficient fully homomorphic encryption from (standard) LWE[C]//Proc of IEEE 52nd Annual Symp on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS2011). Piscataway, NJ: IEEE, 2011: 97−106, articleTitle=null, refAbstract=null), Reference(id=1329457915481665748, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, doi=null, pmid=null, pmcid=null, year=null, volume=null, issue=null, pageStart=null, pageEnd=null, url=null, language=null, rfNumber=21, rfOrder=23, authorNames=null, journalName=null, refType=null, unstructuredReference=Brakerski Z, Gentry C, Vaikuntanathan V. (Leveled) Fully homomorphic encryption without bootstrapping[C]//Proc of the 3rd Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conf (ITCS’12). New York: ACM, 2012: 309–325, articleTitle=null, refAbstract=null), Reference(id=1329457915540386005, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, doi=null, pmid=null, pmcid=null, year=null, volume=null, issue=null, pageStart=null, pageEnd=null, url=null, language=null, rfNumber=22, rfOrder=24, authorNames=null, journalName=null, refType=null, unstructuredReference=Gentry C, Sahai A, Waters B. Homomorphic encryption from learning with errors: Conceptually-simpler, asymptotically-faster, attribute-based[C]//Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2013. Berlin: Springer, 2013: 75−92, articleTitle=null, refAbstract=null), Reference(id=1329457915607494871, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, doi=null, pmid=null, pmcid=null, year=null, volume=null, issue=null, pageStart=null, pageEnd=null, url=null, language=null, rfNumber=23, rfOrder=25, authorNames=null, journalName=null, refType=null, unstructuredReference=Lee Y, Micciancio D, Kim A, et al. Efficient FHEW bootstrapping with small evaluation keys, and applications to threshold homomorphic encryption[C]//Proc of EUROCRYPT 2023. Berlin: Springer, 2023: 227−256, articleTitle=null, refAbstract=null), Reference(id=1329457915678798040, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, doi=null, pmid=null, pmcid=null, year=null, volume=null, issue=null, pageStart=null, pageEnd=null, url=null, language=null, rfNumber=24, rfOrder=26, authorNames=null, journalName=null, refType=null, unstructuredReference=Liu Fenghao, Wang Han. Batch bootstrapping I: - A new framework for SIMD bootstrapping in polynomial modulus[C]//Proc of EUROCRYPT 2023. Berlin: Springer, 2023: 321−352, articleTitle=null, refAbstract=null), Reference(id=1329457915787849945, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, doi=null, pmid=null, pmcid=null, year=null, volume=null, issue=null, pageStart=null, pageEnd=null, url=null, language=null, rfNumber=25, rfOrder=27, authorNames=null, journalName=null, refType=null, unstructuredReference=Zhou Jun, Cao Zhenfu, Qin Zhan, et al. LPPA: Lightweight privacy-preserving authentication from efficient multi-key secure outsourced computation for location-based services in VANETs[J]. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, 2020, 15: 420−434, articleTitle=null, refAbstract=null), Reference(id=1329457915875930330, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, doi=null, pmid=null, pmcid=null, year=null, volume=null, issue=null, pageStart=null, pageEnd=null, url=null, language=null, rfNumber=26, rfOrder=28, authorNames=null, journalName=null, refType=null, unstructuredReference=Gennaro R, Gentry C, Parno B. Non-interactive verifiable computing: Outsourcing computation to untrusted workers[C]//Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2010. Berlin: Springer, 2010: 465−482, articleTitle=null, refAbstract=null), Reference(id=1329457915955622108, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, doi=null, pmid=null, pmcid=null, year=null, volume=null, issue=null, pageStart=null, pageEnd=null, url=null, language=null, rfNumber=27, rfOrder=29, authorNames=null, journalName=null, refType=null, unstructuredReference=Chung K M, Kalai Y, and Vadhan S. Improved delegation of computation using fully homomorphic encryption[C]//Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2010. Berlin: Springer, 2010: 483−501, articleTitle=null, refAbstract=null), Reference(id=1329457916035313885, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, doi=null, pmid=null, pmcid=null, year=null, volume=null, issue=null, pageStart=null, pageEnd=null, url=null, language=null, rfNumber=28, rfOrder=30, authorNames=null, journalName=null, refType=null, unstructuredReference=Parno B, Raykova M, Vaikuntanathan V. How to delegate and verify in public: Verifiable computation from attribute-based encryption[C]//Proc of Theory of Cryptography. Berlin: Springer, 2012: 422–439, articleTitle=null, refAbstract=null), Reference(id=1329457916098228446, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, doi=null, pmid=null, pmcid=null, year=null, volume=null, issue=null, pageStart=null, pageEnd=null, url=null, language=null, rfNumber=29, rfOrder=31, authorNames=null, journalName=null, refType=null, unstructuredReference=Papamanthou C, Shi E, Tamassia R. Signatures of correct computation[C]//Proc of Theory of Cryptography. Berlin: Springer, 2013: 222–242, articleTitle=null, refAbstract=null), Reference(id=1329457917734007008, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, doi=null, pmid=null, pmcid=null, year=null, volume=null, issue=null, pageStart=null, pageEnd=null, url=null, language=null, rfNumber=30, rfOrder=32, authorNames=null, journalName=null, refType=null, unstructuredReference=Choi S G, Katz J, Kumaresan R. et al. Multi-client noninteractive verifiable computation[C]//Proc of Theory of Cryptography. Berlin: Springer, 2013: 499–518, articleTitle=null, refAbstract=null), Reference(id=1329457917880807650, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, doi=null, pmid=null, pmcid=null, year=null, volume=null, issue=null, pageStart=null, pageEnd=null, url=null, language=null, rfNumber=31, rfOrder=33, authorNames=null, journalName=null, refType=null, unstructuredReference=Baum C, Orsini E, Scholl P, et al. Efficient constant-round MPC with identifiable abort and public verifiability[C]//Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2020. Berlin: Springer, 2020: 562−592, articleTitle=null, refAbstract=null), Reference(id=1329457917994053859, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, doi=null, pmid=null, pmcid=null, year=null, volume=null, issue=null, pageStart=null, pageEnd=null, url=null, language=null, rfNumber=32, rfOrder=34, authorNames=null, journalName=null, refType=null, unstructuredReference=Zhang Liangfeng, Wang Huaxiong. Multi-server verifiable computation of low-degree polynomials[C]//Proc of IEEE Symp on Security and Privacy (SP). Piscataway, NJ: IEEE, 2022: 596−613, articleTitle=null, refAbstract=null), Reference(id=1329457918124077286, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, doi=null, pmid=null, pmcid=null, year=null, volume=null, issue=null, pageStart=null, pageEnd=null, url=null, language=null, rfNumber=33, rfOrder=35, authorNames=null, journalName=null, refType=null, unstructuredReference=Chen Xin, Zhang Liangfeng, Publicly Verifiable homomorphic secret sharing for polynomial evaluation[J]. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, 2023, 18: 4609−4624, articleTitle=null, refAbstract=null), Reference(id=1329457918216351975, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, doi=null, pmid=null, pmcid=null, year=null, volume=null, issue=null, pageStart=null, pageEnd=null, url=null, language=null, rfNumber=34, rfOrder=36, authorNames=null, journalName=null, refType=null, unstructuredReference=Gordon S D, Katz J, Liu F H, et al. Multi-client verifiable computation with stronger security guarantees[C]//Proc of Theory of Cryptography. Berlin: Springer, 2015: 144–168, articleTitle=null, refAbstract=null), Reference(id=1329457918279266536, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, doi=null, pmid=null, pmcid=null, year=null, volume=null, issue=null, pageStart=null, pageEnd=null, url=null, language=null, rfNumber=35, rfOrder=37, authorNames=null, journalName=null, refType=null, unstructuredReference=Manulis M, Nguyen J. Fully homomorphic encryption beyond IND-CCA1 security: Integrity through verifiability[C]//Advances in Cryptology-EUROCRYPT 2024. Cham: Springer, 2024: 63−93, articleTitle=null, refAbstract=null), Reference(id=1329457918342181097, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, doi=null, pmid=null, pmcid=null, year=null, volume=null, issue=null, pageStart=null, pageEnd=null, url=null, language=null, rfNumber=36, rfOrder=38, authorNames=null, journalName=null, refType=null, unstructuredReference=Jing Liu, Liang Fengzhang. Privay-preserving and publicly verifiable matrix multiplication[J]. IEEE Transaction on Service Computing, 2013, 16(3): 2059−2071, articleTitle=null, refAbstract=null), Reference(id=1329457918400901354, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, doi=null, pmid=null, pmcid=null, year=null, volume=null, issue=null, pageStart=null, pageEnd=null, url=null, language=null, rfNumber=37, rfOrder=39, authorNames=null, journalName=null, refType=null, unstructuredReference=Fiore D, Mitrokotsa A, Nizzardo L, et al. Multikey homomorphic authenticators[C]//Advances in Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2016. Berlin: Springer, 2016: 499−530, articleTitle=null, refAbstract=null), Reference(id=1329457918514147563, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, doi=null, pmid=null, pmcid=null, year=null, volume=null, issue=null, pageStart=null, pageEnd=null, url=null, language=null, rfNumber=38, rfOrder=40, authorNames=null, journalName=null, refType=null, unstructuredReference=Katz J, Lindell Y. Introduction to Modern Cryptography, Second Edition[M]. Boca Raton FL, USA: CRC Press, 2014, articleTitle=null, refAbstract=null), Reference(id=1329457918593839340, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, doi=null, pmid=null, pmcid=null, year=null, volume=null, issue=null, pageStart=null, pageEnd=null, url=null, language=null, rfNumber=39, rfOrder=41, authorNames=null, journalName=null, refType=null, unstructuredReference=Multiprecision integer and rational arithmetic c/c++ library[OL]. http://www.shamus.ie/, articleTitle=null, refAbstract=null)], funds=null, companyList=[AuthorCompany(id=1329457904559698023, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, xref=null, ext=[AuthorCompanyExt(id=1329457904572280936, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, companyId=1329457904559698023, language=EN, country=null, province=null, city=null, postcode=null, companyName=null, departmentName=null, remark=Department of Cryptography and Network Security, Soft Engineering Institute, East China Normal University, Shanghai 200062), AuthorCompanyExt(id=1329457904643584105, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, companyId=1329457904559698023, language=CN, country=null, province=null, city=null, postcode=null, companyName=null, departmentName=null, remark=华东师范大学软件工程学院 密码与网络安全系 上海 200062)])], figs=[ArticleFig(id=1329457906577158285, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, language=EN, label=Figure 1, caption=Network architecture of VMK-HDEM, figureFileSmall=G4y47Zu33imocCcEEIemBg==, figureFileBig=fh0x9QWVLCfJoJuZIBygVA==, tableContent=null), ArticleFig(id=1329457906661044366, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, language=CN, label=图1, caption=VMK-HDEM的网络架构, figureFileSmall=G4y47Zu33imocCcEEIemBg==, figureFileBig=fh0x9QWVLCfJoJuZIBygVA==, tableContent=null), ArticleFig(id=1329457906858176656, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, language=EN, label=Figure 2, caption=Functional implementation architecture of LWPPAS, figureFileSmall=rIQMCIk4i/Cbua6lGvTitg==, figureFileBig=fSBc5CUJS6Iawxe0Ej3r+g==, tableContent=null), ArticleFig(id=1329457906933674129, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, language=CN, label=图2, caption=LWPPGS功能实现架构, figureFileSmall=rIQMCIk4i/Cbua6lGvTitg==, figureFileBig=fSBc5CUJS6Iawxe0Ej3r+g==, tableContent=null), ArticleFig(id=1329457906996588690, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, language=EN, label=Figure 3, caption=Analysis of public key computational cost of López-Alt and VMK-HDEM schemes at ${S e{n}_{i}} $, figureFileSmall=5l7S2HfcAE/SJtiC0GBZHA==, figureFileBig=B1l9OMJ05YtNwpdjPaMwGg==, tableContent=null), ArticleFig(id=1329457907067891860, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, language=CN, label=图3, caption=López-Alt与VMK-HDEM方案在${S e{n}_{i}} $的公钥计算开销分析, figureFileSmall=5l7S2HfcAE/SJtiC0GBZHA==, figureFileBig=B1l9OMJ05YtNwpdjPaMwGg==, tableContent=null), ArticleFig(id=1329457908712059029, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, language=EN, label=Figure 4, caption=Analysis of computational cost of López-Alt and VMK-HDEM schemes at SER, figureFileSmall=X+d33N6SiFAkvi04ZqNCMQ==, figureFileBig=2H6uuMHOsONStHoUboTqDQ==, tableContent=null), ArticleFig(id=1329457908795945111, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, language=CN, label=图4, caption=López-Alt与VMK-HDEM方案在SER的计算开销分析, figureFileSmall=X+d33N6SiFAkvi04ZqNCMQ==, figureFileBig=2H6uuMHOsONStHoUboTqDQ==, tableContent=null), ArticleFig(id=1329457908896608408, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, language=EN, label=Figure 5, caption=Analysis of computational cost of López-Alt and VMK-HDEM schemes at CSP and REC, figureFileSmall=rLI6M2FqzTF8kWi1gr7q0g==, figureFileBig=vk3H1craBN+YIcQjy9mKng==, tableContent=null), ArticleFig(id=1329457909190209690, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, language=CN, label=图5, caption=López-Alt与VMK-HDEM方案在CSP和REC的计算开销分析, figureFileSmall=rLI6M2FqzTF8kWi1gr7q0g==, figureFileBig=vk3H1craBN+YIcQjy9mKng==, tableContent=null), ArticleFig(id=1329457909269901467, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, language=EN, label=Figure 6, caption=Analysis of computational cost for verifiability of López-Alt and VMK-HDEM schemes at $ S en_i $, figureFileSmall=VyckD5iJA8g4pevGq9a44Q==, figureFileBig=rosbvIqdXPNIIcgSSTxjZg==, tableContent=null), ArticleFig(id=1329457909341204636, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, language=CN, label=图6, caption=López-Alt与VMK-HDEM方案可验证性在$ S en_i $的计算开销分析, figureFileSmall=VyckD5iJA8g4pevGq9a44Q==, figureFileBig=rosbvIqdXPNIIcgSSTxjZg==, tableContent=null), ArticleFig(id=1329457909508976797, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, language=EN, label=Figure 7, caption=Analysis of computational cost for verifiability of López-Alt and VMK-HDEM schemes at SER, figureFileSmall=PCcmZ01JVRl2IKScLJi8PQ==, figureFileBig=CGhTsKWJz0hZuKm8HnA9iw==, tableContent=null), ArticleFig(id=1329457909588668574, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, language=CN, label=图7, caption=López-Alt与 VMK-HDEM方案可验证性在SER的计算开销分析, figureFileSmall=PCcmZ01JVRl2IKScLJi8PQ==, figureFileBig=CGhTsKWJz0hZuKm8HnA9iw==, tableContent=null), ArticleFig(id=1329457909676748959, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, language=EN, label=Figure 8, caption=Analysis of computational cost for verifiability of López-Alt and VMK-HDEM schemes at REC, figureFileSmall=AkQLm4Vq/pL8K4uosbZmyQ==, figureFileBig=vKvV7TKvOq8ZZJe0/VhfxQ==, tableContent=null), ArticleFig(id=1329457909773217952, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, language=CN, label=图8, caption=López-Alt与 VMK-HDEM方案可验证性在REC的计算开销分析, figureFileSmall=AkQLm4Vq/pL8K4uosbZmyQ==, figureFileBig=vKvV7TKvOq8ZZJe0/VhfxQ==, tableContent=null), ArticleFig(id=1329457909882269858, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, language=EN, label=Figure 9, caption=Analysis of communication cost of REC and SER in López-Alt and VMK-HDEM schemes, figureFileSmall=E9NzEZPjNoFR+n4e6EtuyA==, figureFileBig=EjMzdV7v4ealH/oMU6h7YQ==, tableContent=null), ArticleFig(id=1329457909966155939, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, language=CN, label=图9, caption=López-Alt与VMK-HDEM方案在REC和SER的通信开销分析, figureFileSmall=E9NzEZPjNoFR+n4e6EtuyA==, figureFileBig=EjMzdV7v4ealH/oMU6h7YQ==, tableContent=null), ArticleFig(id=1329457910066819236, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, language=EN, label=Figure 10, caption=Analysis of communication cost of López-Alt and VMK-HDEM schemes at SEN, figureFileSmall=O/4kYsxMFgX+Lr0oCKBMMg==, figureFileBig=r/EMqf2LFt3Y7Df6YolrAw==, tableContent=null), ArticleFig(id=1329457910163288230, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, language=CN, label=图10, caption=López-Alt与VMK-HDEM方案在SEN的通信开销分析, figureFileSmall=O/4kYsxMFgX+Lr0oCKBMMg==, figureFileBig=r/EMqf2LFt3Y7Df6YolrAw==, tableContent=null), ArticleFig(id=1329457910255562919, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, language=EN, label=Figure 11, caption=Analysis of communication cost for verifiability of López-Alt and VMK-HDEM schemes at SEN, figureFileSmall=6n3Tc1rm32Tt0qqfcyQylA==, figureFileBig=5Xv2ifsk5LiTE9Rv52belQ==, tableContent=null), ArticleFig(id=1329457910331060392, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, language=CN, label=图11, caption=López-Alt与VMK-HDEM方案在SEN的可验证性的通信开销分析, figureFileSmall=6n3Tc1rm32Tt0qqfcyQylA==, figureFileBig=5Xv2ifsk5LiTE9Rv52belQ==, tableContent=null), ArticleFig(id=1329457910536581289, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, language=EN, label=Figure 12, caption=Analysis of communication cost for verifiability of López-Alt and VMK-HDEM schemes at SER and REC, figureFileSmall=RnNvOlhGHDDiBFQ/GP8eFg==, figureFileBig=HbltZgEcQTWdp5D5gvr4KA==, tableContent=null), ArticleFig(id=1329457910624661674, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, language=CN, label=图12, caption=López-Alt与VMK-HDEM方案在SER和REC的可验证性的通信开销分析, figureFileSmall=RnNvOlhGHDDiBFQ/GP8eFg==, figureFileBig=HbltZgEcQTWdp5D5gvr4KA==, tableContent=null), ArticleFig(id=1329457910733713579, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, language=EN, label=Table 1, caption=

Table for Describing VMK-HDEM Notations

, figureFileSmall=null, figureFileBig=null, tableContent=
符号描述
$ {m}_{i,l} $数据拥有者$ {S en}_{i} $的第$ l $个数据
$ F\left({x}_{1},{x}_{2},… ,{x}_{{n}_{s}}\right) $多用户外包计算的多元多项式
$ {a}_{j} $多项式$ F $第$ j $项$ {Item}_{j} $的系数
$ K $多项式$ F $的项数
$ {t}_{i,j} $变元$ {x}_{i} $在多项式$ F $第$ j $项$ {Item}_{j} $中的幂指数
$ {deg}_{j} $多项式$ F $第$ j $项$ {Item}_{j} $的次数
$ {deg}_{F} $多项式$ F $的次数,即${deg}_{F}= \mathrm{max}\left({deg}_{1},{deg}_{2},… ,{deg}_{K}\right) $
$ {F}_{{k}_{\rm pse}} $带密钥$ {{k}}_{\mathrm{p}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{e}} $的伪随机函数:$ {\left\{\mathrm{0,1}\right\}}^{*}\times {\left\{\mathrm{0,1}\right\}}^{2\mathrm{\lambda }}\to {\left\{\mathrm{0,1}\right\}}^{2\mathrm{\lambda }} $
$ {\mathscr{l}}_{{i}} $$ {S en}_{i} $的密文$ {C}_{i} $的公开标签
$ {\sigma }_{i} $$ {S en}_{i} $的密文$ {C}_{i} $的认证码
), ArticleFig(id=1329457910809211052, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, language=CN, label=表1, caption=

VMK-HDEM符号描述表

, figureFileSmall=null, figureFileBig=null, tableContent=
符号描述
$ {m}_{i,l} $数据拥有者$ {S en}_{i} $的第$ l $个数据
$ F\left({x}_{1},{x}_{2},… ,{x}_{{n}_{s}}\right) $多用户外包计算的多元多项式
$ {a}_{j} $多项式$ F $第$ j $项$ {Item}_{j} $的系数
$ K $多项式$ F $的项数
$ {t}_{i,j} $变元$ {x}_{i} $在多项式$ F $第$ j $项$ {Item}_{j} $中的幂指数
$ {deg}_{j} $多项式$ F $第$ j $项$ {Item}_{j} $的次数
$ {deg}_{F} $多项式$ F $的次数,即${deg}_{F}= \mathrm{max}\left({deg}_{1},{deg}_{2},… ,{deg}_{K}\right) $
$ {F}_{{k}_{\rm pse}} $带密钥$ {{k}}_{\mathrm{p}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{e}} $的伪随机函数:$ {\left\{\mathrm{0,1}\right\}}^{*}\times {\left\{\mathrm{0,1}\right\}}^{2\mathrm{\lambda }}\to {\left\{\mathrm{0,1}\right\}}^{2\mathrm{\lambda }} $
$ {\mathscr{l}}_{{i}} $$ {S en}_{i} $的密文$ {C}_{i} $的公开标签
$ {\sigma }_{i} $$ {S en}_{i} $的密文$ {C}_{i} $的认证码
), ArticleFig(id=1329457910922457261, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, language=EN, label=Table 2, caption=

Sample Contingency Tables Required for Chi-square Tests of Alleles

, figureFileSmall=null, figureFileBig=null, tableContent=
等位基因aA总计
对照组病例数$ {n}_{00} $$ {n}_{01} $$ {2r}_{0} $
实验组病例数$ {n}_{10} $$ {n}_{11} $$ 2{r}_{1} $
等位基因计数$ {c}_{0} $$ {c}_{1} $$ 2N $
), ArticleFig(id=1329457911044092078, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, language=CN, label=表2, caption=

等位基因的卡方检验所需示例列联表

, figureFileSmall=null, figureFileBig=null, tableContent=
等位基因aA总计
对照组病例数$ {n}_{00} $$ {n}_{01} $$ {2r}_{0} $
实验组病例数$ {n}_{10} $$ {n}_{11} $$ 2{r}_{1} $
等位基因计数$ {c}_{0} $$ {c}_{1} $$ 2N $
), ArticleFig(id=1329457911178309808, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, language=EN, label=Table 3, caption=

Table for Describing LWPPGS Notations

, figureFileSmall=null, figureFileBig=null, tableContent=
符号描述
$ {U}_{i} $第$ i $个用户
$ {s}_{i,j} $用户$ {U}_{i} $的第$ j $个SNP位点数值
$ {n}_{11} $携带主要等位基因的实验组病例数
$ {r}_{0} $对照组病例数
$ {r}_{1} $实验组病例数
$ {c}_{1} $主要等位基因的计数
$ N $总病例数
), ArticleFig(id=1329457911278973105, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, language=CN, label=表3, caption=

LWPPGS符号描述表

, figureFileSmall=null, figureFileBig=null, tableContent=
符号描述
$ {U}_{i} $第$ i $个用户
$ {s}_{i,j} $用户$ {U}_{i} $的第$ j $个SNP位点数值
$ {n}_{11} $携带主要等位基因的实验组病例数
$ {r}_{0} $对照组病例数
$ {r}_{1} $实验组病例数
$ {c}_{1} $主要等位基因的计数
$ N $总病例数
), ArticleFig(id=1329457911371247794, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, language=EN, label=Table 4, caption=

Comparison of Computation Cost of López-Alt and VMK-HDEM Schemes

, figureFileSmall=null, figureFileBig=null, tableContent=
方案用于数据隐私保护的计算开销用于可验证性的计算开销
SENSERRECSENSERREC
López-
Alt
$ O\left({n}_{i}\cdot L\right) $$ {O}\left({n}_{s}+{K}{2}^{{{d}{e}{g}}_{{F}}}\right) $$ {O} ({2}^{{{d}{e}{g}}_{{F}}} ) $$ O\left(L\right) $$ O(L\cdot {K}{{d}{e}{g}}_{{F}}) $$ O\left(L\cdot {K}{{d}{e}{g}}_{{F}}\right) $
VMK-
HDEM
$ O\left(L\right) $$ {O}\left({n}_{s}+{K}{{d}{e}{g}}_{{F}}\right) $$ O\left(1\right) $$ O\left(1\right) $$ O\left({K}{{d}{e}{g}}_{{F}}\right) $$ O\left({K}{{d}{e}{g}}_{{F}}\right) $
), ArticleFig(id=1329457911471911091, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, language=CN, label=表4, caption=

López-Alt和VMK-HDEM方案的计算开销对比

, figureFileSmall=null, figureFileBig=null, tableContent=
方案用于数据隐私保护的计算开销用于可验证性的计算开销
SENSERRECSENSERREC
López-
Alt
$ O\left({n}_{i}\cdot L\right) $$ {O}\left({n}_{s}+{K}{2}^{{{d}{e}{g}}_{{F}}}\right) $$ {O} ({2}^{{{d}{e}{g}}_{{F}}} ) $$ O\left(L\right) $$ O(L\cdot {K}{{d}{e}{g}}_{{F}}) $$ O\left(L\cdot {K}{{d}{e}{g}}_{{F}}\right) $
VMK-
HDEM
$ O\left(L\right) $$ {O}\left({n}_{s}+{K}{{d}{e}{g}}_{{F}}\right) $$ O\left(1\right) $$ O\left(1\right) $$ O\left({K}{{d}{e}{g}}_{{F}}\right) $$ O\left({K}{{d}{e}{g}}_{{F}}\right) $
), ArticleFig(id=1329457911576768692, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, language=EN, label=Table 5, caption=

Comparison of Communication Cost of López-Alt and VMK-HDEM Schemes

, figureFileSmall=null, figureFileBig=null, tableContent=
方案用于数据隐私保护的通信开销用于可验证性的通信开销
SENSERRECSENSERREC
López-
Alt
$ O\left(L\right) $$ \mathrm{O}\left(({n}_{s}+{2}^{{deg}_{F}})\cdot L\right) $$ {O}\left({2}^{{deg}_{F}}\right) $$ O\left(L\right) $$ O({{deg}}_{F}\cdot L) $$ O({{deg}}_{F}\cdot L) $
VMK-
HDEM
$ O\left(L\right) $$ O({n}_{s}\cdot L) $$ O\left(1\right) $$ O\left(1\right) $$ O({{deg}}_{F}) $$ O({{deg}}_{F}) $
), ArticleFig(id=1329457913195770037, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, language=CN, label=表5, caption=

López-Alt和VMK-HDEM方案的通信开销对比

, figureFileSmall=null, figureFileBig=null, tableContent=
方案用于数据隐私保护的通信开销用于可验证性的通信开销
SENSERRECSENSERREC
López-
Alt
$ O\left(L\right) $$ \mathrm{O}\left(({n}_{s}+{2}^{{deg}_{F}})\cdot L\right) $$ {O}\left({2}^{{deg}_{F}}\right) $$ O\left(L\right) $$ O({{deg}}_{F}\cdot L) $$ O({{deg}}_{F}\cdot L) $
VMK-
HDEM
$ O\left(L\right) $$ O({n}_{s}\cdot L) $$ O\left(1\right) $$ O\left(1\right) $$ O({{deg}}_{F}) $$ O({{deg}}_{F}) $
)], attaches=null, journal=Journal(id=1324759606947315908, delFlag=0, nameCn=计算机研究与发展, nameEn=Journal of Computer Research and Development, nameHistory1=null, nameHistory2=null, issn=1000-1239, eissn=null, cn=11-1777/TP, coden=null, periodic=0, language=CN, oaType=null, ccby=null, superviseOffice=null, ownerOffice=null, pubOffice=null, editorOffice=null, officeType=null, aims=null, clcCode=null, officeProv=null, officeCity=null, officeAddr=null, officeZip=null, officeEmail=null, officePhone=null, editDirector=null, officeDirector=null, officeDirectorPhone=null, officeStaffNum=null, officeEmpNum=null, coverPicUrl=k2l8zgqwstuxxevFX2qxVA==, journalPrice=null, startedYear=null, abbrevIsoEn=Journal of Computer Research and Development, journalRemark=null, publicationField=null, createdTime=1793776903141, updatedTime=1793850698612, createdBy=18614031015, updatedBy=13701087609, firstLetterCn=J, firstLetterEn=J, subjectCode=Electronic Information, subjectName=null, subjectCodeEn=Electronic Information, subjectNameEn=null, picCn=k2l8zgqwstuxxevFX2qxVA==, picEn=r6k0Ry+RD+c/VXj5QarmDw==, jcr=null, cjcr=null, exts=[JournalExt(id=1325069127710286688, language=CN, name=计算机研究与发展, nameHistory1=null, nameHistory2=null, managedBy=, sponsoredBy=, publishedBy=, editorOffice=, officeProv=null, officeCity=null, officeAddr=, officeZip=, editDirector=, officeDirector=null, officePhone=null, coverPicUrl=null, journalRemark=, submitArticleUrl=null, websiteUrl=, createdTime=1793850698640, updatedTime=1793850698640, createdBy=13701087609, updatedBy=13701087609, submissionGuidelinesUrl=, submissionAuthorUrl=https://crad.ict.ac.cn/journalx/authorLogOn.action, submissionEditorUrl=https://crad.ict.ac.cn/journalx/editorLogOn.action, submissionReviewUrl=https://crad.ict.ac.cn/journalx/expertLogOn.action, submissionCeEditorUrl=https://crad.ict.ac.cn/journalx/editorInChiefLogOn.action, submissionAeEditorUrl=, option={"copyright":""}), JournalExt(id=1325069127777395553, language=EN, name=Journal of Computer Research and Development, nameHistory1=null, nameHistory2=null, managedBy=, sponsoredBy=, publishedBy=, editorOffice=, officeProv=null, officeCity=null, officeAddr=, officeZip=, editDirector=, officeDirector=null, officePhone=null, coverPicUrl=null, journalRemark=, submitArticleUrl=null, websiteUrl=, createdTime=1793850698656, updatedTime=1793850698656, createdBy=13701087609, updatedBy=13701087609, submissionGuidelinesUrl=, submissionAuthorUrl=https://crad.ict.ac.cn/journalx/authorLogOn.action, submissionEditorUrl=https://crad.ict.ac.cn/journalx/editorLogOn.action, submissionReviewUrl=https://crad.ict.ac.cn/journalx/expertLogOn.action, submissionCeEditorUrl=https://crad.ict.ac.cn/journalx/editorInChiefLogOn.action, submissionAeEditorUrl=, option={"copyright":""})], databaseList=null, tenantJournalId=1324759914146529478, websiteList=[Website(id=1325070300139892771, webName=null, webTitle=null, webDomain=null, webCopyrigh=null, webIpcNo=null, seoTitle=null, seoKeywords=null, seoDescription=null, tenantJournalId=null, journalId=1324759914146529478, journalNameCn=null, journalNameEn=null, grayFlag=null, tenantId=1146029695717560320, platformId=null, journalGroupId=null, journalGroupNameCn=null, journalGroupNameEn=null, type=1, domain=https://castjournals.cast.org.cn/joweb/jsjyjyfz/CN, language=CN, createTime=1793850978169, createBy=18614031015, updateTime=1793851040259, updateBy=18614031015, name=计算机研究与发展-中文, tplId=1146099689490845704, title=计算机研究与发展, delFlag=0, indexPage=/home, props=[WebsiteProps(id=1325070893751349360, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=null, journalGroupId=null, siteId=1325070300139892771, code=articleTextType, value=kx, createTime=1793851119697, updateTime=1793851119697, creator=18614031015, updator=18614031015), WebsiteProps(id=1325070893730377837, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=null, journalGroupId=null, siteId=1325070300139892771, code=banner, value=null, createTime=1793851119692, updateTime=1793851119692, creator=18614031015, updator=18614031015), WebsiteProps(id=1325070893772320883, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=null, journalGroupId=null, siteId=1325070300139892771, code=grayFlag, value=0, createTime=1793851119702, updateTime=1793851119702, creator=18614031015, updator=18614031015), WebsiteProps(id=1325070893721989228, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=null, journalGroupId=null, siteId=1325070300139892771, code=logo, value=https://castjournals.cast.org.cn/joweb/jsjyjyfz/CN/file/pic?fileId=U27tDsy717YF7XSPA+Vwdw==, createTime=1793851119690, updateTime=1793851119690, creator=18614031015, updator=18614031015), WebsiteProps(id=1325070893784903797, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=null, journalGroupId=null, siteId=1325070300139892771, code=minRunFlag, value=0, createTime=1793851119705, updateTime=1793851119705, creator=18614031015, updator=18614031015), WebsiteProps(id=1325070893742960751, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=null, journalGroupId=null, siteId=1325070300139892771, code=picServerUrl, value=https://castjournals.cast.org.cn/joweb/jsjyjyfz/CN/file/pic, createTime=1793851119695, updateTime=1793851119695, creator=18614031015, updator=18614031015), WebsiteProps(id=1325070893780709492, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=null, journalGroupId=null, siteId=1325070300139892771, code=silenceFlag, value=0, createTime=1793851119704, updateTime=1793851119704, creator=18614031015, updator=18614031015), WebsiteProps(id=1325070893738766446, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=null, journalGroupId=null, siteId=1325070300139892771, code=staticResourcePath, value=https://castjournals.cast.org.cn/joweb/cast_kjdb_cn_619/, createTime=1793851119694, updateTime=1793851119694, creator=18614031015, updator=18614031015), WebsiteProps(id=1325070893755543665, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=null, journalGroupId=null, siteId=1325070300139892771, code=themeColor, value=null, createTime=1793851119698, updateTime=1793851119698, creator=18614031015, updator=18614031015), WebsiteProps(id=1325070893763932274, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=null, journalGroupId=null, siteId=1325070300139892771, code=themeStyle, value=null, createTime=1793851119700, updateTime=1793851119700, creator=18614031015, updator=18614031015)]), Website(id=1325070300580294698, webName=null, webTitle=null, webDomain=null, webCopyrigh=null, webIpcNo=null, seoTitle=null, seoKeywords=null, seoDescription=null, tenantJournalId=null, journalId=1324759914146529478, journalNameCn=null, journalNameEn=null, grayFlag=null, tenantId=1146029695717560320, platformId=null, journalGroupId=null, journalGroupNameCn=null, journalGroupNameEn=null, type=1, domain=https://castjournals.cast.org.cn/joweb/jsjyjyfz/EN, language=EN, createTime=1793850978274, createBy=18614031015, updateTime=1793851036638, updateBy=18614031015, name=计算机研究与发展-英文, tplId=1146101810881728533, title=Journal of Computer Research and Development, delFlag=0, indexPage=/home, props=[WebsiteProps(id=1325070925288321148, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=null, journalGroupId=null, siteId=1325070300580294698, code=articleTextType, value=kx, createTime=1793851127216, updateTime=1793851127216, creator=18614031015, updator=18614031015), WebsiteProps(id=1325070925263155321, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=null, journalGroupId=null, siteId=1325070300580294698, code=banner, value=null, createTime=1793851127210, updateTime=1793851127210, creator=18614031015, updator=18614031015), WebsiteProps(id=1325070925309292671, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=null, journalGroupId=null, siteId=1325070300580294698, code=grayFlag, value=0, createTime=1793851127221, updateTime=1793851127221, creator=18614031015, updator=18614031015), WebsiteProps(id=1325070925254766712, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=null, journalGroupId=null, siteId=1325070300580294698, code=logo, value=https://castjournals.cast.org.cn/joweb/jsjyjyfz/EN/file/pic?fileId=U27tDsy717YF7XSPA+Vwdw==, createTime=1793851127208, updateTime=1793851127208, creator=18614031015, updator=18614031015), WebsiteProps(id=1325070925326069889, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=null, journalGroupId=null, siteId=1325070300580294698, code=minRunFlag, value=0, createTime=1793851127225, updateTime=1793851127225, creator=18614031015, updator=18614031015), WebsiteProps(id=1325070925279932539, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=null, journalGroupId=null, siteId=1325070300580294698, code=picServerUrl, value=https://castjournals.cast.org.cn/joweb/jsjyjyfz/EN/file/pic, createTime=1793851127214, updateTime=1793851127214, creator=18614031015, updator=18614031015), WebsiteProps(id=1325070925317681280, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=null, journalGroupId=null, siteId=1325070300580294698, code=silenceFlag, value=0, createTime=1793851127223, updateTime=1793851127223, creator=18614031015, updator=18614031015), WebsiteProps(id=1325070925271543930, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=null, journalGroupId=null, siteId=1325070300580294698, code=staticResourcePath, value=https://castjournals.cast.org.cn/joweb/cast_kjdb_en_623/, createTime=1793851127212, updateTime=1793851127212, creator=18614031015, updator=18614031015), WebsiteProps(id=1325070925292515453, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=null, journalGroupId=null, siteId=1325070300580294698, code=themeColor, value=null, createTime=1793851127217, updateTime=1793851127217, creator=18614031015, updator=18614031015), WebsiteProps(id=1325070925300904062, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=null, journalGroupId=null, siteId=1325070300580294698, code=themeStyle, value=null, createTime=1793851127219, updateTime=1793851127219, creator=18614031015, updator=18614031015)])], journalTitle=计算机研究与发展, weixinUrl=null, journalUrl=https://crad.ict.ac.cn/, iacademicId=null, status=1, seqNo=null, journalTitleEn=Journal of Computer Research and Development, journalPhotoCn=k2l8zgqwstuxxevFX2qxVA==, journalPhotoEn=r6k0Ry+RD+c/VXj5QarmDw==, journalFirstLetter=J, journalRecommend=null, journalNew=null, journalCollection=null, jcrJf=null, cjcrJf=null, jcrJfStr=null, cjcrJfStr=null, submissionFirstDecision=null, sciSubjectClassification=null, casSubjectClassification=null, citeScore=null, totalCitationFrequency=null, icpCode=null, psCode=null, advertisingLicenseCode=null, copyrightInformation=null, country=null, option=, provinceCode=null, provinceName=null, collectFlag=false, interPubPlatform=, interPubPlatformUrl=null), detailUrlCn=https://castjournals.cast.org.cn/joweb/jsjyjyfz/CN/10.7544/issn1000-1239.202440453, detailUrlEn=https://castjournals.cast.org.cn/joweb/jsjyjyfz/EN/10.7544/issn1000-1239.202440453, pdfUrlCn=https://castjournals.cast.org.cn/joweb/jsjyjyfz/CN/PDF/10.7544/issn1000-1239.202440453, pdfUrlEn=https://castjournals.cast.org.cn/joweb/jsjyjyfz/EN/PDF/10.7544/issn1000-1239.202440453, aliStartDate=0, aliEndDate=0, collectionFlag=false, citedCount=null, citedUrl=null, previewStatus=0, delFlag=0, hasFullText=1, orderTime=1727712000000, fullTextJson=null, articleText=null, reference=null)
收藏切换
轻量级多用户可验证隐私保护基因序列分析方案
胡云舒 , 周俊 * , 曹珍富 , 董晓蕾
计算机研究与发展 | 数据要素安全流通 2024,61(10): 2448-2466
收起
收藏切换
计算机研究与发展 |数据要素安全流通 2024 , 61 (10) : 2448 -2466
轻量级多用户可验证隐私保护基因序列分析方案
全屏
[Author(id=1329457904756830315, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, orderNo=0, firstName=null, middleName=null, lastName=null, nameCn=null, orcid=null, stid=null, country=null, authorPic=null, dead=0, email=hysss1136@gmail.com, emailSecond=null, emailThird=null, correspondingAuthor=0, authorType=1, ext={EN=AuthorExt(id=1329457904924602477, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, authorId=1329457904756830315, language=EN, stringName=Yunshu Hu, firstName=Yunshu, middleName=null, lastName=Hu, prefix=null, suffix=null, authorComment=null, nameInitials=null, affiliation=null, department=null, xref=null, address=Department of Cryptography and Network Security, Soft Engineering Institute, East China Normal University, Shanghai 200062, bio={"content":"

born in 2004. Undergraduate. Her main research interests include fully homomorphic encryption, secure multiparty computation, and verifiable computation

"}, bioImg=null, bioContent=

born in 2004. Undergraduate. Her main research interests include fully homomorphic encryption, secure multiparty computation, and verifiable computation

, aboutCorrespAuthor=null), CN=AuthorExt(id=1329457905008488558, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, authorId=1329457904756830315, language=CN, stringName=胡云舒, firstName=null, middleName=null, lastName=null, prefix=null, suffix=null, authorComment=null, nameInitials=null, affiliation=null, department=null, xref=null, address=华东师范大学软件工程学院 密码与网络安全系 上海 200062, bio={"img":"PwFIjfZOiEZTL3f2PWRNmQ==","content":"

2004年生. 本科生. 主要研究方向为全同态加密、安全多方计算、可验证计算

"}, bioImg=PwFIjfZOiEZTL3f2PWRNmQ==, bioContent=

2004年生. 本科生. 主要研究方向为全同态加密、安全多方计算、可验证计算

, aboutCorrespAuthor=null)}, companyList=[AuthorCompany(id=1329457904559698023, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, xref=null, ext=[AuthorCompanyExt(id=1329457904572280936, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, companyId=1329457904559698023, language=EN, country=null, province=null, city=null, postcode=null, companyName=null, departmentName=null, remark=Department of Cryptography and Network Security, Soft Engineering Institute, East China Normal University, Shanghai 200062), AuthorCompanyExt(id=1329457904643584105, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, companyId=1329457904559698023, language=CN, country=null, province=null, city=null, postcode=null, companyName=null, departmentName=null, remark=华东师范大学软件工程学院 密码与网络安全系 上海 200062)])]), Author(id=1329457905071403121, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, orderNo=1, firstName=null, middleName=null, lastName=null, nameCn=null, orcid=null, stid=null, country=null, authorPic=null, dead=0, email=jzhou@sei.ecnu.edu.cn, emailSecond=null, emailThird=null, correspondingAuthor=1, authorType=1, ext={EN=AuthorExt(id=1329457905155289203, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, authorId=1329457905071403121, language=EN, stringName=Jun Zhou, firstName=Jun, middleName=null, lastName=Zhou, prefix=null, suffix=null, authorComment=null, nameInitials=null, affiliation=null, department=null, xref=*, address=Department of Cryptography and Network Security, Soft Engineering Institute, East China Normal University, Shanghai 200062, bio={"content":"

born in 1982. PhD, professor, PhD supervisor. Member of CCF, IEEE, ACM and IACR. His main research interests include public key cryptography, cloud computing security, and privacy-preserving machine learning

"}, bioImg=null, bioContent=

born in 1982. PhD, professor, PhD supervisor. Member of CCF, IEEE, ACM and IACR. His main research interests include public key cryptography, cloud computing security, and privacy-preserving machine learning

, aboutCorrespAuthor=null), CN=AuthorExt(id=1329457905251758196, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, authorId=1329457905071403121, language=CN, stringName=周俊, firstName=null, middleName=null, lastName=null, prefix=null, suffix=null, authorComment=null, nameInitials=null, affiliation=null, department=null, xref=*, address=华东师范大学软件工程学院 密码与网络安全系 上海 200062, bio={"img":"+Mx//lc3u7wh16hUmuDbYg==","content":"

1982年生. 博士,教授,博士生导师. CCF、IEEE、ACM和IACR会员. 主要研究方向为公钥密码学、云计算安全、机器学习隐私保护

"}, bioImg=+Mx//lc3u7wh16hUmuDbYg==, bioContent=

1982年生. 博士,教授,博士生导师. CCF、IEEE、ACM和IACR会员. 主要研究方向为公钥密码学、云计算安全、机器学习隐私保护

, aboutCorrespAuthor=null)}, companyList=[AuthorCompany(id=1329457904559698023, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, xref=null, ext=[AuthorCompanyExt(id=1329457904572280936, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, companyId=1329457904559698023, language=EN, country=null, province=null, city=null, postcode=null, companyName=null, departmentName=null, remark=Department of Cryptography and Network Security, Soft Engineering Institute, East China Normal University, Shanghai 200062), AuthorCompanyExt(id=1329457904643584105, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, companyId=1329457904559698023, language=CN, country=null, province=null, city=null, postcode=null, companyName=null, departmentName=null, remark=华东师范大学软件工程学院 密码与网络安全系 上海 200062)])]), Author(id=1329457905323061366, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, orderNo=2, firstName=null, middleName=null, lastName=null, nameCn=null, orcid=null, stid=null, country=null, authorPic=null, dead=0, email=null, emailSecond=null, emailThird=null, correspondingAuthor=0, authorType=1, ext={EN=AuthorExt(id=1329457905398558840, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, authorId=1329457905323061366, language=EN, stringName=Zhenfu Cao, firstName=Zhenfu, middleName=null, lastName=Cao, prefix=null, suffix=null, authorComment=null, nameInitials=null, affiliation=null, department=null, xref=null, address=Department of Cryptography and Network Security, Soft Engineering Institute, East China Normal University, Shanghai 200062, bio={"content":"

born in 1962. PhD, professor, PhD supervisor. Senior member of CCF. His main research interests include public key encryption, digital signature, private computation, and post-quantum cryptography

"}, bioImg=null, bioContent=

born in 1962. PhD, professor, PhD supervisor. Senior member of CCF. His main research interests include public key encryption, digital signature, private computation, and post-quantum cryptography

, aboutCorrespAuthor=null), CN=AuthorExt(id=1329457905465667705, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, authorId=1329457905323061366, language=CN, stringName=曹珍富, firstName=null, middleName=null, lastName=null, prefix=null, suffix=null, authorComment=null, nameInitials=null, affiliation=null, department=null, xref=null, address=华东师范大学软件工程学院 密码与网络安全系 上海 200062, bio={"img":"SQk5/Hy6uxvWhR7+VDx5bQ==","content":"

1962年生. 博士,教授,博士生导师. CCF高级会员. 主要研究方向为公钥加密、数字签名、隐私计算、后量子密码

"}, bioImg=SQk5/Hy6uxvWhR7+VDx5bQ==, bioContent=

1962年生. 博士,教授,博士生导师. CCF高级会员. 主要研究方向为公钥加密、数字签名、隐私计算、后量子密码

, aboutCorrespAuthor=null)}, companyList=[AuthorCompany(id=1329457904559698023, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, xref=null, ext=[AuthorCompanyExt(id=1329457904572280936, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, companyId=1329457904559698023, language=EN, country=null, province=null, city=null, postcode=null, companyName=null, departmentName=null, remark=Department of Cryptography and Network Security, Soft Engineering Institute, East China Normal University, Shanghai 200062), AuthorCompanyExt(id=1329457904643584105, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, companyId=1329457904559698023, language=CN, country=null, province=null, city=null, postcode=null, companyName=null, departmentName=null, remark=华东师范大学软件工程学院 密码与网络安全系 上海 200062)])]), Author(id=1329457905541165179, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, orderNo=3, firstName=null, middleName=null, lastName=null, nameCn=null, orcid=null, stid=null, country=null, authorPic=null, dead=0, email=null, emailSecond=null, emailThird=null, correspondingAuthor=0, authorType=1, ext={EN=AuthorExt(id=1329457905612468349, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, authorId=1329457905541165179, language=EN, stringName=Xiaolei Dong, firstName=Xiaolei, middleName=null, lastName=Dong, prefix=null, suffix=null, authorComment=null, nameInitials=null, affiliation=null, department=null, xref=null, address=Department of Cryptography and Network Security, Soft Engineering Institute, East China Normal University, Shanghai 200062, bio={"content":"

born in 1971. PhD, professor, PhD supervisor. Her main research interests include number theory, cryptography, and network security

"}, bioImg=null, bioContent=

born in 1971. PhD, professor, PhD supervisor. Her main research interests include number theory, cryptography, and network security

, aboutCorrespAuthor=null), CN=AuthorExt(id=1329457905671188607, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, authorId=1329457905541165179, language=CN, stringName=董晓蕾, firstName=null, middleName=null, lastName=null, prefix=null, suffix=null, authorComment=null, nameInitials=null, affiliation=null, department=null, xref=null, address=华东师范大学软件工程学院 密码与网络安全系 上海 200062, bio={"img":"uPuTm+NvfXg5YRg17FxU4A==","content":"

1971年生. 博士,教授,博士生导师. 主要研究方向为数论、密码学、网络安全

"}, bioImg=uPuTm+NvfXg5YRg17FxU4A==, bioContent=

1971年生. 博士,教授,博士生导师. 主要研究方向为数论、密码学、网络安全

, aboutCorrespAuthor=null)}, companyList=[AuthorCompany(id=1329457904559698023, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, xref=null, ext=[AuthorCompanyExt(id=1329457904572280936, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, companyId=1329457904559698023, language=EN, country=null, province=null, city=null, postcode=null, companyName=null, departmentName=null, remark=Department of Cryptography and Network Security, Soft Engineering Institute, East China Normal University, Shanghai 200062), AuthorCompanyExt(id=1329457904643584105, tenantId=1146029695717560320, journalId=1324759914146529478, articleId=1329457896326279228, companyId=1329457904559698023, language=CN, country=null, province=null, city=null, postcode=null, companyName=null, departmentName=null, remark=华东师范大学软件工程学院 密码与网络安全系 上海 200062)])])]
胡云舒 , 周俊* , 曹珍富, 董晓蕾
作者信息
  • 华东师范大学软件工程学院 密码与网络安全系 上海 200062
通讯作者:
作者简介:

2004年生. 本科生. 主要研究方向为全同态加密、安全多方计算、可验证计算

1982年生. 博士,教授,博士生导师. CCF、IEEE、ACM和IACR会员. 主要研究方向为公钥密码学、云计算安全、机器学习隐私保护

1962年生. 博士,教授,博士生导师. CCF高级会员. 主要研究方向为公钥加密、数字签名、隐私计算、后量子密码

1971年生. 博士,教授,博士生导师. 主要研究方向为数论、密码学、网络安全

Lightweight Multi-User Verifiable Privacy-Preserving Gene Sequence Analysis Scheme
Yunshu Hu , Jun Zhou* , Zhenfu Cao, Xiaolei Dong
Affiliations
  • Department of Cryptography and Network Security, Soft Engineering Institute, East China Normal University, Shanghai 200062
  • born in 2004. Undergraduate. Her main research interests include fully homomorphic encryption, secure multiparty computation, and verifiable computation

    born in 1982. PhD, professor, PhD supervisor. Member of CCF, IEEE, ACM and IACR. His main research interests include public key cryptography, cloud computing security, and privacy-preserving machine learning

    born in 1962. PhD, professor, PhD supervisor. Senior member of CCF. His main research interests include public key encryption, digital signature, private computation, and post-quantum cryptography

    born in 1971. PhD, professor, PhD supervisor. Her main research interests include number theory, cryptography, and network security

出版时间: 2024-10-01 doi: 10.7544/issn1000-1239.202440453
文章导航
收藏切换

随着云计算、大数据等新兴网络服务的蓬勃发展,数据要素在智慧医疗、科学研究等领域中占据重要地位. 基因组测序技术通过对病人基因组序列进行处理来判断病人的患病原因和类别,在多个领域有广泛应用. 由于存储、计算资源受限,本地用户通常需要租用资源丰富但工作在不可信环境下的云服务器来完成复杂的大规模基因组测序处理函数计算任务. 为了保护用户数据隐私及验证计算结果的正确性,国内外现有工作通常的做法是利用公钥全同态加密或安全多方计算技术实现数据隐私保护;利用Yao混淆电路或双线性配对技术实现计算结果的正确性验证. 由于密码原语的计算开销和通信开销巨大,均不适用于基因序列分析系统中存储、计算资源受限的本地用户的客观性能需求. 为了解决上述挑战性问题,提出了一个轻量级多用户可验证隐私保护基因序列分析方案. 首先,构造了一种高效的可验证多密钥同态数据封装机制VMK-HDEM,该方案支持在密文域上对L个不同输入实例的打包计算,用户端$ {S en}_{i} $公钥加密的使用次数复杂度为O(L),即与其数据集的大小$ {n}_{i} $无关,大大降低了资源受限的本地用户的计算开销;在可验证性方面,云服务器生成的密文计算结果正确性验证证据大小复杂度为$ O({deg}_{F}) $(其中$ {deg}_{F} $代表外包计算函数的阶),与用户数据集大小$ {n}_{i} $无关. 然后,基于所构造的新型密码原语VMK-HDEM,设计了一个轻量级高效的可验证隐私保护基因序列分析方案LWPPGS,有效保护了用户基因数据集的隐私和基因序列分析结果的隐私,并高效验证其分析结果的正确性. 最后,通过形式化的安全性证明和实验仿真结果表明了所构造方案VMK-HDEM和LWPPGS的安全性和实用性.

多密钥全同态数据封装机制  /  可验证  /  基因序列分析  /  隐私保护  /  高效性

As the development of the emerging areas of network services such as big data and cloud computing, data element has played an increasingly critical role in the fields of intelligent e-health and scientific research. Gene sequencing technology is widely used in many fields to determine the cause and category of a patient’s disease, by processing the patient’s gene sequence. Due to constrained storage and computing resources, local users often need to rent resource-abundant cloud servers, unfortunately always working in untrusted environments, to fulfill the computationally-intensive task of large-scale gene sequencing function evaluation. To guarantee users’ data privacy and the correctness of computing results, most of the state-of-the-art methods exploit the techniques of public key fully homomorphic encryption and secure multiparty computation to achieve data privacy, and the technique of Yao’s garbled circuit or bilinear paring to achieve correctness verification. Owing to the fact that huge computational overhead and communication overhead are required in the cryptographic primitives mentioned above, they are inappropriate for efficiency needs of the resource-constrained local users in gene sequence analysis. To address this challenging issue, in this paper, a lightweight verifiable privacy-preserving gene sequence analysis scheme in the multi-user setting is proposed. Firstly, we design an efficient verifiable multi-key homomorphic data encapsulation mechanism VMK-HDEM. The proposed VMK-HDEM enables batch outsourced function evaluation on L different input instances over the encrypted domain. The usage time complexity of public key encryption on each user $ {S en}_{i} $’s end is O(L), independent of the dataset size $ {n}_{i} $, which significantly decreases the computational cost of local users. For verification, the size of the proof is $ O({deg}_{F}) $ where $ {deg}_{F} $ denotes the degree of the function, independent to the size of user’s dataset $ {n}_{i} $. Furthermore, based on our constructed cryptographic primitive VMK-HDEM, a lightweight and efficient verifiable privacy-preserving gene sequence analysis scheme LWPPGS is proposed. It not only can preserve the privacy of both users’ gene datasets and the results of gene sequence analysis, but also efficiently verify the correctness of the outcome. Finally, formal security proof and experimental simulation results show the security and practicability of our proposed VMK-HDEM and LWPPGS.

multi-key fully homomorphic data encapsulation mechanism  /  verifiability  /  gene sequence analysis  /  privacy-preserving  /  efficiency
胡云舒, 周俊, 曹珍富, 董晓蕾. 轻量级多用户可验证隐私保护基因序列分析方案. 计算机研究与发展, 2024 , 61 (10) : 2448 -2466 . DOI: 10.7544/issn1000-1239.202440453
Yunshu Hu, Jun Zhou, Zhenfu Cao, Xiaolei Dong. Lightweight Multi-User Verifiable Privacy-Preserving Gene Sequence Analysis Scheme[J]. Journal of Computer Research and Development, 2024 , 61 (10) : 2448 -2466 . DOI: 10.7544/issn1000-1239.202440453
随着云计算和大数据的蓬勃发展,数据要素安全正成为隐私计算、区块链等领域的有力保障,成为车联网、电子医疗等各类新兴网络服务的重要基石. 基因组测序技术自从2003年人类基因组计划宣告成功起,到今天已经获得了突飞猛进的发展. 现在,人们已经可以用低廉的成本获取非常详尽的基因组数据,并将其广泛应用于卫生保健、生物医学研究、司法鉴定以及直接面向消费者的基因检测等各个领域[1]. 在基因组序列的比对和处理分析中,将未知序列同已知序列进行相似性比较是一项非常重要的研究,其中序列比对运用某种特定的数学模型或算法,找出2个或多个序列之间的最大匹配碱基数或残基数,其反映了序列之间的相似程度. 全基因组关联分析(genome-wide association study,GWAS)作为热门的遗传分析方法,在人类和动植物复杂性状遗传研究中已取得初步成果. 它以连锁不平衡为基础,通过识别数百个或数千个个体的定位群体中高密度的分子标记,一般是从上万个甚至上百万个单核苷酸多态性(single nucletide polymorohism,SNP)标记数据库中筛选出与复杂性状表现型变异相关联的分子标记,进而分析这些分子标记对表现型的遗传效应. 然而,由于每个个体所具有的SNP数量巨大且基因序列比对函数运算复杂,所以存储、计算资源受限的本地用户通常将基因测试任务外包给资源充足的云服务器完成.
然而云服务器通常工作在不可信环境中. 半可信的(semi-honest)云服务器在诚实执行协议的同时会通过与用户的交互,从协议的副本中最大程度地窃取用户数据隐私;恶意的云服务器则会通过任意行为破坏协议的正确运行,返回用户错误的计算结果. 由于个体基因序列信息和基因序列分析结果与用户隐私休戚相关,且不正确的基因序列分析结果会严重影响疾病预测、诊断及相关科研工作顺利开展. 此外,基因序列分析通常要通过将多个用户的基因序列信息与带有特定病灶特征的基因序列片段进行比对实现,因此,如何构建轻量级可验证多用户隐私保护基因序列分析方案成为亟待解决的重要研究课题.
国内外现有工作大多利用公钥全同态加密、安全多方计算或差分隐私技术实现[2-8]. 多密钥公钥全同态加密可以实现在不同密钥加密的密文数据上进行密态计算. López-Alt等人[2]利用公钥全同态加密算法[3]设计了多用户安全外包计算方案. Chen等人[4]基于BFV方案和CKKS方案[5],给出了对应的多密钥全同态加密方案. 然而,上述方案要求数据拥有者对其数据集中的每一个数据进行公钥全同态加密,因此,其公钥加密的使用次数复杂度$ O\left({n}_{i}\right) $与各用户$ {S en}_{i} $数据集大小呈线性相关,其中$ {n}_{i} $表示用户数据集的大小. 此外,该方案的密文大小随着电路中乘法运算深度的增加而迅速膨胀. 因此无法满足基因序列分析任务中存储、计算、通信资源受限用户的低功耗性能需求.
为解决上述问题,Zhou 等人[9]和曹珍富等人[10]通过减少公钥加密的使用次数提出了高效的安全外包计算新理论与新方法,在支持用户数据密态计算的同时将本地用户$ {S en}_{i} $的公钥加密使用次数复杂度由$ O\left({n}_{i}\right) $降低到O(1). 然而该方案仅支持单用户(单密钥)的安全外包计算,但在基因分析系统中,多个用户的同一SNP位点的基因信息需要在多个不同密钥下加密以确保不同用户之间的基因数据隐私保护,并且加密后的密文还需在云端进行外包计算得到密态分析结果. 此外,该方案还无法在恶意敌手模型下对云服务器给出的计算结果进行高效的正确性验证,难以支持恶意云服务器输出错误的基因序列分析结果. 最后,该方案还无法支持在密文域上对多个输入实例进行外包函数批量计算,其计算开销与通信开销仍有进一步提升空间. 另一方面,基于秘密共享等技术实现安全外包计算协议和基于数据扰动等技术实现的差分隐私保护协议,用于多用户隐私保护基因序列分析任务,也会对用户的通信复杂度和计算结果的精度带来不同程度的影响[10].
针对多用户场景的隐私保护基因序列密态分析,近年来国内外也有一些研究结果[11-14]. Chen等人[11]基于SNP序列数据库,提出了采用汉明码和哈希图来保证数据隐私性与完整性的方案;基于半诚实的云服务器,Hasan等人[12]提出了大大减少计算开销的高效可扩展的安全共享和计算基因组数据的方法. 然而,文献[11–14]工作大多利用计算、通信开销巨大的公钥全同态加密技术实现,使得资源受限的本地用户无法承受巨大的计算和通信的复杂性,不适用于基因序列分析系统这类大数据与复杂函数的计算场景. 且上述基因序列统计分析方案也未考虑在恶意敌手模型下为用户提供计算结果正确性的高效可验证机制.
为了解决上述挑战性问题,本文提出了一个高效的可验证多密钥同态数据封装机制VMK-HDEM,该方案支持多用户、多数据的协同打包与密态计算,且能在恶意敌手模型下保证外包计算结果的正确性. 并在此基础上,设计了一个轻量级多用户可验证隐私保护基因序列分析方案. 本文的主要贡献有3点:
1)设计了高效的可验证多密钥同态数据封装机制VMK-HDEM. 相较于国内外大多数可验证外包计算协议,该方案不使用公钥全同态加密,而是依据混合加密的原则,利用离线状态下常数次(与用户数据集大小无关)任意CPA安全的公钥加密算法加密对称加密密钥(会话密钥),在线状态下设计仅包含简单加法、乘法运算的且具有被动攻击下不可区分安全性的对称全同态加密算法加密数据. 在合作不合谋的双服务器模型下,利用密文重随机化技术和重加密技术,把多个不同密钥加密的输入数据转换成统一密钥加密的数据,从而将多密钥问题转换为单密钥问题. 此外,该方案还利用多密钥同态消息验证码实现恶意敌手模型下,计算结果的接收方能高效验证云服务器密文计算结果的正确性. 云服务器可在密文域上对多个外包函数输入实例进行打包计算和批量生成计算结果正确性验证证据.
2)基于本文设计的可验证多密钥同态数据封装机制VMK-HDEM,提出了多用户、多数据协同的轻量级可验证隐私保护基因序列分析方案(LWPPGS).方案. 该方案实现了对大规模多用户源基因密文数据的批量计算和处理,以及在密文域上用于病例对照差异的等位基因卡方检验分析,从而对功能机制进行有效评估. 最终,将密文域上的基因组序列分析结果返回给用户,仅拥有授权用户可高效验证基因序列分析结果的正确性并解密得到明文的分析结果.
3)形式化的安全性证明和仿真实验结果表明本文提出的VMK-HDEM机制和LWPPGS具备CPA安全性,且在数据拥有者、云服务器与接收方端的计算、通信效率方面均得到显著提升. 在密文域上对L个不同输入实例进行外包函数打包计算时,用户端$ {S en}_{i} $公钥加密的使用次数复杂度为O(L),即与其数据集的大小$ {n}_{i} $无关,大大降低了资源受限的本地用户计算开销;在可验证性方面,云服务器生成的密文计算结果正确性验证证据大小复杂度为$ O({deg}_{F}) $(其中$ {deg}_{F} $代表外包计算函数的阶),与用户数据集大小$ {n}_{i} $无关.
本节主要针对国内外可验证隐私保护基因序列分析工作中的代表性关键密码技术,即全同态加密和可验证计算进行阐述.
1)全同态加密
全同态加密(fully homomorphic encryption,FHE)的概念由Rivest,Adleman 和 Dertouzos[15]在1978年提出. 全同态加密支持在没有对密文输入数据进行解密的情况下,即在密文域上进行任意函数$ F $的计算. 授权用户对函数$ F $在密文域上计算后得到的密文计算结果解密后,可得到与直接在明文域上计算函数$ F $相同的结果[16-17]. 因此,可以利用全同态加密将数据加密后上传至云服务器,云服务器在密文域上计算得到的结果解密后与直接通过明文计算得到的结果相同. 通过这种方式,存储、计算资源受限的本地用户可租用云服务器丰富的计算资源进行外包计算,同时保护数据隐私. 2009年Gentry[18]提出了第一个可支持任意函数计算的全同态加密方案,该方案基于多项式环上的理想格,但方案非常复杂且效率低下,实际应用困难. 2009年Dijk等人 [19]对上述基于理想格的方案进行改进,基于AGCD困难问题,提出了一种整数上的同态加密方案,即DGHV方案,但存在公钥数目过大和长度过长的问题. Brakerski 等人[20]基于错误学习(learning with errors,LWE),避开了理想格问题和稀疏子集问题,提出了采用重线性化技术来解决噪声增长问题的同态加密方案,即 BV 方案. 随后,Brakerski等人[21] 又基于环上的错误学习(RLWE)提出了层次型同态加密方案——BGV,其中提到的密钥转换和模转换技术对之后的研究影响颇深. 之后,Gentry等人[22]基于矩阵思想和LWE安全假设提出了GSW全同态加密方案. 其同态加法和同态乘法就是矩阵上的加法和矩阵上的乘法,并且没有用到密钥转换算法,但该方案需要较大的密钥尺寸和计算开销,这使得它在实际应用中需要更高的硬件资源和计算能力. Cheon等人[5]提出了一个近似计算同态加密算法,即CKKS方案. 其具体构造基于BGV方案,但也可以基于其他类型的全同态加密方案. CKKS方案是目前对实数和复数进行近似同态计算最有效的方法. 为了支持更深的乘法电路,Lee等人[23]和Liu等人[24]分别提出了具有较小评估密钥的FHEW高效自举方案和多项式模数下支持打包的批量自举方案. 在多密钥全同态加密方面,López-Alt等人[2]提出了一个多密钥外包计算方案,但该方案的解密开销与用户数相关. Chen等人[4]基于BFV方案和CKKS方案[5],给出了对应的多密钥全同态加密方案. 该方案提出了一种针对打包密文生成重线性化密钥的新方法. Kwak等人[16]提出了一种实用的多密钥TFHE同态加密方案. 但文献[2, 4, 16]方案所需计算开销和通信开销仍十分巨大,难以适应基于大规模数据集与复杂函数的多用户隐私保护基因序列分析,成为资源受限的本地用户的性能瓶颈. 近年来,Zhou等人[25]基于任意单向陷门置换提出了一种高效的多用户安全外包计算方案,但未考虑恶意敌手模型下的密文计算结果正确性验证问题.
2)可验证计算
外包计算的可验证性是指客户端希望将在输入$ x $上的函数$ F $的计算委托给恶意敌手模型下的云服务器完成. 如果服务器回复$ y $,客户端的目标是用比计算函数$ F $花费更少的开销验证$ y=F\left(x\right) $的正确性. Gennaro 等人[26]引入了可验证计算的概念,并设计了一种基于混淆电路的非交互式可验证计算方案. Chung等人[27]利用全同态加密方案构造了一个使用较小公钥的非交互式可验证计算方案. 此外,Parno等人[28]设计了一种基于CP-ABE 的公开可验证计算方案. Papamanthou 等人[29]提出了一种云环境下新的动态计算验证模型. 为了支持多用户系统,Choi 等人[30]提出了一种使用代理无关传输方案的多用户非交互式可验证计算方案. 为了进一步实现多用户环境下的高效公开可验证,近年来,Baum等人[31]提出了一种支持可识别中止和高效公开可验证的常数轮安全多方计算协议. 上述边缘计算结果的正确性可验证方案主要通过Yao的混淆电路(garbled circuit)或双线性配对实现,计算开销仍较大,无法满足可验证基因序列分析任务中低功耗的本地用户性能需求. 在多服务器模型下,基于公开可验证的秘密共享技术,给出了可验证的外包多项式计算方案[32-33]. 但该方案无法保护用户的数据隐私和计算结果隐私,且需要用户间交互,带来较大的通信开销. 此外,文献[22–33]方案每进行一次计算,云服务器就需要生成一个验证证据且用户需要进行一次计算结果正确性验证,为计算结果接收方带来的验证计算开销与通信开销也极大.
不同于国内外目前的大多数多用户可验证外包计算方案[26-36],本文基于混合加密原则,通过减少公钥加密使用次数,针对多个输入实例设计批量函数计算和批量生成验证证据新方法,大大降低了资源受限用户端和云服务器端的计算开销与通信开销. 构建了轻量级多用户可验证全同态数据封装机制及高效的可验证隐私保护基因序列分析方案.
定理1. 中国剩余定理(Chinese remainder theorem,CRT)[9]. 假设正整数$ {m}_{1},{m}_{2},… ,{m}_{n} $两两互素,则同余方程组:
$ \left\{\begin{aligned}& x\equiv {a}_{1}\left({\rm mod\;}{m}_{1}\right)\\&x\equiv {a}_{2}\left({\rm mod\;}{m}_{2}\right)\\[-5pt]&\quad\quad\quad \vdots \\[-3pt]&x\equiv {a}_{n}\left({\rm mod\;}{m}_{n}\right)\end{aligned}\right. \text{,} $
有整数解,并且在模$ M={m}_{1}*{m}_{2}*… *{m}_{n} $的情况下解是唯一的,为
$ x\equiv \left({a}_{1}{M}_{1}{M}_{1}^{-1}+{a}_{2}{M}_{2}{M}_{2}^{-1}+… +{a}_{n}{M}_{n}{M}_{n}^{-1}\right){\rm{mod}}\;M \text{,} $
其中$ {M}_{i}=\dfrac{M}{{m}_{i}} $,$ {M}_{i}^{-1} $为$ {M}_{i} $模$ {m}_{i} $的逆元.
定理2. 标记程序(labeled program)[37]. 一个标记的程序$ P $为一个元组$ \left(f,{l}_{1},… ,{l}_{n}\right) $,其中$ f:{M}^{n}\to M $是一个n元变量的函数(如一个电路),$ {l}_{i}\in {\left\{\mathrm{0,1}\right\}}^{*} $是$ f $第$ i $个输入的标签. 标记程序可由下面方式组成:给定$ {P}_{1},… , {P}_{t} $和一个函数$ g $:$ {M}^{t}\to M $,所组成的程序$ {P}^{*} $是通过计算$ g $在$ {P}_{1},… ,{P}_{t} $上的输出得到的,表示为$ {P}^{*}=g\left({P}_{1},… ,{P}_{t}\right) $. $ {P}^{*} $的标记输入都是$ {P}_{1},… ,{P}_{t} $不同标记的输入(所有具有相同标记的输入被分到同一组,然后作为$ {P}^{*} $的一类输入). 令$ {f}_{id}:M\to M $为恒等函数,$ l\in {\left\{\mathrm{0,1}\right\}}^{*} $为任意标签. 记$ {I}_{l}=\left({f}_{id},l\right) $为带标签$ l $的标识程序. 值得注意的是,一个程序$ {P}=\left(f,{l}_{1},… ,{l}_{n}\right) $可以被表示为由n个恒等程序$ {P}=f\left({I}_{{l}_{1}},… ,{I}_{{l}_{n}}\right) $组成.
本节首先给出可验证多密钥同态数据封装机制(VMK-HDEM)的算法定义与安全模型,包括数据隐私安全模型和可验证性安全模型. 并在此基础上,给出建立在VMK-HDEM方案基础上构造的多用户、多数据协同的轻量级可验证隐私保护基因序列分析方案(LWPPGS)的安全目标.
VMK-HDEM的系统模型如图1所示.
1)假定每个数据拥有者$ {S en}_{i}\left(i=\mathrm{1,2},… ,{n}_{s}\right) $的数据集大小是$ {n}_{i} $,在一次函数计算中,$ {S en}_{i} $有$ L $条隐私输入数据实例$ {m}_{i,l}(l=\mathrm{1,2},… ,L) $,其中$ L $是参与外包函数计算的输入数据实例数且$ L\le {n}_{i} $,并将这些输入实例用各自的密钥进行加密后形成密文$ {C}_{{S en}_{i}} $以及密文输入的认证码$ {\sigma }_{i} $,上传给云平台;
2)不失一般性的,在一对合作但不共谋的云服务器$ S ER $和密码服务器提供商$ CS P $场景下,在密文域上计算多元多项式函数$ F\left({x}_{1},{x}_{2},… ,{x}_{{n}_{s}}\right)=\displaystyle\sum_{j=1}^{K}{a}_{j}\displaystyle\prod_{i=1}^{{n}_{s}}{{x}_{i}}^{{t}_{i,j}} $,记函数的阶为$ {deg}_{F} $,得到函数的密文计算结果$ {C}_{F} $,以及云服务器$ S ER $利用外包函数$ F $和$ {\sigma }_{i} $生成的密文计算结果正确性验证证据$ \sigma $;
3)云服务器将密文计算结果$ {C}_{F} $和计算结果验证证据$ \sigma $返回给接收方$ REC $;
4)授权的接收方$ REC $验证外包计算结果的正确性,验证通过后进一步解密函数计算结果.
本文提出的$ \mathrm{V}\mathrm{M}{K}{\text{-}}\mathrm{H}\mathrm{D}\mathrm{E}\mathrm{M} $方案包含5个算法,分别是$ VMK $-$ HDEM. S etup $,$ VMK $-$ HDEM. KeyGen $,$ VMK $-$ HDEM. Enc $,$ VMK $-$ HDEM. Eval $,$ VMK $-$ HDEM. Dec $. 下面分别给出这5个算法的输入输出定义:
1)$ V M K $-$ HDEM. S etup( {1}^{ \mathrm{\lambda }} ) \to ( PPR,s{k}_{PKE,S ER}, $ $ {sk}_{PKE,CS P}, {sk}_{PKE,REC}) $. 输入安全参数$ \lambda $,生成云服务器SER、密码服务提供商CSP和授权接受方REC的公私钥$ \big({pk}_{PKE,S ER}, {sk}_{PKE,S ER}\big) $,$ \left({pk}_{PKE,CS P},{sk}_{PKE,CS P}\right) $和$ \left({pk}_{PKE,REC},{sk}_{PKE,REC}\right) $,输出公共参数$ PPR=({\lambda ,pk}_{PKE,S ER},{pk}_{PKE,CS P},{pk}_{PKE,REC},ID, T $)其中$ ID $是数据拥有者的身份标识符$ i $的集合,$ T $是标签$ \tau $的标签空间.
2)$ VMK $-$ HDEM. KeyGen\left(PPR\right) \to (pb{k}_{i},{pvk}_{i},{pbk}_{CS P}, {pvk}_{CS P},{k}_{i}) $. 输入公开参数$ PPR $,输出数据拥有者$ S e{n}_{i} $的临时公钥$ pb{k}_{i} $和临时私钥$ pv{k}_{i} $、密码服务提供商$ CS P $的临时公钥$ pb{k}_{CS P} $和临时私钥$ pv{k}_{CS P} $,以及由数据拥有者$ {S en}_{i} $秘密保存的标签生成与验证密钥$ {k}_{i} $,$ {k}_{i} $包括一个伪随机函数密钥$ {k}_{\rm pse,i} $以及一个用户生成和验证标签的种子$ {x}_{i} $.
3)$ V M K $-$ HDEM. Enc(PPR,{pvk}_{i},{pbk}_{i}, \{{m}_{i,l}\}(i= 1,2,… , {n}_{{s}}; l=\mathrm{1,2},… ,L),{k}_{i})\to {C}_{{S en}_{i}} $. 输入公开参数$ PPR $、数据拥有者$ S e{n}_{i} $的临时公私钥$ {pbk}_{i} $和$ {pvk}_{i} $、消息$ \{{m}_{i,l}\} $和标签生成验证密钥$ {k}_{i} $,输出密文$ {C}_{{S en}_{i}} $.
4) $ VMK $ - $ HDEM. \,Eval\; (\;PPR,\;F,\;s{k}_{PKE,S ER},\;s{k}_{PKE,CS P}, {{p}{b}{k}}_{CS P}, {pvk}_{CS P},{C}_{{S en}_{i}} (i=\mathrm{1,2},… , {n}_{s})) \to {{C}}_{REC,S ER} $. 输入公开参数$ PPR $、多元多项式函数$ F $、云服务器$ S ER $的私钥$ s{k}_{PKE,S ER} $、密码服务提供商$ CS P $的私钥$ {sk}_{PKE,CS P} $、密码服务提供商$ CS P $的临时公私钥对$ {pbk}_{CS P} $和$ {pvk}_{CS P} $以及密文$ {C}_{{S en}_{i}} $,输出密文$ {C}_{REC,S ER} $.
5)$ VMK{\text -}HDEM. \,Dec\,(\,{PPR,sk}_{PKE,REC}, $ $ {C}_{REC,S ER},F)\,\to F ({m}_{1,l},{m}_{2,l},… ,{m}_{{n}_{s},l}) $或$\perp $. 输入公开参数$ PPR $、授权接受方$ REC $的私钥$ {sk}_{PKE,REC} $、密文$ {{C}}_{REC,S ER} $以及函数$ F $,输出$ L $个函数的运算结果$ F\left({m}_{1,l},{m}_{2,l},… ,{m}_{{n}_{s},l}\right), $其中$ l=\mathrm{1,2},… , L $;或者输出⊥,即当验证失败时无法输出正确的函数计算结果.
首先我们给出$ \rm {V}{M}{K}{\text -}{H}{D}{E}{M} $方案的数据输入隐私和输出隐私.
1)输入隐私. 该协议的输入隐私为诚实数据拥有者的本地数据集中的输入数据安全,能有效抵抗被俘获的数据拥有者、2个合作不合谋的服务器之一和被俘获的数据接收方发起的合谋攻击.
2)输出隐私. 该协议的输出隐私为外包函数计算结果仅能由授权的接收方正确解密获得. 具体而言,外包函数的计算结果数据安全能有效抵抗被俘获的数据拥有者与2个合作不合谋的服务器之一发起的合谋攻击.
下面形式化定义$ \rm {V}{M}{K}{\text -}{H}{D}{E}{M} $方案的数据隐私安全模型. 为描述简洁,我们以输入数据隐私安全模型为例给出其形式化安全模型和定义,输出隐私安全模型可同样定义. 给定一个诚实数据拥有者$ {S en}_{{i'}} $的输入数据$ {m}_{{i'},l}\left({i'}\in ID;l=\mathrm{1,2},… ,L\right) $,$ {S en}_{{i'}} $上传它的密文输入数据给云服务器$ S ER $进行隐私保护的外包函数计算. 对于$ \rm {V}{M}{K}{\text -}{H}{D}{E}{M} $方案,通过一个模拟者$ B $和概率多项式时间能力的敌手$ {\mathcal{A}}_{\rm dp}^{\rm VMK{\text -}HDEM} $之间的游戏$ DP{\text -}CP{A}_{{\mathcal{A}}_{\rm dp}^{\rm VMK{\text -}HDEM}}\left(\lambda \right) $来形式化定义数据隐私安全模型,下面我们给出该游戏的各个阶段:
1)初始化阶段. 输入安全参数$ {1}^{\lambda } $,模拟者$ B $运行$ {V}{M}{K}{\text -}{H}{D}{E}{M}. {S} {e}{t}{u}{p}({1}^{{\lambda }}) $来生成云服务器SER、密码服务提供商CSP和授权接受方REC的公私钥$ \big({{pk}}_{PKE,S ER}, {{sk}}_{PKE,S ER}\big) $,$ \left({{pk}}_{PKE,CS P},{{sk}}_{PKE,CS P}\right) $和$ \left({{pk}}_{PKE,REC},{{sk}}_{PKE,REC}\right) $. 并生成公共参数$ PPR=({\mathrm{\lambda },{pk}}_{PKE,S ER},{{pk}}_{PKE,CS P},{{pk}}_{PKE,REC}, ID,T $). 接着运行$ {V}{M}{K}{\text -}{H}{D}{E}{M}. {K}{e}{y}{G}{e}{n}\left({PPR}\right) $生成数据拥有者$ {S en}_{i}(i=\mathrm{1,2},… ,{n}_{s}) $的临时公私钥$ {pbk}_{i}\mathrm{和}{pvk}_{i} $、CSP的临时公私钥$ pb{k}_{CS P} $和$ pv{k}_{CS P} $以及由数据拥有者$ {S en}_{i} $秘密保存的用于生成和验证标签的密钥$ {k}_{i} $. 最后将$ (PPR, {\{pbk}_{i}\},pb{k}_{CS P}) $都返回给敌手$ {\mathcal{A}}_{\rm dp}^{\rm VMK{\text -}HDEM} $.
2)查询腐化谕言机$ {O}^{\rm Cor} $. 定义初始腐化集合$ {L}_{\rm corr}= \varnothing $,敌手$ {\mathcal{A}}_{\rm dp}^{\rm VMK{\text -}HDEM} $可以俘获除诚实数据拥有者$ S e{n}_{{i'}} $以外的数据拥有者$ S e{n}_{j}(j=\mathrm{1,2},… ,{n}_{s} $且$ j\ne {i'}) $、授权接收方以及云服务器SER和密码服务提供商CSP中的一个. 敌手$ {\mathcal{A}}_{\rm dp}^{\rm VMK{\text -}HDEM} $可以利用$ {O}^{\rm Cor} $查询$ {O}^{\rm Cor}\left(j\right) $,获得对应的被腐化数据拥有者的私钥$ {pvk}_{j} $,模拟者$ B $更新$ {L}_{\rm corr}\leftarrow {L}_{\rm corr}\cup \{j\} $;还可以查询$ {O}^{\rm Cor}\left(S ER\right) $或$ {O}^{\rm Cor}\left(CS P\right) $以及$ {O}^{\rm Cor}\left(REC\right) $分别获得$ {sk}_{PKE,S ER} $或$ {(sk}_{PKE,CS P},pv{k}_{CS P}) $以及$ {sk}_{PKE,REC} $、模拟者$ B $相应的更新腐化集合.
3)挑战阶段. 敌手$ {\mathcal{A}}_{\rm dp}^{\rm VMK{\text -}HDEM} $选择一对挑战明文消息$ {m}_{{i'},l,0},{m}_{{i'},l,1} $($ l=\mathrm{1,2},… ,L) $,且$ {|m}_{{i'},l,0}|=|{m}_{{i'},l,1}| $,并将这对挑战明文发送给模拟者$ B$. B随机选择$ b{\in }_{R}\left\{\mathrm{0,1}\right\} $,输出挑战密文$ {C}_{{i'}}^{*}={V}{M}{K}{\text -}{H}{D}{E}{M}. {E}{n}{c}({PPR},{pvk}_{{i'}},{pbk}_{{i'}},{m}_{{i'},l,b}, {k}_{{i'}}) $给敌手$ {\mathcal{A}}_{\rm dp}^{\rm VMK{\text -}HDEM} $.
4)猜测阶段. 敌手$ {\mathcal{A}}_{\rm dp}^{\rm VMK{\text -}HDEM} $收到挑战密文$ {C}_{{i'}}^{*} $后进行猜测,输出$ {b'}\in \left\{\mathrm{0,1}\right\} $. 如果$ {b'}=b $,则说敌手$ {\mathcal{A}}_{\rm dp}^{\rm VMK{\text -}HDEM} $成功赢得了游戏$ DP{\text -}CP{A}_{{\mathcal{A}}_{\rm dp}^{\rm VMK{\text -}HDEM}}\left(\lambda \right) $;反之则失败.
定义1. 数据隐私安全. 在上述游戏$ DP{\text -}CP{A}_{{\mathcal{A}}_{\rm dp}^{\rm VMK{\text -}HDEM}} \left(\lambda \right) $中,我们定义概率多项式时间能力的敌手$ {\mathcal{A}}_{\rm dp}^{\rm VMK{\text -}HDEM} $获胜的优势为$ Ad{v}_{DP{\text -}CPA}^{{\mathcal{A}}_{\rm dp}^{\rm VMK{\text -}HDEM}}\left(\lambda \right)= \Big|{Pr}\left[{b'}=b\right]- \dfrac{1}{2}\Big| $. 那么,所提出的$\rm {V}{M}{K}{\text -}{H}{D}{E}{M} $方案能实现数据隐私的CPA(选择明文攻击)安全性,当且仅当对于任意概率多项式时间能力的敌手$ {\mathcal{A}}_{\rm dp}^{\rm VMK{\text -}HDEM} $,上述优势都满足不等式$ Ad{v}_{CPA}^{{\mathcal{A}}_{\rm dp}^{\rm VMK{\text -}HDEM}}\left(\lambda \right)\le \epsilon \left(\lambda \right) $,其中$ \epsilon \left(\lambda \right) $为$ \lambda $上的可忽略函数.
我们首先给出VMK-HDEM方案的可验证性目标. 在VMK-HDEM方案中,多元多项式函数$ F\big({x}_{1}, {x}_{2},… ,{x}_{{n}_{S}}\big) $的每一个输入数据$ {x}_{i} $都有一个验证码$ {\sigma }_{i} $. 我们的可验证性安全模型保证了敌手在不知道相关密钥的情况下,只能获得合法用户已生成的验证码$ {\sigma }_{i}(i=\mathrm{1,2},… ,{n}_{s}) $,或合法用户已生成的验证码上的函数计算结果$ \sigma \left(\sigma =F\left({\sigma }_{1},… ,{\sigma }_{{n}_{s}}\right)\right) $. 直观地说,我们的可验证性安全模型保证了当云服务器计算得出错误的函数结果时,授权的接收方接受此结果的概率是可忽略的.
下面我们形式化的定义VMK-HDEM方案的可验证性(不可伪造性)安全模型. 对于VMK-HDEM方案,我们通过一个模拟者$ B $和敌手$ {\mathcal{A}}_{\rm ver}^{\rm VMK{\text -}HDEM} $之间的实验$ HomU F{\text -}CM{A}_{{\mathcal{A}}_{\rm ver}^{\rm VMK{\text -}HDEM}}\left(\lambda \right) $来形式化定义可验证性安全模型,下面我们介绍该实验的5个阶段:
1)初始化. 模拟者$ B $运行$ {V}{M}{K}{\text -}{H}{D}{E}{M}. S etup({1}^{\mathrm{\lambda }}) $来生成云服务商SER、密码服务提供商CSP和接受方REC的公私钥$ \left({pk}_{PKE,S ER},{sk}_{PKE,S ER}\right) $,$ \left({{pk}}_{PKE,CS P},{{sk}}_{PKE,CS P}\right) $和$ \left({{pk}}_{PKE,REC}, \;{{sk}}_{PKE,REC}\right) $. 并生成公共参数$ PPR=(\mathrm{\lambda }, {pk}_{PKE,S ER}, {{pk}}_{PKE,CS P}, $$ {{pk}}_{PKE,REC},ID,T) $($ ID $是数据拥有者的身份标识符$ i $的集合,$ T $是标签$ \tau $的标签空间). 并将$ PPR $发送给敌手$ {\mathcal{A}}_{\rm ver}^{\rm VMK{\text -}HDEM} $.
2)查询认证码生成谕言机$ {O}^{\rm Mac{\text -}Gen} $. 敌手$ {\mathcal{A}}_{\rm ver}^{\rm VMK{\text -}HDEM} $可以适应性向模拟者提交表单$ \left(\varDelta ,{l'},m\right) $进行查询. 其中$ \varDelta $是一个数据集的标识符;$ {l'}=\left(i,\tau \right) $,其中$ i\in ID, \tau \in {{T}} $;$ {m}\subseteq {M} $,是消息总空间$ {{M}} $中的一个子集. 模拟者$ B $针对敌手$ {\mathcal{A}}_{\rm ver}^{\rm VMK{\text -}HDEM} $不同的查询,回答如下:
① 如果$ \left(\varDelta ,{l'},m\right) $中的$ \varDelta $代表的数据集是第一次被查询,模拟者$ B $初始化一个空的列表$ {L}_{\varDelta }=\varnothing $并且继续执行②.
② 如果$ \left(\varDelta ,{l'},m\right) $中的$ {l'} $的身份标识符$ i $是第一次被查询,模拟者$ B $运行密钥生成算法生成用于生成和验证认证标签的密钥$ {k}_{i}\stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow }{V}{M}{K}{\text -}{H}{D}{E}{M}. KeyGen\left(PPR\right) $(此处$代表密钥生成算法$ {V}{M}{K}{\text -}{H}{D}{E}{M}. {K}{e}{y}{G}{e}{n} $是一个概率性算法,下文出现的$符号含义相同),除了生成$ {k}_{i} $,还生成数据拥有者$ S e{n}_{i} $的临时公私钥$ (pb{k}_{i},pv{k}_{i}) $和密码服务提供商$ CS P $的临时公私钥对$ (pb{k}_{CS P},pv{k}_{CS P}) $. 并且$ {k}_{i} $隐式地与数据拥有者的身份标识符$ i $绑定. 模拟者$ B $继续执行③.
③ 如果$ \left(\varDelta ,{l'},m\right) $满足$ \left({l'},m\right)\notin {L}_{\varDelta } $,模拟者$ B $运行加密算法得到认证码$ {\sigma }_{{l'}}\stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow }{V}{M}{K}{\text -}{H}{D}{E}{M}. $${E}{n}{c}\big(PPR,{pvk}_{i}, {pbk}_{i}, m,{k}_{i}\big) $(注意这里只运行$ {V}{M}{K}{\text -}{H}{D}{E}{M}. {E}{n}{c} $中生成认证码的部分),并返回认证码$ {\sigma }_{{l'}} $给敌手$ {\mathcal{A}}_{\rm ver}^{\rm VMK{\text -}HDEM} $,并更新集合$ {L}_{\varDelta }\leftarrow {L}_{\varDelta }\cup \{{l'},m\} $.
④ 如果$ \left(\varDelta ,{l'},m\right) $满足$ \left({l'}, \cdot \right)\in {L}_{\varDelta } $(意味着敌手已经对于某个集合$ {m'}\left(m\subseteq {m'}\right) $进行过查询$ \left(\varDelta ,{l'},{m'}\right) $),那么$ B $忽略此次查询.
3) 查询认证码验证谕言机$ {O}^{\rm Mac{\text{-}}ver} $. 敌手$ {\mathcal{A}}_{\rm ver}^{\rm VMK{\text -}HDEM} $可以通过查询验证谕言机,即敌手可以提交一个查询$ \left(P,\varDelta ,m,\sigma \right) $. 其中,$ P $是一个标记程序,可以记为$ P= \left(F,l'_{1},l'_{2},… ,l'_{{n}_{s}}\right),F $是一个有$ {n}_{s} $个变量的函数,$ l'_{i}\mathrm{是}F $第$ i $个输入的标签;$ \varDelta $代表某个数据集;$ m $是消息空间的一个消息;$ \sigma $是敌手想要验证的认证码. 模拟者$ B $计算$ {V}{M}{K}{\text -}{H}{D}{E}{M}. {D}{e}{c}\left(P,{\varDelta ,\left\{{k}_{i}\right\}}_{i\in P},m,\sigma \right) $(注意这里$ B $只运行$ {V}{M}{K}{\text -}{H}{D}{E}{M}. {D}{e}{c} $中的验证认证码部分),其中$ {\left\{{k}_{i}\right\}}_{i\in P} $是指所有和程序$ P $中涉及到的数据拥有者的标识符$ i $绑定的密钥的集合. 若验证成功,代表验证码$ \sigma $是消息$ m $对应的合法认证码,模拟者$ B $输出1;反之,代表验证失败,模拟者$ B $输出0. 模拟者$ B $将结果返回给敌手$ {\mathcal{A}}_{\rm ver}^{\rm VMK{\text -}HDEM} $.
4)查询腐化谕言机$ {O}^{\rm Mac{\text -}Cor} $. 敌手可以通过查询腐化谕言机来获取被腐化的数据拥有者的私钥. 具体地说,在游戏最初,模拟者$ B $初始化一个为空的腐化用户集合$ {L}_{\rm corr}=\varnothing $. 在游戏过程中,敌手$ {\mathcal{A}}_{\rm ver}^{\rm VMK{\text -}HDEM} $可以适应性地使用任意数据拥有者的标识符$ i $查询其密钥. 如果$ i\notin {L}_{\rm corr} $,那么腐化的谕言机将密钥$ {k}_{i} $返回给敌手(如果$ i $是第一次被查询则运行$ {V}{M}{K}{\text -}{H}{D}{E}{M}. KeyGen $来生成密钥$ {k}_{i} $),然后更新列表$ {L}_{\rm corr}\leftarrow {L}_{\rm corr}\cup \{i\} $. 如果$ i\in {L}_{\rm corr} $,那么腐化的谕言机返回之前已生成的密钥$ {k}_{i} $.
5)伪造阶段. 在游戏的最后,敌手$ {\mathcal{A}}_{\rm ver}^{\rm VMK{\text -}HDEM} $输出一个元组$ \left({P}^{*},{{\varDelta }^{*},m}^{*},{\sigma }^{*}\right) $. 如果$ {\mathcal{A}}_{\rm ver}^{\rm VMK{\text -}HDEM} $输出的元组是一个成功伪造(根据定义2),游戏将输出1,否则输出0.
定义2. 成功伪造. 已知实验$ HomU F{\text -}CM{A}_{{\mathcal{A}}_{\rm ver}^{\rm VMK{\text -}HDEM}} \left(\lambda \right) $中$ \left({P}^{*},{{\varDelta }^{*},m}^{*},{\sigma }^{*}\right) $是敌手$ {\mathcal{A}}_{\rm ver}^{\rm VMK{\text -}HDEM} $在实验结束时返回的元组,其中$ {P}^{*}=\left({F}^{*},{l}_{1}^{*},… ,{l}_{t}^{*}\right) $,$ {\varDelta }^{*} $是某个数据集的标识符,$ {m}^{*}\in M $,$ {\sigma }^{*} $是一个认证码. 如果对于任何$ i\in {P}^{*} $且$ i\notin {L}_{\rm corr} $(即$ {P}^{*} $中没有被腐化的用户),$ {V}{M}{K}{\text -}{H}{D}{E}{M}. {D}{e}{c}\left({P}^{*},{{{\varDelta }^{*},\left\{{k}_{i}\right\}}_{i\in {P}^{*}},m}^{*},{\sigma }^{*}\right) $(注意这里只运行解密算法中的验证认证码的部分)的运算结果都输出1,并且下列3种条件中任一条件能够被满足,则敌手输出的$ \left({P}^{*},{{\varDelta }^{*},m}^{*},{\sigma }^{*}\right) $是一个成功的伪造.
1)条件1. $ {L}_{{\varDelta }^{*}} $在游戏过程中没有被初始化(即数据集$ {\varDelta }^{*} $没有被查询过).
2)条件2. 对于所有的$ i\in \left[t\right] $,存在$ \exists ({l}_{i}^{*},{m}_{i})\in {L}_{{\varDelta }^{*}} $,但$ {m}^{*}\ne {F}^{*}({m}_{1},{m}_{2},… ,{m}_{t}) $. 即敌手不能在已经正确生成了认证码的消息的函数计算结果上做伪造.
3)条件3. 存在一个标签$ {l}^{*} $满足$ {(l}^{*}, \cdot )\notin {L}_{{\varDelta }^{*}} $,即敌手从未用$ {l}^{*} $进行过查询.
定义3. 可验证性安全. 在上述游戏$ HomU F{\text{-}} CM{A}_{{\mathcal{A}}_{\rm ver}^{\rm VMK{\text -}HDEM}}\left(\lambda \right) $中,我们定义概率多项式时间能力的敌手$ {\mathcal{A}}_{\rm ver}^{\rm VMK{\text -}HDEM} $获胜的优势为$ Ad{v}_{{H}{o}{m}{U} {F}{\text -}{C}{M}{A}}^{{\mathcal{A}}_{\rm ver}^{\rm VMK{\text -}HDEM}}\left(\lambda \right)\;=\;{P} {r} [HomU F- $$ CM{A}_{{\mathcal{A}}_{\rm ver}^{\rm VMK{\text -}HDEM}} $$ \left(\lambda \right)=1] $. 那么,所提出的$ \mathrm{V}\mathrm{M}\mathrm{K}{\text-} \mathrm{H}\mathrm{D}\mathrm{E}\mathrm{M} $方案能实现可验证性安全(不可伪造性),当且仅当对于任意概率多项式时间能力的敌手$ {\mathcal{A}}_{\rm ver}^{\rm VMK{\text -}HDEM} $,上述优势都满足不等式$ Ad{v}_{{H}{o}{m}{U} {F}{\text -}{C}{M}{A}}^{{\mathcal{A}}_{\rm ver}^{\rm VMK{\text -}HDEM}}\left(\lambda \right)\le \epsilon \left(\lambda \right) $,其中$ \epsilon \left(\lambda \right) $为$ \lambda $上的可忽略函数.
LWPPGS的数据隐私安全目标定义有:
1)输入隐私. LWPPGS方案的输入隐私是指多个用户的输入基因序列信息,即对应一段基因序列的碱基对排序. 用户将基因序列数据加密上传到服务器,并确保2个合作不合谋的服务器之一无法与其他被俘获的用户合谋获取诚实用户的基因信息.
2)输出隐私. LWPPGS方案的输出隐私是指用户的基因序列的分析结果. 分析结果仅能由授权的接收方正确解密获得. 具体而言,计算基因序列的外包函数的计算结果的数据隐私安全能够有效抵抗被俘获的数据拥有者与2个合作不合谋的服务器之一发起的共谋攻击.
由于LWPPGS方案是基于可验证的多密钥同态数据封装机制VMK-HDEM构建的,因此其数据隐私安全可以规约到VMK-HDEM的数据隐私安全上.
LWPPGS的可验证性安全目标是指当云服务器计算得出错误的基因序列分析结果时,用户接受该结果的概率是可忽略的. 与LWPPGS方案的数据隐私安全模型相同,由于LWPPGS方案是基于VMK-HDEM方案构建的,因此其可验证性安全可以规约到VMK-HDEM的可验证性安全上.
本节中,我们基于混合加密原则,提出了一个可验证的多密钥同态数据封装机制VMK-HDEM. 利用一个任意的$ \rm CPA $安全的公钥加密算法$ PKE $作为黑盒(其包括初始化算法$ PKE. S etup $、密钥生成算法$ PKE. KeyGen $、加密算法$ PKE. Enc $和解密算法$ PKE. Dec $)用于加密对称密钥;并设计了一个具有被动攻击下不可区分安全性的对称同态加密算法加密数据. 同时,构造了一个多密钥同态消息认证码来共同组成VMK-HDEM. 方案的可验证性是指接收方能有效验证密文计算结果的正确性,防止恶意云服务器输入错误计算结果. 为了实现可验证性,每一个数据拥有者(发送方)$ S e{n}_{i} $将对自己的带有标签$ {l}_{i'} $的密文输入数据进行计算以生成一个认证码$ {\sigma }_{i} $,然后云服务器将生成密文计算结果正确性的证据$ \sigma =F (\sigma_{1},… , {\sigma }_{{n}_{s}} ) $. VMK-HDEM方案中用户外包计算的函数为多元多项式形式的函数. 在下面的方案描述过程中,为方便起见,我们令$ {n}_{s} $(数据拥有者个数)为函数的变元个数,令$ F\left({x}_{1},{x}_{2},… ,{x}_{{n}_{s}}\right)=\displaystyle\sum_{j=1}^{K}{a}_{j}\displaystyle\prod_{i=1}^{{n}_{s}}{{x}_{i}}^{{t}_{i,j}} $,即函数计算的$ {n}_{s} $个自变量分别来自$ {n}_{s} $个$ S e{n}_{i} $. 值得一提的是,每个发送方$ S e{n}_{i} $的数据集大小是$ {n}_{i} $,所构造的VMK-HDEM方案支持对$ L $个不同输入实例的批量函数计算. 即$ S e{n}_{i} $每次从其数据集中选择$ L $个输入数据进行加密并打包$ (L\le {n}_{i}) $,再将打包密文输入发送给云服务器,使其能在$ L $组已打包的$ {n}_{s} $维密文输入数据上进行一次函数运算,批量得到$ L $个函数密文计算结果以及一个计算结果正确性验证证据$ \sigma $. 最后,接收方可以使用$ \sigma $对$ L $个函数密文计算结果的正确性进行批量验证,并解密分别得到这$ L $次函数计算的明文计算结果.
本文中VMK-HDEM的符号描述如表1所示.
本节详细介绍VMK-HDEM方案的具体步骤.
1)$ V M K {\text -} HDEM. S etup( {1}^{\mathrm{\lambda }}) \to ({PPR}, s{k}_{PKE,S ER}, $ $ {sk}_{PKE,CS P}, {sk}_{PKE,REC}) $. 输入安全参数$ \lambda $,任选一个CPA安全的公钥加密算法PKE,运行$ PKE. S etup({1}^{\mathrm{\lambda }}) $和$ PKE. KeyGen({1}^{\mathrm{\lambda }}) $;输出3对公私钥,分别为云服务商SER、密码服务提供商CSP和授权接受方REC的公私钥对$ ({pk}_{PKE,S ER}, {sk}_{PKE,S ER}) $,$ ({pk}_{PKE,CS P},{sk}_{PKE,CS P}) $和$ ({pk}_{PKE,REC},{sk}_{PKE,REC}) $. 私钥$ {S}{K}= ({sk}_{PKE,S ER},{sk}_{PKE,CS P},{sk}_{PKE,REC} ) $分别由云服务器SER,密码服务提供商CSP,授权接受方REC各自秘密保存. 数据拥有者的身份标识符$ i $的集合$ ID=\left[{n}_{s}\right] $是一个整数界限$ {n}_{s}\in \mathbb{N} $. 标签$ \tau $的标签空间$ T $由任意二进制字符串组成,即$ {{T}}={\left\{\mathrm{0,1}\right\}}^{*} $. 最后参数生成算法输出公开参数$ {PPR}=({\lambda ,pk}_{PKE,S ER},{pk}_{PKE,CS P},{pk}_{PKE,REC},ID,T $).
2)$ V M K {\text -} HDEM. KeyGen\left({PPR}\right) \to ({pbk}_{i},{pvk}_{i},{pbk}_{CS P}, {pvk}_{CS P},{k}_{i}) $. 每个数据拥有者$ S e{n}_{i}\left(i=\mathrm{1,2},… ,{n}_{s}\right) $随机选择$ 2L+1 $个大素数$ {p}_{i,1},{p}_{i,2},… ,{p}_{i,L},{s}_{i},{q}_{i,1},{q}_{i,2},… ,{q}_{i,L} $. 令$ {q}_{i,\min} $=$ {\rm{Min}}{\{q}_{i,l}\} $,消息空间为$ {Z}_{{q}_{i,\min}}^{*} $,满足$ {|p}_{i,l}|=|{q}_{i,l}|=|{s}_{i}|= \lambda $($ l=1, 2,… ,L $). 计算$ {{N}}_{{i}}=\displaystyle\prod _{l=1}^{L}{p}_{i,l} $. 计算$ {T}_{i}={s}_{i}\displaystyle\prod _{l=1}^{L}{p}_{i,l} $,令$ {N}_{i}={p}_{i,l}\cdot M_{i,l}\left(l=\mathrm{1,2},… ,L\right), $其中$ {M}_{i,l}\cdot M'_{i,l}\equiv 1\left({\rm mod}\;{p}_{i,l}\right) $. 数据拥有者$ {S en}_{i} $的临时公钥和私钥分别为${pbk}_{i}=\left({T}_{i},{\{q}_{i,l}\}\right) $,$ {pvk}_{i}= \left(\{{p}_{i,l}\},{s}_{i},{N}_{i}\right)\left(l=\mathrm{1,2},… ,L\right). CS P $随机选择$ 2L+1 $个大素数$ {p}_{1} ,{p}_{2} ,…,{p}_{L} $,s,$ {q}_{1}{,q}_{2},… ,{q}_{L}$,满足$ \left|{p}_{1}\right| = \left|{p}_{2}\right| = … = \left|{p}_{L}\right|=\left|{q}_{1}\right|=… =\left|{q}_{L}\right|=\left|s\right|=\lambda $. 计算$ N $=$ \displaystyle\prod_{l=1}^{L}{p}_{l} $. 令$ {N={p}_{l}\cdot Q}_{l} (l= \mathrm{1,2},… ,L),{Q}_{l}\cdot Q'_{l}\equiv 1\left({\rm mod}\;{p}_{l}\right),(l= \mathrm{1,2},… ,L $). 计算$ T= s\displaystyle\prod_{l=1}^{L}{p}_{l} $,$ CS P $的临时公私钥为$ pb{k}_{CS P}=T,pv{k}_{CS P}=({\{p}_{l}\}, {\{q}_{l}\},s,N) $. 接着通过一个伪随机函数生成器生成伪随机函数密钥$ {k}_{\rm pse} $,以及带密钥的伪随机函数$ {F}_{{k}_{\rm pse}}:{\left\{\mathrm{0,1}\right\}}^{*}\times {\left\{\mathrm{0,1}\right\}}^{2\mathrm{\lambda }}\to {\left\{\mathrm{0,1}\right\}}^{2\mathrm{\lambda }} $. 最后$ {S en}_{i} $选择一个随机数$ {x}_{i}\in {Z}_{{T}_{i}}^{*} $,输出用于生成和验证认证标签的密钥$ {k}_{i}=({k}_{\rm pse},{x}_{i}) $,$ {k}_{i} $由数据拥有者$ {{S} {e}{n}}_{{i}} $秘密保存.
3)$ V M K{\text -}$$ H D E M. Enc({PPR},{pvk}_{i},{pbk}_{i},\{{m}_{i,l}\}(i = 1,2,…, {{n}}_{{s}};l=\mathrm{1,2},… ,L),{k}_{i})\to {C}_{{S en}_{i}} $. 首先定义认证码空间,每个认证码$ \sigma $包含一对$ \left(I,y\right) $,其中集合$ I\subseteq ID $,多项式$ y $位于$ {n}_{s} $元多项式环$ {{F}}_{{q}_{1,\min},{q}_{2,\min},… ,{q}_{{n}_{s},\min}}[{X}_{1},{X}_{2},… ,{X}_{{n}_{s}}] $中. 每个拥有数据$ {m}_{i,l} $的数据拥有者$ {S en}_{i} $计算$ {m}_{i,l,{p}_{i,l}}= {m}_{i,l} $ ($ {\rm mod}\;{p}_{i,l} $),$ \left(l=\mathrm{1,2},… ,\mathrm{L}\right) $,然后随机选择$ {r}_{i,0} $,$ {r}_{i,1}\in \{0,1\}^{2\mathrm{\lambda }} $,$ {k}_{i,l} $ $ \in {\left\{0,1\right\}}^{\mathrm{\lambda }} $,其中$ {r}_{i}{\in Z}_{T}^{*} $ 并且计算
$ C_{i,S ER}=PKE.Enc_{pk_{PKE,S ER}}\left(r_{i,0}\right), $
$ L $是偶数时:$ {C}_{i,CS P,l}^{1}={{P}{K}{E}. {E}{n}{c}}_{{{pk}}_{PKE,CS P}}\left({p}_{i,l}\|{p}_{i,l+1}\right) $
$ \left(l=\mathrm{1,3},5,… ,L-1\right);$
$ L $是奇数时:$ {C}_{i,CS P,l}^{1}={{P}{K}{E}. {E}{n}{c}}_{{{pk}}_{PKE,CS P}}\left({p}_{i,l}\|{p}_{i,l+1}\right) $
$ \left(l=\mathrm{1,3},5,… ,L-2\right) ,$
${C}_{i,CS P,l}^{1}=PKE. En{c}_{p{k}_{PKE,CS P}}\left({p}_{i,l}\|{0}^{\lambda }\right)\left(l=L\right). $
数据拥有者$ {S en}_{i} $可以在离线状态下完成上述操作.
对给定的$ L $,对密文进行加密:
$ C_i=r_{i,0}\left(\sum_{l=1}^LM_{i,l}^{-1}M_{i,l}\left(m_{i,l}+k_{i,l}q_{i,l}\right)_{p_{i,l}}\right)+r_{i,1}N_i{\rm mod}\; T_i, $
其中$ {{M}_{i,l}^{-1}}{M}_{i,l}\equiv 1\left({\rm mod}\;{p}_{i,l}\right) $. 接着$ S e{n}_{i} $首先为密文$ {C}_{i} $生成标签$ {l}_{i'}=(i,{\tau }_{i})\in ID\times T $,其中$ i $为$ S e{n}_{i} $的身份标识符,标签$ {\tau }_{i} $通过连接它们的性质和索引产生,比如$ {\mathrm{\tau }}_{{i}}=\mathrm{“}\mathrm{输}\mathrm{入}\mathrm{”}\left|\right|i. S e{n}_{i} $将标签$ {l}_{i'} $公开. 接着为密文$ {C}_{i} $生成一个认证码$ {\sigma }_{i}=\left({I}_{i},{y}_{i}\right), $其中$ {I}_{i}=i $,$ {y}_{i} $是一个以$ {X}_{i} $为变量的一次多项式. $ S e{n}_{i} $首先将标签值代入密钥生成阶段生成的伪随机函数计算得到$ {r}_{{\tau }_{i}}={F}_{{k}_{\rm pse}}\left({\tau }_{i}\right) $. 接着令$ {y}_{0,i}={C}_{i} $;${y}_{1,i}=\dfrac{{r}_{{\tau }_{i}}-{C}_{i}}{{x}_{i}}({x}_{i} $是$ KeyGen $算法中生成的认证标签密钥$ {k}_{i} $的一部分),再利用$ \left({y}_{0,i},{y}_{1,i}\right) $来构建多项式$ {y}_{i}\left({{X}}_{{i}}\right)={y}_{1,i}{{X}}_{{i}}+{y}_{0,i} $. 注意当自变量$ {{X}}_{{i}}=0 $时, 多项式$ {y}_{i}\left({{X}}_{{i}}\right)= $$ {C}_{i} $;当自变量取$ {x}_{i} $时,$ {y}_{i}\left({{X}}_{{i}}\right)= $$ {r}_{{\tau }_{i}} $.
接着$ S e{n}_{i} $用接收方$ REC $的公钥加密认证标签密钥$ {k}_{i} $:
$ C_{k_{\rm{p}se}}=PKE.Enc_{pk_{PKE,REC}}\left(k_{\rm{p}se}\right), $
$ {C}_{{x}_{i}}={PKE. Enc}_{{pk}_{PKE,REC}}\left({x}_{i}\right). $
令$ {C}_{{k}_{i}}=\left({C}_{{k}_{\rm pse}},{C}_{{x}_{i}}\right) $,数据拥有者$ S e{n}_{i} $将密文$ {C}_{{S en}_{i}}= \left({C}_{i,S ER},{\{C}_{i,CS P,l}^{1}\}\left(l=\mathrm{1,2},… ,L\right),{C}_{i},{\sigma }_{i},{C}_{{k}_{i}}\right) $发送给云服务器$ S ER $.
4)$ {V}{M}{K} {\text -}\, {H}{D}{E}{M}. \,{E}{v}{a}{l}\;(\;{PPR}, \;{F}, \;s{k}_{PKE,S ER},\; {sk}_{PKE,CS P}, {pbk}_{CS P} $,$ {pvk}_{CS P} $,$ C_{S en_i}\left(i=\mathrm{1,2},…,\mathrm{\mathit{n_{{s}}}}\right) $) $ \to {C}_{REC,S ER} $. 云服务器$ S ER $首先用其私钥$ s{k}_{PKE,S ER} $解密得$ {r}_{i,0}={PKE. Dec}_{{sk}_{PKE,S ER}} \left({C}_{i,S ER}\right) $,然后发送$ {C}_{i}\mathrm{和}{C}_{i,CS P,l}^{1}( {l}=\mathrm{1,2},… ,{L}) $给$ CS P $.
$ CS P \;$首先用其私钥$ s{k}_{PKE,CS P} $解密得$ {p}_{i,l}\,=\,PKE. Dec_{{sk}_{PKE,CS P}}\left({C}_{i,CS P,l}^{1}\right) $. 接着随机选择$ {r}_{i,CS P}\in {\left\{\mathrm{0,1}\right\}}^{2\lambda } $,$ {k}_{i,l}^{CSP}\in {\left\{\mathrm{0,1}\right\}}^{\lambda } $,并利用自己的临时公私钥进行重加密:
$ C'_{i,l}=\left(C_i{\rm mod}\; p_{i,l}\right){\rm mod}\; q_{i,l}=r_{i,0}m_{i,l}{\rm mod}\; q_{i,l}, $
$ C''_{i,l}=\left(C'_{i,l}+k_{i,l}^{CS P}q_l\right){\rm mod}\; p_l,\left(l=\mathrm{1,2},…,L\right), $
$ C''_{i}=\left(\displaystyle\sum_{l=1}^{L}{Q}_{l}Q'_{l}C''_{i,l}+{r}_{i,CS P}N\right){\rm mod}\;T. $
最后,$ CS P $将$ {C}_{CS P}=\left(C''_{i}\right) $发送给$ S ER $. 不失一般性地,我们令外包多元多项式$ F $的第$ j $项$ {Item}_{j}={a}_{j}\displaystyle\prod_{i=1}^{{n}_{s}}{{x}_{i}}^{{t}_{i,j}} \left(j=\mathrm{1,2},… ,K\right) $的次数为$ {deg}_{j} $. 接收到$ {{C}}_{CS P} $后,$ S ER $随机选取$ {r}\in {\left\{\mathrm{0,1}\right\}}^{2\mathrm{\lambda }} $,满足$ {r}\in {{Z}}_{{T}}^{\mathrm{*}} $,然后计算:
$ C''_{i,S ER}=r_{i,0}^{-1}C''_i, $
$ C''_{i,S ER}=rC''_{i,S ER} . $
接着计算:
$ {C}_{{Item}_{j}}={r}^{{deg}_{F}{\text -}{deg}_{j}}{a}_{j}\displaystyle\prod_{i=1}^{{n}_{s}}{\left(C''_{i,S ER}\right)}^{{t}_{i,j}} , $
$ C_F^{\rm{b}ld}=\displaystyle\sum_{j=1}^KC_{Item_j}, $
$ Y_{Item_j}=a_j\displaystyle\prod_{i=1}^{n_s}\left(y_i\right)^{t_{i,j}}, $
$ {Y}_{F}^{\rm bld}=\displaystyle\sum_{j=1}^{K}{Y}_{{Item}_{j}} , $
其中,$ {Y}_{{Item}_{j}} $和$ {Y}_{F}^{\rm bld} $是$ {n}_{s} $元的多元多项式,且$ {Y}_{F}^{\rm bld} $的阶为$ {deg}_{F} $.
接着$ S ER $发送$ {C}_{F}^{\rm bld} $和$ {Y}_{F}^{\rm bld} $给$ CS P.\; CS P $接收之后,计算:
$ C_{F,l}^{CS P,1}=\left(C_F^{\rm{b}ld}{\rm mod}\; p_l\right){\rm mod}\; q_l, $
$ {C}_{F,l}^{CS P,2}={PKE. Enc}_{{pk}_{PKE,REC}}\left({C}_{F,l}^{CS P,1}\right) . $
接着$ CS P $发送$ {C}_{F,l}^{CS P,2} $给$ S ER $,最后$ S ER $首先计算:
$ {C}_{REC,S ER}={PKE. Enc}_{{pk}_{PKE,REC}}\left(r\right) \text{.} $
$ S ER $再根据接收的$ {n}_{s}\mathrm{个}\mathrm{认}\mathrm{证}\mathrm{码}{\left\{{\sigma }_{i}:=\left({I}_{i},{y}_{i}\right)\right\}}_{i} $,生成最终的关于密文域上函数计算结果正确性验证证据$ \sigma =(I,y) $,其中$ I=\bigcup\limits_{i=1}^{{n}_{s}}{I}_{i} $,$ y={Y}_{F}^{\rm bld} $.
最后$ S ER $将$ {{C}_{REC,S ER} = \left(\right\{C}_{F,l}^{CS P,2}\}(l = \mathrm{1,2},… ,L),{C}_{REC,S ER}, {C}_{F}^{\rm bld},{C}_{{k}_{i}}) $和认证码$ \sigma $发给授权接收方$ REC $.
5)$ {V}{M}{K} {\text -} {H}{D}{E}{M}. {D}{e}{c}(PPR,{l}_{i'}\left(i = {1,2},… ,{n}_{s}\right),s{k}_{PKE,REC}, {C}_{REC,S ER},\sigma ,F)\to{F}_{l}\left({m}_{1,l},{m}_{2,l},… ,{m}_{{n}_{s},l}\right) $或$ \perp $. 接收方首先需要验证密文域上外包计算结果的正确性,再对计算结果进行解密.
令$ {P}=\left({F},l'_{1},… ,l'_{{n}_{s}}\right) $,其中F为上述云服务器SER上的外包计算函数,$ {l}_{i'} $为数据拥有者$ S e{n}_{i} $公开的标签,且$ {l}_{i'}=(i,{\tau }_{i}) $. 接着$ REC $用自己的私钥解密得到用于验证函数计算结果正确性证据的密钥$ {k}_{i} $,包括$ {x}_{i} $和伪随机函数密钥$ {k}_{\rm pse} $:
$ x_i=PKE.Dec_{sk_{PKE,REC}}\left(C_{x_i}\right), $
$ {k}_{\rm pse}={PKE. Dec}_{{sk}_{PKE,REC}}\left({C}_{{k}_{\rm pse}}\right) . $
再用得到的伪随机函数密钥计算:
$ {r}_{{\tau }_{i}}={F}_{{k}_{\rm pse}}\left({\tau }_{i}\right) . $
又有$ \mathrm{\sigma }=\left({I},{y}\right) $,令$ {I}=\left\{{\bar{I}}_{1},{\bar{I}}_{2},… ,{\bar{I}}_{{n}_{s}}\right\},{\bar{I}}_{v}\ne {\bar{I}}_{u}( {v}, {u}\in\{1, 2,… ,{n}_{S}\} \mathrm{且} {v}\ne {u}). \;REC $接着验证下列3个等式,当且仅当3个等式都成立时,$ REC $接收$ S ER $的计算结果并对其解密;反之验证失败,$ REC $输出$ \perp $.
$ \left\{\bar{I}_1,\bar{I}_2,…,\bar{I}_{n_s}\right\}=\left\{i:i\in P\right\}, $
$ y\left(\mathrm{0,0},…,0\right)=C_F^{\rm{b}ld}, $
$ y\left({x}_{1},{x}_{2},… ,{x}_{{n}_{s}}\right)={F}\left({r}_{{\tau }_{1}},… ,{r}_{{\tau }_{{n}_{s}}}\right) . $
若验证成功,$ REC $用自己私钥解密函数的计算结果:
$ r=PKE.Dec_{sk_{PKE,REC}}\left(C_{REC,S ER}\right), $
$ {C}_{F,l}^{CS P,1}={PKE. Dec}_{{sk}_{PKE,REC}}\left({C}_{F,l}^{CS P,2}\right) ( l=\mathrm{1,2},… , {L} ). $
最后得到$ L $个函数计算结果:
$ F{\left({m}_{1,l},{m}_{2,l},… ,{m}_{{n}_{s},l}\right)}_{l}={r}^{{-deg}_{F}}{C}_{F,l}^{CS P,1} (l=\mathrm{1,2},… ,L) . $
在本节中,我们基于5.2节中提出的VMK-HDEM,设计了LWPPGS. 该方案能在密文上对用户的基因数据进行统计分析,实现用于病例对照差异的等位基因卡方检验.
我们首先介绍明文域上的等位基因卡方检验方案的计算方法. 等位基因卡方检验通常需要与多个SNP进行遗传关联测试. 以一对等位基因A和a为例,A为主要等位基因,a为次要等位基因. 一个SNP的数据可以以2种形式表示:一种是按基因型计数(例如aa,Aa和AA),另一种是根据等位基因A和a的疾病状态计数的列联表. 等位基因情况(A,a)的列联表如表2所示.
表2中$ {n}_{00} $ 是携带次要等位基因a的对照病例数,$ {n}_{01} $是主要等位基因A的对照病例数,$ {n}_{10} $是携带次要等位基因a的实验组病例数,$ {n}_{11} $是携带主要等位基因A的实验组病例数;$ {r}_{0} $是对照组病例数,$ {r}_{1} $是实验组病例数;$ {c}_{0} $表示次要等位基因的计数, $ {c}_{1} $ 表示主要等位基因的计数,N是总病例数. $ {y}_{i} $表示第$ i $个个体的疾病状态,$ {y}_{i}=1 $表示个体患有疾病,反之,$ {y}_{i}=0 $;$ {s}_{i}\in \left\{\mathrm{0,1},2\right\} $对应于个体$ i $的等位基因变异数,其中,$ {n}_{11}= $$ {y}^{\rm T}\cdot s $,${r}_{1} =2{y}^{\rm T}\cdot y $,${c}_{1}= \displaystyle\sum_{i=0}^{N}{s}_{i} $.
通过计算$ \mathrm{卡}\mathrm{方}\mathrm{值}{\mathrm{\chi }}^{2} $,可确定预期频率和观察到的频率之间是否存在显著差异,从而计算关联强度$ OR $:
$ {\mathrm{\chi }}^{2}=\dfrac{{2{N}\left(2{n}_{11}N-2{c}_{1}{r}_{1}\right)}^{2}}{{c}_{1}\left(2N-{c}_{1}\right){2r}_{1}\cdot \left(2N-{2r}_{1}\right)} \text{,} $
$ OR=\dfrac{{n}_{11}\left({n}_{11}-{2r}_{1}-{c}_{1}+2N\right)}{\left({c}_{1}-{n}_{11}\right)\left(2{r}_{1}-{n}_{11}\right)} . $
值得一提的是,我们可以通过使用矢量化公式同时计算M个SNP的$ {\mathrm{\chi }}^{2} $值和$ OR $值. 此时,$ {u}_{b}={\left\{1\right\}}_{i=1}^{b},b= M,N;{n}_{11}={y}^{\rm T}\cdot {\boldsymbol{S}}, 2{r}_{1}=2({y}^{\rm T}\cdot y $)$ {u}_{M},{c}_{1}:={u}_{N}^{\rm T}\cdot {\boldsymbol{S}} $,标量$ 2N $用矩阵$ \boldsymbol{d}=2N{\mathit{u}}_{M} $替代. 其中$ \boldsymbol{S}\in {\left\{\mathrm{0,1},2\right\}}^{N\times M} $表示SNP矩阵,$ {\mathit{S}}_{\mathit{i},\mathit{j}} $对应第$ i $个个体的第$ j $个SNP.
并且根据$ {\mathrm{\chi }}^{2} $和$ OR $的表达式,我们可以按照分子分母分离出4个式子,分别计算出4个表达式的结果即可得到卡方值$ {\mathrm{\chi }}^{2} $和关联强度$ OR $的值:
$ Item_{j,\rm{n}um}=2N\left(2n_{11}N-2c_1r_1\right)^2, $
$ Item_{j,\rm{d}en}=c_1\left(2N-c_1\right)2r_1\cdot\left(2N-2r_1\right), $
$ Item_{j,\rm{o}rnum}=n_{11}\left(n_{11}-2r_1-c_1+2N\right), $
$ {Item}_{j,{\rm orden}}=\left({c}_{1}-{n}_{11}\right)\left(2{r}_{1}-{n}_{11}\right) .$
如图2所示,数据拥有者$ {S en}_{i} $输入多个SNP位点的基因型数据及相关疾病的表现型后,云服务器在密文域上对多个数据拥有者输入的数据进行卡方检验运算,将结果返回给接收方REC,REC根据计算结果生成相关医学诊断,在得到数据拥有者$ {S en}_{i} $的请求申请后,将医学诊断发送给数据拥有者.
接下来我们在上述基因序列分析计算方法(等位基因卡方检验)的基础上,基于可验证多密钥同态数据封装机制$ VMK{\text -}HDEM $,构造一个轻量级可验证多用户隐私保护等位基因卡方检验方案LWPPGS. 该方案包含5个算法$ {L}{W}{P}{P}{G}{S}.{S} {e}{t}{u}{p} $,$ {L}{W}{P}{P}{G}{S}. {K}{e}{y}{ }{G}{e}{n} $,$ {L}{W}{P}{P}{G}{S}. {E}{n}{c} $,$ {L}{W}{P}{P}{G}{S}. {E}{v}{a}{l} $和$ {L}{W}{P}{P}{G}{S}. {D}{e}{c} $,我们假定共有$ {n}_{u} $个用户:$ \left\{{U}_{i}\right\}(i=\mathrm{1,2},… ,{n}_{u}) $;每个用户$ {U}_{i} $有$ M $个SNP:$ \{{s}_{i,j}\}\left(j=\mathrm{1,2},… ,M\right) $;$ \{{y}_{i,{j}_{0}}\}({j}_{0}=1) $代表用户$ {U}_{i} $的疾病状态;令5.3.1节提出的可用于计算卡方值$ {\mathrm{\chi }}^{2} $和关联强度$ OR $的4个函数表达式为$ {{R}}_{j}=({Item}_{j,{\rm num}}, {Item}_{j,{\rm den}},{Item}_{j,{\rm ornum}},{Item}_{j,{\rm orden}}) $.
本文提出的LWPPGS方案的符号描述如表3所示.
下面我们详细介绍LWPPGS方案的各个算法:
1)$ {L}{W}{P}{P}{G}{S}.{S} {e}{t}{u}{p}({1}^{\lambda } $). 调用可验证多密钥同态数据封装机制中的$ VMK{\text -}HDEM. S etup({1}^{\lambda }) $算法完成初始化,输入安全参数$ \mathrm{\lambda } $,生成3对公私钥$ ({{pk}}_{PKE,S ER}, {{sk}}_{PKE,S ER}) $,$ ({{pk}}_{PKE,CS P},\,{{sk}}_{PKE,CS P}) $和$ ({{pk}}_{PKE,REC},\,{{sk}}_{PKE,REC}) $,分别分发给云服务商$ S ER $,加密服务提供商$ CS P $,授权接受用户$ REC $. 并输出公开参数$ {PPR}=({\mathrm{\lambda },{pk}}_{PKE,S ER},{{pk}}_{PKE,CS P}, {{pk}}_{PKE,REC},ID, T $). $ ID $是用户的身份标识符$ i $的集合,$ T $是标签$ \tau $的标签空间.
2)$ {L}{W}{P}{P}{G}{S}. {K}{e}{y}{G}{e}{n}\left({PPR}\right) $. 调用可验证多密钥同态数据封装机制中的$ VMK{\text -}HDEM. KeyGen\left(PPR\right) $算法,以公共参数$ PPR $为输入,为每个用户$ {U}_{i} $随机选择2L+1个大素数$ {p}_{i,1},{p}_{i,2},… ,{p}_{i,L},{s}_{i},{q}_{i,1},… ,{q}_{i,L} $,计算$ {N}_{i} $=$ \displaystyle\prod_{l=1}^{L}{p}_{i,l} $,$ {T}_{i}={s}_{i}\displaystyle\prod_{l=1}^{L}{p}_{i,l} $,设置用户$ {U}_{i} $的临时公钥和临时私钥分别为$ {pbk}_{i}=({T}_{i},{\{q}_{i,l}\}),{pvk}_{i}=(\{{p}_{i,l}\},{s}_{i},{N}_{i})\left(l=\mathrm{1,2},… ,L\right). CS P $也随机选择2L+1个大素数$ {p}_{1},{p}_{2},…, {p}_{L} $,s,$ {q}_{1}, {q}_{2}, … , {q}_{L} $,计算$ N $=$ \displaystyle\prod_{l=1}^{L}{p}_{l} $,$ T={s}\displaystyle\prod_{l=1}^{L}{p}_{l} $,CSP的临时公私钥为$ {pbk}_{CS P}= T,pv{k}_{CS P}=({\{p}_{l}\},{\{q}_{l}\},s,N) $. 用户$ {U}_{i} $通过一个伪随机函数生成器生成伪随机函数私钥$ {k}_{\rm pse} $,并选择一个随机数$ {x}_{i} $,生成用于生成和验证认证码标签的密钥$ {k}_{i}= ({k}_{\rm pse},{x}_{i}) $,并由$ {U}_{i} $秘密保存.
3)$ {L}{W}{P}{P}{G}{S}. {E}{n}{c}({PPR},{pbk}_{i},pv{k}_{i},\{{s}_{i,j}\left\}\right(i=\mathrm{1,2},… ,{n}_{u}; j=\mathrm{1,2},… ,M),\{{y}_{i,{j}_{0}}\left\}\right(i=\mathrm{1,2},… ,{n}_{u};{j}_{0}=1),{k}_{i})$. 该算法输入公共参数、用户$ {U}_{i} $的临时公私钥对、用户的疾病状态$ {y}_{i,{j}_{0}}\left({j}_{0}=1\right) $和$ M $个SNP上的$ {s}_{i,j}(j=\mathrm{1,2},… ,M) $,其中$ {y}_{i,{j}_{0}}=\left\{\mathrm{0,1}\right\} $;${s}_{i,j}=\left\{\mathrm{0,1},2\right\} $. 然后调用算法$ VMK{\text -}HDEM. $${E}{n}{c}\left({PPR},{pbk}_{i},{pvk}_{i},\{{s}_{i,j}\}\left(i=\mathrm{1,2},… ,{n}_{u},j=\mathrm{1,2},… ,M\right),{k}_{i}\right) $和算法$ {V M K{\text -}HDEM. Enc(PPR,pbk}_{i},{pvk}_{i},\{{y}_{i,{j}_{0}}\}(i= 1,2,… , {n}_{u}; $$ {j}_{0}=1),{k}_{i}) $,分别对用户$ {U}_{i} $的对应SNP位点上的等位基因数$ \{{s}_{i,j} \} $以及是否患病$ {\{y}_{i,{j}_{0}}\} $进行加密,得到加密后的数据$ {C}_{{s}_{i}} $,$ {C}_{{y}_{i}} $和认证码$ {\sigma }_{{s}_{i}} $,$ {\sigma }_{{y}_{i}} $再上传至服务器进行外包计算.
4)$ LW P PG S .Eval(PPR,R_j,sk_{PKE,S ER},sk_{PKE,CS P},pbk_{CS P}, \rm{ }\mathrm{\mathit{_{ }pvk_{CSP}}},\mathit{\mathrm{\mathit{C}}}_{S en_i}(\mathit{\mathrm{\mathit{i}}}=\mathrm{1,2},…,\mathrm{\mathit{n_u}})) $ . 该算法输入公共参数$ PPR $、与卡方值$ {\mathrm{\chi }}^{2} $和关联强度$ OR $有关的函数表达式$ {{R}}_{j} $、计算服务器SER和CSP的私钥、CSP的临时公私钥对和用户上传的密文数据$ {C}_{{S en}_{i}} $,且其中
$ {C}_{{S en}_{i}}=\left({C}_{{y}_{i}},{C}_{{s}_{i}}\right);$
$ {{R}}_{j}=\left({Item}_{j,{\rm num}},{Item}_{j,{\rm den}},{Item}_{j,{\rm ornum}},{Item}_{j,{\rm orden}}\right). $
然后$ {L}{W}{P}{P}{G}{S}. {E}{v}{a}{l} $算法调用$ {V}{M}{K}{\text -}{H}{D}{E}{M}. {E}{v}{a}{l} $ $ ({PPR},{{R}}_{j},{{sk}_{PKE,S ER},{sk}_{PKE,CS P},pbk}_{CS P},{pvk}_{CS P},{C}_{S e{n}_{i}}(i=1, 2,… ,{n}_{u})) $算法计算$ {{R}}_{j} $中的函数表达式
$ C_{Item_{j,\mathrm{\rm{n}um}}}=d\times\left(n_{11}\times d-c_1\times2r_1\right)^2, $
$ C_{Item_{j,\mathrm{\rm{d}en}}}=c_1\times\left(d-c_1\right)\times2r_1\times\left(d-2r_1\right), $
$ C_{Item_{j,\mathrm{\rm{o}rnum}}}=n_{11}\times\left(n_{11}-2r_1-c_1+d\right), $
$ {C}_{{Item}_{j,{\rm orden}}}={({c}_{1}-n}_{11}\left)\times \right({2r}_{1}-{n}_{11}) ,$
其中,$ {\boldsymbol u}_{b}={\left\{1\right\}}_{i=1}^{b}\in {\mathbb{R}}^{b};b=M,N $;
$ {n}_{11}:={\boldsymbol y}^{\rm T}{\boldsymbol{S}};{c}_{1}:={\boldsymbol u}_{N}^{\rm T}{\boldsymbol{S}} . $
$ {\boldsymbol y}^{\rm T}={(C}_{{y}_{1,{j}_{0}}},{C}_{{y}_{2,{j}_{0}}},… ,{C}_{{y}_{{n}_{u},{j}_{0}}}) $是单位行向量,
$ \boldsymbol S={(C}_{{s}_{1,j}},{C}_{{s}_{2,j}},… ,{C}_{{s}_{{n}_{u},j}}) $是单位行向量.
计算完成后得到密文域上的$ {n}_{u} $个用户在同一SNP位点的卡方检验值计算所需的所有分子分母值.
最后服务器将上述L组密文计算结果:
$ C_{R_j}=\left(C_{Item_{j,\mathrm{\rm{n}um}}},C_{Item_{j,\mathrm{\rm{d}en}}},C_{Item_{j,\mathrm{\rm{o}rnum}}},C_{Item_{j,\mathrm{\rm{o}rden}}}\right)\left(j=\mathrm{1,2},…,L\right) $
和上述计算过程中生成的验证码$ \mathrm{\sigma } $,以及其他密文发送给授权的接收方.
5)$ {L}{W}{P}{P}{G}{S}. {D}{e}{c}({PPR},{sk}_{PKE,REC},{C}_{{R}_{j}},\mathrm{\sigma } $). 该算法输入公共参数$ PPR $、授权接收者的私钥$ {sk}_{PKE,REC} $和密文域上的推荐结果$ {C}_{{R}_{j}} $,调用算法$ {V}{M}{K}{\text -}{H}{D}{E}{M}. {D}{e}{c}({PPR}, {sk}_{PKE,REC} $,$ {C}_{{R}_{j}},\mathrm{\sigma } $),用户利用认证标签密钥验证$ \mathrm{\sigma } $,若验证失败则拒绝接受$ S ER $的计算结果;若验证成功,则利用自己的私钥进行解密,获得明文域上卡方检验所需要的计算数据$ {R}_{j}=\big({Item}_{j,{\rm num}},{Item}_{j,{\rm den}},{Item}_{j,{\rm ornum}}, {Item}_{j,{\rm orden}}\big),\left(j=\mathrm{1,2},… ,L\right) $. 最后计算得到$ L $个卡方值$ {{{\chi }}^{2}_{j}} $以及$ L $个关联强度$ OR $的值:
$ {{{\chi }}^{2}_{j}}=\dfrac{{Item}_{j,{\rm num}}}{{Item}_{j,{\rm den}}}, $
$ {OR}_{j}=\dfrac{{Item}_{j,{\rm ornum}}}{{Item}_{j,{\rm orden}}}\left(j=\mathrm{1,2},… ,L\right) . $
本文提出的VMK-HDEM基于混合加密的思想设计实现. 具体而言,使用了CPA安全的任意公钥加密算法PKE加密对称密钥;利用仅包含简单加法、乘法运算的对称全同态加密算法加密数据. 依据文献[38]中有关混合加密安全性的定理11和定理12,只需证明我们的对称全同态加密方案具有被动攻击下的不可区分安全性,便可证明混合加密方案,即本文构造的VMK-HDEM的数据隐私是CPA安全的.
在给出具体的安全性证明之前,我们先给出2个困难问题$ \mathrm{A}\mathrm{G}\mathrm{C}\mathrm{D}\mathrm{和}\rm D{\text{-}}AGCD $的定义.
定义4. 近似最大公约数问题($ \mathrm{A}\mathrm{G}\mathrm{C}\mathrm{D} $问题). $ \left(\rho ,\eta ,\gamma \right)- $近似最大公约数问题是指:对于一个$ \eta $比特的素数$ u $,和一个$ \gamma $比特的整数$ M=u\cdot {q}_{0} $,其中$ {q}_{0} $是在$ \mathbb{Z}\cap [0,{2}^{\gamma }/u) $ 中的随机整数. 给出多项式个数的样本$ D\gamma ,\rho \left(u\right) := \{\mathrm{选}\mathrm{择}q\leftarrow Z,r\leftarrow \mathbb{Z}\cap ({\mathrm{0,2}}^{\rho }),\mathrm{输}\mathrm{出}x=q\cdot u+r({\rm mod}\;M\left)\right\} $,求$ u $.
定义5. 判定性的近似最大公约数问题. (D-$ \mathrm{A}\mathrm{G}\mathrm{C}\mathrm{D} $问题). $ \left(\rho ,\eta ,\gamma \right)- $判定性的近似最大公约数问题是指:对于一个$ \eta $比特的素数$ u $和一个$ \gamma $比特的整数$ M=u\cdot {q}_{0} $,以及多项式数量样本$ D\gamma ,\rho \left(u\right) $,判断$ z= x+r'\cdot b\left({\rm mod}\;M\right) $中的$ b $,$ b\in \left\{\mathrm{0,1}\right\} $且$ x\leftarrow D\left(u\right)\mathrm{且}r'\leftarrow Z $.
下面,我们给出VMK-HDEM方案的数据隐私安全性定理.
定理3. 数据隐私. 假设$ {\mathcal{A}}_{\rm dp}^{\rm VMK{\text -}HDEM} $是一个概率多项式时间的敌手,且能够以不可忽略的优势概率$ {\varepsilon' } $攻破VMK-HDEM方案中对称全同态加密算法在被动攻击下的不可区分安全性. 那么存在一个模拟者$ B $,可以通过与敌手$ {\mathcal{A}}_{\rm dp}^{\rm VMK{\text -}HDEM} $的交互,以不可忽略的优势概率$ {\epsilon }_{\rm D{\text -}AGCD} $解决 D-AGCD困难问题,即
$ {\varepsilon }_{\rm D{\text -}AGCD}\ge {\varepsilon' }. $
证明. 我们首先给定一个诚实数据拥有者$ {S en}_{{i'}} $和其输入数据$ \{{m}_{{i'},l} \}\left({i'}\in ID;l=\mathrm{1,2},… ,L\right) $,$ {S en}_{{i'}} $上传它的密文输入数据给云服务器$ S ER $进行隐私保护的外包函数计算,再假定存在一个概率多项式时间能力的敌手$ {\mathcal{A}}_{\rm dp}^{\rm VMK{\text -}HDEM} $能以不可忽略的优势概率成功攻破VMK-HDEM方案中加密数据部分的对称全同态加密算法在被动攻击下的不可区分安全性,我们进而证明存在一个多项式时间的模拟者$ B $能够通过下述实验$ DP{\text -}CP{A}_{{\mathcal{A}}_{\rm dp}^{\rm VMK{\text -}HDEM}}\left(\lambda \right) $利用$ {\mathcal{A}}_{\rm dp}^{\rm VMK{\text -}HDEM} $的能力解决D-$ \mathrm{A}\mathrm{G}\mathrm{C}\mathrm{D} $问题.
1)初始化阶段. 系统运行$ {V}{M}{K}{\text -}{H}{D}{E}{M}. S etup({1}^{\lambda }) $算法,为$ S ER $,$ CS P $和$ REC $各生成一对公私钥$ \big({{pk}}_{PKE,S ER}, {{sk}}_{PKE,S ER}\big),\big({{pk}}_{PKE,CS P},{{sk}}_{PKE,CS P}\big), $$ \left({{pk}}_{PKE,REC},{{sk}}_{PKE,REC}\right). $并输出公开参数$ PPR=({\mathrm{\lambda },{pk}}_{PKE,S ER},{{pk}}_{PKE,CS P},{{pk}}_{PKE,REC},ID, T) $. 然后系统运行$ {V}{M}{K}{\text -}{H}{D}{E}{M}. KeyGen\left(PPR\right) $算法输出数据拥有者$ S e{n}_{i} $的临时公私钥$ {pbk}_{i}=\left({T}_{i},{\{q}_{i,l}\}\right),{pvk}_{i}= \left(\{{p}_{i,l}\},{s}_{i},{N}_{i}\right) $和$ CS P $的临时公私钥$ pb{k}_{CS P}=T, pv{k}_{CS P}= ({\{p}_{l}\},{\{q}_{l}\},s,N) $. 模拟者$ B $将$ (PPR,{\{pbk}_{i}\},pb{k}_{CS P}) $返回给敌手$ {\mathcal{A}}_{\rm dp}^{\rm VMK{\text -}HDEM} $.
2)查询腐化谕言机$ {O}^{\rm Cor} $. 定义初始腐化集合$ {L}_{\rm corr}=\varnothing $,敌手$ {\mathcal{A}}_{\rm dp}^{\rm VMK{\text -}HDEM} $可以俘获除诚实数据拥有者$ S e{n}_{{i'}} $以外的数据拥有者$ S e{n}_{j}(j=\mathrm{1,2},… ,{n}_{s} $且$ j\ne {i'}) $、授权接收方以及云服务器SER和密码服务提供商CSP中的一个. 敌手$ {\mathcal{A}}_{\rm dp}^{\rm VMK{\text -}HDEM} $可以利用$ {O}^{\rm Cor} $查询$ {O}^{\rm Cor}\left(j\right) $,$ {O}^{\rm Cor} $返回对应被腐化的数据拥有者的私钥$ {pvk}_{j}= \left(\{{p}_{j,l}\},{s}_{j},{N}_{j}\right) $给敌手,且模拟者$ B $更新$ {L}_{\rm corr}\leftarrow {L}_{\rm corr}\cup j $;$ {\mathcal{A}}_{\rm dp}^{\rm VMK{\text -}HDEM} $还可以查询$ {O}^{\rm Cor}\left(S ER\right) $,$ {O}^{\rm Cor} $返回$ {sk}_{PKE,S ER} $;$ {\mathcal{A}}_{\rm dp}^{\rm VMK{\text -}HDEM} $查询$ {O}^{\rm Cor}\left(CS P\right) $,$ {O}^{\rm Cor} $返回$ {(sk}_{PKE,CS P},pv{k}_{CS P}) $,其中$ pv{k}_{CS P}=({\{p}_{l}\},{\{q}_{l}\},s,N) $;$ {\mathcal{A}}_{\rm dp}^{\rm VMK{\text -}HDEM} $查询$ {O}^{\rm Cor}\left(REC\right) $,$ {O}^{\rm Cor} $返回$ {sk}_{PKE,REC} $. 且模拟者$ B $相应地更新腐化集合.
3)挑战阶段. 敌手$ {\mathcal{A}}_{\rm dp}^{\rm VMK{\text -}HDEM} $选择一对挑战明文$ {\left(\right\{m}_{{i'},l,0}\},{\{m}_{{i'},l,1}\}\left)\right(l=\mathrm{1,2},… ,L) $,满足$ \left|{m}_{{i'},l,0}\right|=\left|{m}_{{i'},l,1}\right| $,将它们发送给模拟者$ B. B $随机选取$ b{\in }_{R}\left\{\mathrm{0,1}\right\} $然后计算
$ \begin{split} {C}_{{i'}}^{}= & {r}_{{i'},0} \left( \sum _{l=1}^{L}{{M}_{{i'},l}^{-1}}{M}_{{i'},l}{\left({m}_{{i'},l,b}+{k}_{{i'},l}{q}_{{i'},l}\right)}_{{p}_{{i'},l}} \right)+{r}_{{i'},1}{N}_{{i'}}{\rm mod}\;{T}_{{i'}} =\\& {q}_{{i'}}\cdot {u}_{{i'},h}+{\left({m}_{{i'},h,b}+{k}_{{i'},h}{q}_{{i'},h}\right)}_{{p}_{{i'},h}}{\rm mod}\;{T}_{{i'}},\end{split}$
其中$ {r}_{{i'},0},{r}_{{i'},1}\in {\left\{0,1\right\}}^{2\mathrm{\lambda }} $,$ {k}_{{i'},l}\in {\left\{{0,1}\right\}}^{{\lambda }} \subseteq \mathbb{Z}\cap \left({\mathrm{0,2}}^{\rho }\right)\left(\rho =\lambda \right) $,$ {N}_{{i'}} = {p}_{{i'},l}\cdot M_{{i'},l},{{M}_{{i'},l}^{-1}}{M}_{{i'},l}\equiv 1 ({\rm mod}\;{p}_{{i'},l} ), $且$ {q}_{{i'}}\in {\mathbb{Z}}_{{q}_{0,{i'}}},{q}_{0,{i'}}={T}_{{i'}}/{u}_{{i'}, h} $.
模拟者$ B $返回$ {C}_{{i'}}^{*}\leftarrow {C}_{{i'}}+{r''}b{\rm mod}\;{T}_{{i'}} $作为挑战密文返回给敌手$ {\mathcal{A}}_{\rm dp}^{\rm VMK{\text -}HDEM} $,其中$ {r''}{\in }_{R}{\mathbb{Z}}_{{T}_{{i}_{o}}} $. 敌手输出$ {b'}= \left\{\mathrm{0,1}\right\} $. 如果$ {b'} = b $,则敌手$ {\mathcal{A}}_{\rm dp}^{\rm VMK{\text -}HDEM} $在游戏$ DP{\text -} CP{A}_{{\mathcal{A}}_{\rm dp}^{\rm VMK{\text -}HDEM}}\left(\lambda \right) $中获胜,说明该方案的对称全同态加密算法部分在被动攻击下不具备不可区分性安全;反之敌手失败,则说明该方案的对称全同态加密算法部分在被动攻击下具备不可区分性安全.
从上述的模拟规约过程中我们可以观察到:当$ b=1 $并且$ {r''} $是在$ {\mathbb{Z}}_{{T}_{i}} $中服从均匀分布随机选取时,$ {C}_{{i'}}^{*} $在$ {\mathbb{Z}}_{{T}_{i}} $上服从均匀分布. 因此在这种情况下,模拟者$ B $解决困难问题D-$ \mathrm{A}\mathrm{G}\mathrm{C}\mathrm{D} $的优势概率是0,因为$ {C}_{{i'}}^{*} $没有泄露任何$ {m}_{{i'},l,b} $的任何信息,由此敌手$ {\mathcal{A}}_{\rm dp}^{\rm VMK{\text -}HDEM} $猜对$ b $的概率是$ 1/2 $. 相反地,当$ b=0 $时,$ {C}_{{i'}}^{*}={C}_{{i'}}^{} $,且$ {C}_{{i'}}^{*}\leftarrow $$ {D}_{\gamma ,\lambda }\left({u}_{i,h}\right) $,因此$ {C}_{{i'}}^{*} $与$ {m}_{{i'},l,b} $的密文是不可区分的.
因此,给定模拟者D-$ \mathrm{A}\mathrm{G}\mathrm{C}\mathrm{D} $困难问题实例,$ z= x+r'\cdot b\left({\rm mod}\;M\right) $,判断$ b\in \left\{\mathrm{0,1}\right\} $. 模拟者$ B $只需要令$ {C}_{{i'}}^{*}=z, {r''}=r',{C}_{{i'}}^{}=x $;将$ {C}_{{i'}}^{*} $作为挑战密文返回给敌手$ {\mathcal{A}}_{\rm dp}^{\rm VMK{\text -}HDEM} $. 若敌手$ {\mathcal{A}}_{\rm dp}^{\rm VMK{\text -}HDEM} $能够攻破VMK-HDEM方案中对称全同态加密算法在被动攻击下的不可区分安全性,则$ {\mathcal{A}}_{\rm dp}^{\rm VMK{\text -}HDEM} $输出的$ {b'}=b $,模拟者$ B $以$ {\mathcal{A}}_{\rm dp}^{\rm VMK{\text -}HDEM} $的输出$ {b'} $作为对D-$ \mathrm{A}\mathrm{G}\mathrm{C}\mathrm{D} $困难问题的解,即可得
        ${\varepsilon }_{\rm D{\text -}AGCD}\ge {\varepsilon' } $证毕.
定理4. 可验证性安全. 如果5.2节中$ {V}{M}{K}{\text -}{H}{D}{E}{M}. KeyGen $算法中定义的函数$ {F}_{{k}_{\rm pse}} $是一个伪随机函数,那么本文所构造VMK-HDEM方案的可验证性安全(不可伪造性)可抵抗在4.3.2节中定义的概率多项式时间能力的敌手$ {\mathcal{A}}_{\rm ver}^{\rm VMK{\text -}HDEM} $发起的适应性选择消息攻击.
证明. 由Fiore [29] 等人给出的$ \rm Theorem3 $可知:如果函数$ F $是一个伪随机函数,那么其在文献[29]中给出的多密钥同态消息认证码对于概率多项式实践能力的敌手发起的适应性选择消息攻击具有可验证性安全(不可伪造性). 而在本文构造的$ \rm {V}{M}{K}{\text -}{H}{D}{E}{M} $方案中,将文献[29]给出的多密钥同态消息认证码技术在对应的密文域上实现,使得所构造的$\rm {V}{M}{K}{\text -}{H}{D}{E}{M} $方案在恶意敌手模型下保护数据隐私的同时可实现对云服务器密文计算结果的正确性验证. 由此,定理4可由文献[29]的$\rm Theorem3 $中的结论直接得证. 证毕.
1)LWPPGS方案的数据隐私安全. 由于LWPPGS方案的数据隐私安全目标是基于VMK-HDEM方案的数据隐私安全模型构建的,因此当VMK-HDEM方案的数据隐私能实现CPA安全时,LWPPGS方案的数据隐私也能实现CPA安全.
2)LWPPGS方案的可验证性安全. 由于LWPPGS方案的可验证性安全目标基于VMK-HDEM方案的可验证性安全模型构建的,因此当VMK-HDEM方案的可验证性安全可抵抗4.3.2节中定义的概率多项式时间能力的敌手$ {\mathcal{A}}_{\rm ver}^{\rm VMK{\text -}HDEM} $发起的适应性选择消息攻击时,LWPPGS方案也可获得相应的可验证性安全.
本节对VMK-HDEM与基于公钥全同态加密Brakerski’s FHE[20]的López-Alt多用户安全外包计算方案[2],在计算开销和通信开销等方面进行了对比分析,表明了以VMK-HDEM作为密码原语构造的多用户可验证隐私保护基因序列分析方案的高效性与实用性.
我们使用MIRACL库[39],在搭载2.6 GHz处理器和4 GB RAM的Linux平台上运行以研究方案性能. 我们设置安全参数$ \lambda = $128. 在$ \rm {V}{M}{K}{\text -}{H}{D}{E}{M} $方案和轻量级高效可验证隐私保护基因序列分析方案中,我们使用消息空间在$ {\left\{\mathrm{0,1}\right\}}^{2\lambda } $上具有CPA安全的ElGamal来实例化PKE. 在对比方案López-Alt方案[2]使用的Brakerski的公钥全同态加密算法[3]中,我们设置$ \left|{q}_{\rm B}\right|= 512,|{p}_{\rm B}|= 4\;096 $.
我们首先统计了López-Alt方案[2]和VMK-HDEM方案分别在数据拥有者端$ SEN $、云服务器$ S ER $端和接收方$ REC $端的关于数据隐私保护和可验证性的计算开销和通信开销. 表4和表5分别是López-Alt方案[2]和VMK-HDEM方案的计算开销对比表和通信开销对比表.
表4和表5中$ L $是函数输入实例个数,$ {n}_{s} $是数据拥有者个数, $ {n}_{i} $是数据拥有者$ S e{n}_{i} $的数据集大小,$ {{d}{e}{g}}_{{F}} $是多项式$ F $的次数. 下面我们具体分析López-Alt方案[2]和VMK-HDEM方案中不同参与方的开销.
假定每个数据拥有者$ S e{n}_{i}\left(i=\mathrm{1,2},… ,{n}_{s}\right) $的数据集大小为$ {n}_{i} $,最好的情况是在每个外包函数计算实例中,$ S e{n}_{i} $只需提供其数据集中的1个输入数据,且$ S e{n}_{i} $可提供$ L $个输入数据作为$ L $次打包函数计算的输入. 而最坏情况下,每一次函数运算都需要$ S e{n}_{i} $输入其数据集中的全部数据作为外包函数计算的输入并批量打包进行$ L $次函数计算,此时本文VMK-HDEM方案中数据拥有者的公钥加密算法PKE使用次数复杂度为$ O\left(L\right) $;而López-Alt的方案[2]的公钥加密使用次数复杂度是$ O\left({n}_{i}\cdot L\right) $. 这是因为本文的VMK-HDEM方案基于混合加密,数据拥有者可在离线阶段用公钥加密算法加密临时对称密钥,用全同态对称加密算法加密数据,因此公钥加密的使用次数复杂度与数据拥有者$ S e{n}_{i} $的数据集大小$ {n}_{i} $无关;而López-Alt方案[2]中,每一次函数运算中数据拥有者需要对其数据集中的每一个数据进行Brakerski’s公钥全同态加密,因此其公钥加密的使用次数复杂度为$ O\left({n}_{i}\cdot L\right) $. 显见,VMK-HDEM方案在数据拥有者端的计算复杂度显著降低. 如图3所示,横坐标是数据集的大小$ {n}_{i} $,纵坐标是数据拥有者的公钥加密计算开销,在最坏情况下,随着数据集大小$ {n}_{i} $的增长,VMK-HDEM方案中$ S e{n}_{i} $的公钥加密的计算开销基本保持不变,而López-Alt 方案[2]中$ S e{n}_{i} $的公钥加密计算开销迅速增加.
在VMK-HDEM方案中,云服务器SER的计算开销为$ {O}\left({n}_{s}+{K}{{d}{e}{g}}_{{F}}\right) $,远小于López-Alt 方案[2]中的$ {O}\left({n}_{s}+{K}{2}^{{{d}{e}{g}}_{{F}}}\right) $.因为VMK-HDEM方案中,云服务器SER为了在密文域上计算外包函数,除了运行$ {n}_{s} $次乘法盲化外,只需要进行$ {K}\cdot ({{d}{e}{g}}_{{F}}-1) $次乘法运算;而López-Alt的方案[2]在最坏的情况下,即多项式$ F $的每个乘积项$ {Item}_{j}(j=\mathrm{1,2},… ,K) $的次数都为$ {{d}{e}{g}}_{{F}} $,需要$ {n}_{s} $次乘法盲化和$ {K}{\cdot 2}^{{{d}{e}{g}}_{{F}}} $次乘法运算来完成密文域上函数计算. 如图4所示,横坐标是$ S e{n}_{i} $加密的数据实例个数$ L $,纵坐标是云服务器的计算开销,当多元多项式的项数K和阶$ {{d}{e}{g}}_{{F}} $增大时,VMK-HDEM方案中云服务器$ S ER $的计算开销的增长幅度明显小于López-Alt 方案[2]中的增长幅度.
在VMK-HDEM方案和López-Alt的方案[2]中,密码服务器提供商CSP的计算开销都是$ O\left({n}_{s}L\right) $(此处${n}_{s} $代表外包计算函数$ F $的变元个数),用于在函数计算时对$ F $的$ {n}_{s} $个输入数据进行重加密. 而对于接收方$ REC $,由于López-Alt的方案中使用Brakerski的公钥FHE[20],进行解密需要对大小为$ {2}^{{deg}_{F}} $的密文向量和私钥向量进行内积运算;而在VMK-HDEM中,接收方$ REC $的计算开销与外包函数$ F $的次数无关,其计算复杂度为$ O\left(1\right) $,大大低于López-Alt中所需的$ {O}\left({2}^{{{d}{e}{g}}_{{F}}}\right) $. 如图5所示, 横坐标是$ S e{n}_{i} $加密的数据实例个数$ L $,纵坐标是CSP和REC的计算开销,随着加密的数据实例个数L的增长,VMK-HDEM方案中REC的计算开销明显少于López-Alt方案中的计算开销;VMK-HDEM方案中CSP的计算开销也略少于López-Alt方案.
在VMK-HDEM方案中,数据拥有者$ S e{n}_{i} $可以对其在$ L $个函数输入实例中的消息$ {m}_{i,l}(l=\mathrm{1,2},… ,L) $进行打包生成一个打包后的密文$ {C}_{i} $,然后在密文$ {C}_{i} $上生成一个打包认证码$ {\mathrm{\sigma }}_{i} $,因此计算开销与其函数的输入实例个数$ L $无关,计算复杂度是$ O\left(1\right) $;而在López-Alt的方案[2]中,因无法对$ {m}_{i,l} $进行打包,所以需要生成$ L $个认证码$ {\sigma }_{i,l}\left(l=1,… ,L\right) $,计算复杂度应为$ O\left(L\right) $. 如图6所示,横坐标是$ S e{n}_{i} $加密的数据实例的个数$ L $,纵坐标为$ S e{n}_{i} $在可验证性上的计算开销,随着实例个数的增加,VMK-HDEM方案的数据拥有者的可验证性的计算开销基本不变,而López-Alt方案中的开销在不断增加.
对于云服务器$ S ER $而言,在VMK-HDEM方案中$ S e{n}_{i} $会对其$ L $个输入实例进行打包生成一个验证码$ {\mathrm{\sigma }}_{i}(i=\mathrm{1,2},… ,{n}_{s}) $,因此$ S ER $只需要将$ {\mathrm{\sigma }}_{i} $代入外包计算函数$ F $中进行一次函数计算,生成一个计算结果正确性的证据$ \sigma $,计算复杂度是$ O\left({K}{{d}{e}{g}}_{{F}}\right) $;而在López-Alt的方案[2]中,因无法对$ {m}_{i,l} $进行打包,所以计算复杂度应为$ O(L\cdot {K}{{d}{e}{g}}_{{F}}) $. 如图7所示,横坐标是$ S e{n}_{i} $加密的数据实例个数$ L $,纵坐标是$ S ER $的可验证性的计算开销,随着实例个数的增加,VMK-HDEM方案中$ S ER $的可验证性计算开销基本不变,而López-Alt的方案[2]中开销在不断增加.
对于接收方$ REC $而言,由于VMK-HDEM方案中,云服务器$ S ER $对$ L $个输入实例的函数计算结果批量生成一个唯一的用于计算结果正确性验证的证据$ {\mathrm{\sigma }}_{} $,因此$ REC $只需对此证据进行1次验证就能表明$ L $个函数计算结果的正确性,计算复杂度是$ O\left({K}{{d}{e}{g}}_{{F}}\right) $;相对地,López-Alt方案中接收方$ REC $的计算复杂度是$ O\left(L\cdot {K}{{d}{e}{g}}_{{F}}\right) $.
如图8所示,横坐标是$ S e{n}_{i} $加密的数据实例个数$ L $,纵坐标是$ REC $的可验证性的计算开销,随着实例个数的增加,VMK-HDEM方案中$ REC $的可验证性计算开销基本不变,而López-Alt的方案[2]中验证的计算开销基本呈线性增长.
在本文提出的VMK-HDEM方案中,当$ S e{n}_{i}(i=1, 2,… ,{n}_{s}) $加密的输入数据实例个数为$ L $时,云服务器$ S ER $和接收方REC的通信复杂度分别为$ O({n}_{s}\cdot L) $和$ O\left(1\right) $;但在基于Brakerski公钥FHE[20]的López-Alt的方案[2]中,由于云服务器每在密文域上执行1次乘法运算,其密文大小就将扩张1倍,所以其云服务器$ S ER $和接收方REC的通信复杂度分别为${O}\left( ({n}_{s}+{2}^{{deg}_{F}})\cdot L\right) $和$ {O}\left({2}^{{deg}_{F}}\right) $. 如图9所示,横坐标为多元多项式的阶数$ {deg}_{F} $,纵坐标为云服务器$ S ER $和接收方$ REC $的通信开销. 随着多元多项式阶数的增加,VMK-HDEM方案中$ S ER $和$ REC $的通信开销基本不变,而López-Alt的方案[2]中的通信开销随之迅速增加.
当$ S e{n}_{i}\left(i=1,… ,{n}_{s}\right) $加密的输入数据实例个数为$ L $时, 在VMK-HDEM方案中,由$ {V}{M}{K}{\text -}{H}{D}{E}{M}. KeyGen $算法可知,数据拥有者$ S e{n}_{i} $的通信开销复杂度是$ O\left(L\right) $;而López-Alt的方案[2]中$ S e{n}_{i} $的通信开销也是$ O\left(L\right) $. 但在VMK-HDEM方案中,数据拥有者仅需向云服务器上传$ {L}/{2} $个加密对称密钥的公钥加密算法PKE的密文;而在López-Alt的方案[2]中,数据拥有者需要上传$ L $个输入数据的公钥全同态加密密文. 如图10所示,横坐标是$ S e{n}_{i} $的加密的数据实例个数$ L $,纵坐标是数据拥有者的通信开销, VMK-HDEM方案中数据拥有者的通信开销小于López-Alt的方案中的开销.
在VMK-HDEM方案中,假设数据拥有者$ S e{n}_{i} $有$ L $个输入实例$ {m}_{i,l}(l=\mathrm{1,2},… ,L) $,由7.1.2小节中的分析可知,VMK-HDEM方案中$ S e{n}_{i} $只生成1个验证码$ {\mathrm{\sigma }}_{i} $,而López-Alt的方案[2]需要生成$ L $个认证码. 因此VMK-HDEM方案中,数据拥有者的有关验证性的通信复杂度是$ O\left(1\right) $, López-Alt的方案是$ O\left(L\right) $. 如图11所示,横坐标是数据拥有者加密的数据实例个数$ L $,纵坐标是数据拥有者的通信开销,随着实例个数的增加,VMK-HDEM方案中数据拥有者可验证性的通信开销基本不变,而López-Alt的方案中的开销随之增加.
由7.1.2节的分析可知,在VMK-HDEM方案中,云服务器$ S ER $会对$ L $个计算结果正确性的证据进行打包生成一个证据$ \sigma $,并将其发送给接收方REC;而López-Alt的方案[2]中,云服务器会计算生成$ L $个计算结果正确性的证据并将其发送给接收方REC. 因此VMK-HDEM方案中云服务器和接收方有关验证性的通信复杂度都为$ O({{deg}}_{F}) $;而López-Alt的方案中云服务器和接受方有关验证性的通信复杂度都为$ O({{deg}}_{F}\cdot L) $. 如图12所示,横坐标为$ S e{n}_{i} $加密的数据实例个数$ L $,纵坐标为云服务器和接收方的可验证性的通信开销. 当$ {deg}_{F}=10 $时,随着实例个数的增加,VMK-HDEM方案中接收方REC和云服务器SER的可验证性通信开销基本不变,而López-Alt的方案[2]中的开销随之增加.
本文提出了一种高效可验证的多密钥同态数据封装机制VMK-HDEM,并基于该新型密码原语设计了一个轻量级的多用户可验证隐私保护基因序列分析协议LWPPGS. 通过减少公钥加密使用次数,对数据拥有者的数据进行批量加密;支持对多个函数输入实例在密文域上进行批量函数计算和批量生成计算结果正确性验证证据. 最后,安全性分析和实验仿真表明在保护用户基因数据隐私和基因序列分析结果隐私的前提下,所构造的方案能准确、高效地完成基因序列分析并验证其正确性.
作者贡献声明:胡云舒提出可验证的多密钥同态数据封装机制VMK-HDEM的算法思路和实验方案并撰写论文;周俊提出可验证隐私保护基因序列分析方案LWPPGS的算法思路和实验方案;曹珍富对本文的密码方案给出总体设计思路和框架;董晓蕾提出指导意见并修改论文.

参考文献 引证文献
排序方式:
1
Kantarcioglu M, Jiang W, Liu Y, et al. A cryptographic approach to securely share and uery genomic sequences[C]//Proc of the 2008 IEEE Transactions Information Technol. Piscataway, NJ: IEEE, 2008: 606–617
2
López-Alt A, Tromer E, Vaikuntanathan V. On-the-fly multiparty computation on the cloud via multikey fully homomorphic encryption[C]//Proc of the 44th annual ACM Symp on Theory of Computing. New York: ACM, 2012: 1219–1234
3
Brakerski Z, Vaikuntanathan V. Fully homomorphic encryption from ring-LWE and security for key dependent messages[C]//Advances in Cryptology—CRYPTO 2011(Lecture Notes in Computer Science). Berlin: Springer, 2011: 505–524
4
Chen H, Dai W, Kim M, et al. Efficient multi-key homomorphic encryption with packed ciphertexts with application to oblivious neural network inference[C]//Proc of the 2019 ACM SIGSAC Conf on Computer and Communications Security. New York: ACM, 2019: 395–412
5
Cheno J H, Kim A, Kim M, et al. Homomorphic encryption for arithmetic of approximate numbers[C]//Advances in Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2017. Cham: Springer, 2017: 409–437
6
Coron J S, Lepoint J, Tibouchi M. ScaleInvariant fully homomorphic encryption over the integers[C]//Advances in Cryptology-EUROCRYPT 2010. Berlin: Springer, 2014: 311–328
7
Cheon J H, Kim J, Lee M S, et al, CRT-based fully homomorphic encryption over the integers[J]. Information Sciences, 2015, 310: 149−162
8
Micciancio D, Vaikuntanathan V. SoK: Learning with errors, circular security, and fully homomorphic encryption[C]//Proc of Public-Key Cryptography – PKC 2024. Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland, 2024: 291−321
9
Zhou Jun, Kim-Kwang R C, Cao Zhenfu, et al. PVOPM: Verifiable privacy-preserving pattern matching with efficient outsourcing in the malicious setting[C]//Proc of the 2021 IEEE Transactions Dependable Secure Computing. Piscataway, NJ: IEEE, 2021: 2253−2270
10
曹珍富,董晓蕾,周俊,等. 大数据安全与隐私保护研究进展[J]. 计算机研究与发展,2016,53(10):2137−2151
Cao Zhenfu, Dong Xiaolei, Zhou Jun, et al. Research advances on big data security and privacy preserving[J]. Journal of Computer Research and Development, 2016, 53(10): 2137−2151 (in Chinese)
11
Chen Jing, Chen Zhiping, Kuang Linai, et al. Security count query and integrity verification based on encrypted genomic data[C]//Proc of the 9th Int Conf on Computer Engineering and Networks. Berlin: Springer, 2021: 647−654
12
Hasan M Z, Mahdi M S R, Sadat M N, et al. Secure count query on encrypted genomic data[J]. Journal of Biomedical Informatics, 2018, 81: 41−52
13
Choi S G, Katz J, Kumaresan R, et al. Multi-client non-interactive verifiable computation[C]//Proc of Theory of Cryptography. Berlin: Springer, 2013: 499−518
14
冯帅,邓伦治. 基于身份的隐私保护数据审计方案[J]. 贵州师范大学学报:自然科学版,2023,41(2):105–112
Feng Shuai, Deng Lunzhi. Identity-based data auditing scheme with privacy protection[J]. Journal of Guizhou Normal University (Natural Sciences), 2023, 41(2): 105–112
15
Rivest R L, Adleman L, Dertouzos M L. On data banks and privacy homomorphisms[C]. Foundations of Secure Computation, New York: Academia Press, 1978: 169−179
16
Kwak H, Min S, Song Y. Towards practical multi-key TFHE: Parallelizable, key-compatible, quasi-linear complexity[C]//Proc of Public-Key Cryptography – PKC 2024. Cham: Springer, 2024: 354−385
17
彭长根,何兴,谭伟杰等. 人工智能算法安全研究现状与对策[J]. 贵州师范大学学报:自然科学版,2022,40(6):1−16
Peng Changgen, He Xin, Tan Weijie, et al. Research status and countermeasures of artificial intelligence algorithm security[J]. Journal of Guizhou Normal University (Natural Sciences), 2022, 40(6): 1−16
18
Gentry C. Fully homomorphic encryption using ideal lattices[C]//Proc of the 41st Annual ACM Symp on Theory of Computing. New York: ACM, 2009: 169−178
19
Dijk M V, Gentry C, Halevi S, et al. Fully homomorphic encryption over the integers[J]. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2010, 2009(4): 24−43
20
Brakerski Z, Vaikuntanathan V. Efficient fully homomorphic encryption from (standard) LWE[C]//Proc of IEEE 52nd Annual Symp on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS2011). Piscataway, NJ: IEEE, 2011: 97−106
21
Brakerski Z, Gentry C, Vaikuntanathan V. (Leveled) Fully homomorphic encryption without bootstrapping[C]//Proc of the 3rd Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conf (ITCS’12). New York: ACM, 2012: 309–325
22
Gentry C, Sahai A, Waters B. Homomorphic encryption from learning with errors: Conceptually-simpler, asymptotically-faster, attribute-based[C]//Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2013. Berlin: Springer, 2013: 75−92
23
Lee Y, Micciancio D, Kim A, et al. Efficient FHEW bootstrapping with small evaluation keys, and applications to threshold homomorphic encryption[C]//Proc of EUROCRYPT 2023. Berlin: Springer, 2023: 227−256
24
Liu Fenghao, Wang Han. Batch bootstrapping I: - A new framework for SIMD bootstrapping in polynomial modulus[C]//Proc of EUROCRYPT 2023. Berlin: Springer, 2023: 321−352
25
Zhou Jun, Cao Zhenfu, Qin Zhan, et al. LPPA: Lightweight privacy-preserving authentication from efficient multi-key secure outsourced computation for location-based services in VANETs[J]. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, 2020, 15: 420−434
26
Gennaro R, Gentry C, Parno B. Non-interactive verifiable computing: Outsourcing computation to untrusted workers[C]//Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2010. Berlin: Springer, 2010: 465−482
27
Chung K M, Kalai Y, and Vadhan S. Improved delegation of computation using fully homomorphic encryption[C]//Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2010. Berlin: Springer, 2010: 483−501
28
Parno B, Raykova M, Vaikuntanathan V. How to delegate and verify in public: Verifiable computation from attribute-based encryption[C]//Proc of Theory of Cryptography. Berlin: Springer, 2012: 422–439
29
Papamanthou C, Shi E, Tamassia R. Signatures of correct computation[C]//Proc of Theory of Cryptography. Berlin: Springer, 2013: 222–242
30
Choi S G, Katz J, Kumaresan R. et al. Multi-client noninteractive verifiable computation[C]//Proc of Theory of Cryptography. Berlin: Springer, 2013: 499–518
31
Baum C, Orsini E, Scholl P, et al. Efficient constant-round MPC with identifiable abort and public verifiability[C]//Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2020. Berlin: Springer, 2020: 562−592
32
Zhang Liangfeng, Wang Huaxiong. Multi-server verifiable computation of low-degree polynomials[C]//Proc of IEEE Symp on Security and Privacy (SP). Piscataway, NJ: IEEE, 2022: 596−613
33
Chen Xin, Zhang Liangfeng, Publicly Verifiable homomorphic secret sharing for polynomial evaluation[J]. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, 2023, 18: 4609−4624
34
Gordon S D, Katz J, Liu F H, et al. Multi-client verifiable computation with stronger security guarantees[C]//Proc of Theory of Cryptography. Berlin: Springer, 2015: 144–168
35
Manulis M, Nguyen J. Fully homomorphic encryption beyond IND-CCA1 security: Integrity through verifiability[C]//Advances in Cryptology-EUROCRYPT 2024. Cham: Springer, 2024: 63−93
36
Jing Liu, Liang Fengzhang. Privay-preserving and publicly verifiable matrix multiplication[J]. IEEE Transaction on Service Computing, 2013, 16(3): 2059−2071
37
Fiore D, Mitrokotsa A, Nizzardo L, et al. Multikey homomorphic authenticators[C]//Advances in Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2016. Berlin: Springer, 2016: 499−530
38
Katz J, Lindell Y. Introduction to Modern Cryptography, Second Edition[M]. Boca Raton FL, USA: CRC Press, 2014
39
Multiprecision integer and rational arithmetic c/c++ library[OL]. http://www.shamus.ie/
2024年第61卷第10期
81
41
0
引用本文
BibTeX
文章信息
doi: 10.7544/issn1000-1239.202440453
  • 接收时间:2024-06-05
  • 首发时间:2026-11-17
  • 出版时间:2024-10-01
补充材料
相关文章
文章信息
作者
出版历史
  • 收稿日期:2024-06-05
  • 修回日期:2024-07-17
基金
作者信息
    华东师范大学软件工程学院 密码与网络安全系 上海 200062

通讯作者:

参考文献
分享链接
https://castjournals.cast.org.cn/joweb/jsjyjyfz/CN/10.7544/issn1000-1239.202440453
分享至
全文二维码

扫描看全文

引用本文
BibTeX
本文的引用情况
2种不同金属材料的力学参数
科
Family
属数
Number of
genus
种数
Number of
species
占总种数比例
Percentage of
total species (%)
属
Genus
种数
Number of
species
占总种数比例
Percentage of total
species (%)
鹅膏菌科Amanitaceae 2 11 5.26 鹅膏菌属 Amanita 10 4.78
小菇科 Mycenaceae 2 12 5.74 丝盖伞属 Inocybe 5 2.39
多孔菌科 Polyporaceae 8 14 6.70 蜡蘑属 Laccaria 5 2.39
红菇科 Russulaceae 3 23 11.00 小皮伞属 Marasmius 6 2.87
小菇属 Mycena 11 5.26
光柄菇属 Pluteus 5 2.39
红菇属 Russula 17 8.13
栓菌属 Trametes 5 2.39
关闭全屏